

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

SEMPER FIDELIS



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THE SEARCH THAT NEVER ENDS



IN THE industrial life of America, research has been of constantly increasing importance. And today it is a national resource, for the research of industrial and college laboratories is proving its value in War.

To the Bell System, research is an old idea, for the telephone itself was born in a laboratory. Behind its invention, sixty-nine years ago, were researches in electricity and acoustics and in speech and hearing.

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Their fields of inquiry have broadened and deepened through these years; they inquire into all the sciences and engineering arts which have any promise of improving the telephone. Much has been learned but still more will be, because their search goes on. That is why the telephone laboratory grew to be Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated, the largest

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Improvements in industry can be left to chance in the hope that some one, sometime, will think of something useful; that some good invention will turn up.

The other way to make improvements is to organize so that new knowledge shall always be coming from researches in the fundamental sciences and engineering arts on which the business is based. From that steady stream will arise inventions and new methods, new materials and improved products.

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At present—and this started before Pearl Harbor—its trained scientists and engineers and all their skilled associates are concentrating on products of importance to our armed forces. But when this work is happily over they will be ready to continue their developments for the needs of peace.



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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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
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A class of women Marines learns to receive and transcribe a message tapped out by their instructor.



Having learned to receive, a student practices sending a message.



A group of Marines gather about while one demonstrates the operation of this radio direction finder.

WOMEN MARINES STUDY RADIO AT UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN



These women Marines are getting practical experience by communicating with a detachment at the University of Chicago.



A student operates the transmitter of the school's radio station.



What makes the instrument tick is here investigated by a group of student Marines.





Hail and Farewell

By Captain Garrett Graham, USMCR

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox shakes hands with the new Commandant, Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, as the retiring Commandant, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, looks on approvingly.

WITH confidence in the future as great as its pride in the past, the United States Marine Corps greets the new year and a new Commandant as it extends an affectionate farewell to the man who has guided its destinies during the most eventful period of its long and glamorous history.

The dawn of 1944 sees Lieutenant General Holcomb voluntarily stepping down to make way for his successor Lieutenant General Vandegrift, for whom he manifests the greatest respect. In the 168 years the Marine Corps has been in existence no other Marines have held this rank, and no other Commandants have been charged with such staggering responsibility.

Never has the Marine Corps been so strong as it has grown under the Holcomb administration. Never has it faced such bitter and bloody fighting as surely lies ahead under Vandegrift's command.

The preëminent qualities of leadership which have marked the careers of these two men have been almost universally recognized both in and out of the service. The public reaction was probably best summed up in the following editorial which appeared in the *Washington Post* the day following the official announcement:

"It is the peculiar genius or good fortune of America to produce great leadership in times of crisis. The United States Marine Corps, which has borne so heavy and vital a burden in this war, appears to have been specially gifted on this score. We should be obliged to lament the retirement of Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb as Commandant of the Marine Corps were it not for the fact that he is to be succeeded by Lieutenant General Alexander Vandegrift. One can pay no higher compliment to either man than to say that he is the other's peer."

"The Marine Corps, rank and file together, numbered 16,000 men when General Holcomb assumed command seven years ago. He will turn over to General Vandegrift on January 1 an elite body 300,000 strong—strong not only in numbers but also in an indefinable and incomparable *esprit*. Tarawa is but the latest testimonial to how well the traditions and the indomitable spirit of the Marine Corps have accompanied its growth under General Holcomb's stewardship."

"The spirit of the Marines was imprinted upon Thomas Holcomb's character by forty-three years of service among them. In turn he conveyed it to those who served under him. To one of the graduating classes at Quantico he said:

'You will learn to be tough . . . tough in the best sense of the word. Tough does not mean the bully or the swaggering braggart. It means you will be men of courage and resolve . . . men of character and of training and discipline . . . men whose business it is to bring us victory.' The code is a worthy one for all our officers in every service. It has lately acquired reason for reemphasis.

"General Holcomb will retire at the end of this year by his own will, not because he is overage but because he has reached the age of retirement. He has enforced the retirement rule on others; therefore, as a matter of course, he enforces it upon himself. Happily he will be called to some other active duty. Like him, General Vandegrift has done all that he commanded others to do. At Guadalcanal, he earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for leading his men in their magnificent assault upon the Jap-held beaches. The luster of the Marine Corps will not tarnish in his care."

ALEXANDER ARCHER VANDEGRIFT was born in Charlottesville, Virginia, fifty-six years ago. He attended the University of Virginia for two years before deciding to emulate the military career of his grandfather, Carson Vandegrift, who was a captain with Longstreet in the Civil War and a veteran of Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. The grandfather was an almost idolatrous worshipper of Stonewall Jackson and instilled in the grandson a desire to follow, if he could, in that great general's footsteps.

Leaving the University of Virginia, young Vandegrift was coached at Swaely School in Washington and in 1909, at the age of twenty-two, he passed his examinations and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps.

One year later he married Mildred Strode of Lynchburg, Virginia. They have one son, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Archer Vandegrift, Jr., USMC, who recently concluded a tour of duty as an instructor in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico and has now been assigned to combat duty.

The senior Vandegrift, as a second lieutenant, went to Nicaragua in 1912 with the Marine Corps Expeditionary Battalion and in 1914 he took part in the occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico. In 1915, as a first lieutenant, he participated in operations against the *Cacos* in Northern Haiti. From 1916 to 1918, then again from 1919 to 1923, he served with the Haitian *gendarmerie*. In 1927 he was General Smedley D. Butler's Operations and Training Officer in Shanghai, China, and later that year accompanied this colorful Leatherneck to duty in Tientsin.

Returning from China in 1929, Vandegrift was assigned to the Budget Bureau in Washington. From 1933 to 1935 he was Assistant Chief of Staff—personnel officer—of the Fleet Marine Force at Quantico. He was sent back to China in August, 1935, as Executive Officer of the Marine detachment assigned to the American Embassy in Peiping. In April, 1936, he reached the rank of Colonel and succeeded Colonel P. M. Rexey in command of the detachment.

It is significant that the man who won America's first land victory in the present war against the Japanese had had an opportunity previously to study them at close range. While on duty at Shanghai his position was such that he was sup-

posed to be on friendly terms with a number of Japanese generals who were already busily engaged in their aggression against China. At this time he is reported to have come to the inescapable conclusion that the United States and Japan would ultimately collide headon because of the latter's growing arrogance.

In April, 1937, Colonel and Mrs. Vandegrift returned home by way of the Soviet Union traveling from Harbin to Moscow on the Trans-Siberian Express. What he saw on this trip confirmed his earlier impression that the geographical and military problems of Russia and the United States were greatly similar. At this time he had the foresight to realize that in the Second World War toward which the world was so inevitably heading, Russia would be fighting on our side as surely as we would be fighting Japan.

Vandegrift was on duty at Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington from June, 1937, to November, 1941, first as Secretary to the Commandant, the then Major General Holcomb, and later as Assistant Commandant with the rank of Brigadier General. In March, 1942, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and placed in command of the First Marine Division.

In the murky dawn of August 7, 1942, his hardy Leathernecks splashed ashore on the beaches of Guadalcanal and Tulagi and by the ferocious tenacity with which they fought through four long, bitter months, they firmly established their Commanding General in an enduring place in history.

THROUGH all these years of efficient, painstaking work, Vandegrift had kept himself much in the background. He made not the slightest attempt to publicize his accomplishments and like many other hard-working, efficient Marine officers, his name seldom appeared before the reading public. In fact, he appeared to be averse to publicity, but the record he was making was perfectly well-known to his fellow officers.

A recent book, *These Are The Generals*, contains an excellent biographical sketch by Leigh White who comments: "Archer Vandegrift has always shunned the limelight." White continues: "Vandegrift became a hero with very little assistance from either press or radio. He was almost never mentioned in news dispatches from Guadalcanal—perhaps because he held no press conferences during the campaign—and it was not until he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in Washington by President Roosevelt that his kindly, tight-lipped countenance became familiar to the American public. . . . It is precisely in his talent for self-effacement that Archer Vandegrift so closely resembles that other great Virginian, General Thomas J. Jackson. Nobody had ever heard of Stonewall Jackson, either, at the outbreak of the Civil War, and he, too, rose to fame without benefit of fanfare because of his surprising ability to win battles against seemingly hopeless odds. . . .

"Vandegrift is a living model of the southern gentleman of the old school. He is so polite and soft-spoken that he is continually disappointing the people whom he meets. They find him lacking in the fire-eating traits they like to expect of all Marines and they find it difficult to believe that such a mild-mannered man could really have led and won the bloody fight for Guadalcanal."

One of the officers who was there with him commented: "He is one of the most curious generals there ever was. He just can't wait to see what's going on. He believes in getting out in front with his men, and we had a hell of a time keeping him from getting shot by snipers."

When asked what, in his opinion, had held Guadalcanal against such terrific odds, Vandegrift answered: "It was the spirit of the Marines. If my men hadn't been willing to stick it out when all seemed lost, we'd never have been able to hold the island."

White continues, in his vignette of the new Commandant: "It is no longer a secret that many of our Army and Navy leaders thought Guadalcanal would end in disaster. Indeed, on many occasions there was no reason for thinking it could end in any other way."

"But the one man who seemed never to have worried about the final outcome is General Vandegrift. That he and his men were able to hold out when almost everyone else thought Guadalcanal was doomed is partly due to

Halsey's daring (Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.) and the willingness of McCain (Vice Admiral John S. McCain) to sacrifice his precious carriers. But the bulk of the credit must go to Vandegrift, the general to whom it never occurred that he could be defeated, and who was able to communicate that spirit to his troops. Therein lies the secret of his generalship."

This is the picture of Vandegrift of Guadalcanal, as others see him. Since that campaign the Marines have won an even harder and bloodier victory at Tarawa. Wake, Guam, the Philippines, and Japan itself lies ahead.

The Corps has no illusions about its part in these coming actions. Its function is to spearhead such attacks. It knows that each mile it moves toward Tokyo will be tougher and bloodier than the last. But it is ready. It is grimly confident of its training, equipment and personnel. To this is added the greater confidence of being led by a man who has thoroughly proved himself in the supreme test of battle.



Tarawa Airfield Named for Marine

THREE airfields on newly taken strategic atolls in the Gilbert Islands have been named, two of them in honor of two U. S. naval officers who were recently reported missing in action, and one for a Marine hero who went in ahead of the first assault wave and was killed in action on Betio Island.

They are:

Hawkins Field on Betio Island, Tarawa, in honor of First Lieutenant William Deane Hawkins, USMC, killed in action on Betio.

Mullinnix Field on Buota Island, Tarawa, in honor of Rear Admiral Henry Maston Mullinnix, U. S. Navy, who was aboard the USS *Liscome Bay*, lost as the result of submarine torpedoing in the Gilbert Islands area November 24, 1943.

O'Hare Field on Abemama, in honor of Lieutenant Commander Edward Henry O'Hare, U. S. Navy, announced missing in action November 26, 1943.

Lieutenant Hawkins went overseas as a sergeant and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the field on October 23, 1942, while serving on Guadalcanal. He was promoted to first lieutenant June 1, 1943. As a platoon leader, Lieutenant Hawkins continued to lead his men on Tarawa after being twice wounded. Robert Sherrod, correspondent for *Time* magazine, cabled: "The bravest man I have ever seen was Lieutenant William D. Hawkins, a Texas boy from El Paso who commanded a platoon."

"Hawkins had told me aboard ship that he would put his platoon of men up against any company of soldiers on earth and guarantee to win. He was slightly wounded by shrapnel as he came ashore in the first wave, but the furthest thing from his mind was to be evacuated. He led his platoon into the forest of coconut palms. During a day

and a half he personally cleaned out six Jap machine gun nests, sometimes standing on top of a half track and firing point blank at four or five men who fired back at him from behind blockhouses. Lieutenant Hawkins was wounded a second time, but he still refused to retire. To say that his conduct was worthy of the highest traditions of the Marine Corps is like saying the Empire State Building is moderately high."

Lieutenant Hawkins is the second Marine whose gallantry has been recognized during this war in the naming of an airfield wrested from the foe. Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named for Major Lofton R. Henderson, commanding officer of a Marine dive bomber squadron.

During the battle of Midway June 4, 1942, he dived his blazing plane, hit by antiaircraft fire, onto a Japanese aircraft carrier, perishing in the explosion. He received a posthumous award of the Navy Cross.

Before his most recent command in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Mullinnix was in command of the USS *Saratoga*, on which he previously had served in other capacities as a junior officer. For his service as Commander of a patrol wing of the Atlantic Fleet, he received a Letter of Commendation from the Secretary of the Navy.

The Congressional Medal of Honor was presented to Lieutenant Commander O'Hare by the President of the United States for conspicuous courage in single-handedly shooting down five enemy bombers and severely damaging a sixth when they were approaching for an attack on his carrier. This action took place February 20, 1942, when Lieutenant Commander O'Hare was section leader of Fighting Squadron Three. In the Battle of Wake Island, October 5-6, 1943, he personally accounted for one enemy plane, and was a member of a four-man team that shot down six additional planes.

Medal of Honor Winner Adds to Score

CAPTAIN JAMES E. SWETT, USMCR, holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor, recently shot down his 13th Japanese plane, a Zero, in a fight over Kahili air field on Bougainville Island.

Captain Swett was presented with the Congressional Medal of Honor on October 9, 1943 by Major General Ralph Mitchell, Commanding General of Marine Aviation in the South Pacific. He received it for having knocked down seven Japanese dive-bombers in one 15-minute dog-fight on April 7, 1943. He is now the leading ace on active duty in the South Pacific.

His most recent "kill" was made while flying with a group of Marine fighters who were scrap-hunting over the Kahili field. Captain Swett said that about 30 Zeros took off to meet them.

"We waited for them at 16,000 feet," he said, "and began diving on them when they got up to about 4,000." Captain Swett said he missed out on the first pass at the Japs, scoring only a few deflection hits on a Zero. "Then," he said, "it seemed that I couldn't see anything but Zeros at all. They were all over the sky. Clouds of them. And I could see none of my wingmen, although they were there."

"The Jap I got actually killed himself. He just flew right in front of my guns a few hundred yards away. I cut him from one end to the other."

Captain Swett enlisted in the Marine Corps on August 26, 1941, and received his wings on April 16, 1942 at the Naval Air Training Center, Corpus Christi, Texas. His parents are Mr. and Mrs. G. C. Swett of San Mateo, Calif.



Captain James E. Swett



"Hellhawks" Down 102 Planes

THE Hellhawks, Marine fighter squadron, has shot down 102 Japanese planes to become one of the leading aerial outfits in the South Pacific war zone. The squadron has recently returned to this country.

The Marine squadron ran its total up to 102 on October 11, when two of its pilots shot down four Zeros while escorting Marine bombers in the Bougainville area, Northern Solomons. In amassing its remarkable record, the squadron has lost but eight of its own pilots in combat for a better than 12-to-one average against the Japs.

On June 30, opening day of the New Georgia campaign, the Hellhawks shot down 20 enemy fighters in a single engagement over Rendova Island. The squadron intercepted a large Japanese bomber strike over Rendova on July 15, shooting down 10 of the bombers and six escorting Zeros. In another engagement, two days later, the Marines accounted for 14 Zeros. In all these scraps, the Hellhawks were heavily outnumbered by the enemy.

Three of the top-ranking pilots in this theater of war fly with the squadron. Leading man in the outfit is First Lieutenant Wilbur J. Thomas, whose 16½ officially accredited planes make him one of the war's high-ranking aces. His half credit is for a plane he shared with First Lieutenant Edward O. Shaw who has 13 planes in his record book. Captain James M. Cupp stands third among the Hellhawks with 12 victories.

Four other Marine aces, with at least five official enemy planes, won their spurs with the squadron. They include: First Lieutenant John L. Morgan, Jr., 8½ planes; Captain Sheldon O. Hall, six planes; First Lieutenant Milton N. Vedder, six planes, and Major Gregory J. Weissenberger, five planes.

Major Weissenberger is the outfit's former skipper, succeeding the late Major Wade H. Britt, Jr., who was killed in a crash last April. The Hellhawks are now commanded by Major Robert J. Anderson.

The Attack on Tarawa

Some Eye-Witness Accounts

(The following story was written by Sergeant Pete Zurinden, a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent.)

TARAWA, NOVEMBER 22.

WITH seven other Marines, I have been bobbing around in a Navy tank lighter for the past 48 hours, trying to reach Betio Beach, about 1,000 yards away, where several thousand other Leathernecks are engaged in one of the bitterest hand-to-hand combats the Pacific war theater—or any war theater—has ever witnessed.

My companions comprise a Marine Corps half-track crew. Their heavy artillery piece, mounted on a combination truck and tractor chassis, is needed badly ashore. We set out at dawn Saturday (November 20) under orders to strike Betio Beach only 26 minutes after the first infantry assault wave, but the stubborn Japs have held us at bay for two days.

Since dawn yesterday things have been rather quiet, but the first 24 hours of our delayed shoreward excursion were one continuous nightmare. As I write, we are waiting to be towed over spiky coral—our goal definitely in sight at last.

We were barely 50 yards away from our mother transport, starting the treacherous eight mile drive to the beach, when a heavy Jap naval shell whistled over our bow, exploding with a shattering blast just under the prow of our trooper ship. For three of us, First Lieutenant Herbert A. Robinson, Pfc. Thomas McCane Cantlin, and myself, that shot was the first we ever had had to duck, but duck we did.

As the sky brightened, we had a ringside seat during the murderous bombing and shelling of Tarawa, the biggest Jap garrison in the Gilberts. Miles away we saw a continuous wall of fire flashing from the great battle-wagons of one of the largest task forces ever assembled. Overhead roared more carrier-based planes than we could count.

During the first hour Tarawa was a smoking hell. From one end of its two and one-half mile length to the other, great fires blazed brilliantly in the broad daylight and bombs threw debris hundreds of feet above the towering cocoanut palms that stud the atoll.

The first assault began about 0830. The Japs, with their terrifying 40 millimeter guns and slashing mortars, attempted to destroy the onrushing landing boats. But, undaunted, the little craft took full advantage of the tide,



This is the Tarawa beachhead the Marines took and held. The level island, where the highest point of ground is twelve feet high but the average is only six feet, is graphically shown.

TARAWA



← This is the communications post or "nerve center" of a Marine regiment on Tarawa.




↑ Leaders of the assault: Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson (seated front), Colonel Merritt A. Edson (standing with hands on hips), and Lieutenant Colonel David M. Shoup (center)



↑ Marines take a "break" beside an amphibian tractor but keep their rifles ready against possible counterattack.

↓ Two Marines man a machine gun amid the wreckage as a third lays aside his rifle to move up and assist them.



← While the battle is still in its early stages, the Stars and Stripes are raised on a flagpole improvised from a palm tree with its upper branches shot away.

A Japanese command post on Tarawa protected by six-foot walls of reinforced concrete. This stronghold withstood direct hits from 16-inch naval guns.






↑ A squad leader signals for an advance against Japanese snipers.



↑ Marines advance as black smoke rises from an oil dump set afire by a direct hit from destroyers offshore.



↑ Marines charge a hill past a Japanese dugout. Note trench in the foreground with other Marines ready to move forward.



↑ A pack howitzer goes into action. Note the Marine in the center wearing a helmet with two holes in it. He was wearing the helmet when a shell fragment went through it.



← As the smoke of battle clears, a Marine goes through the wreckage of a building in search of wounded among the dead.



Marines on Tarawa Island beach take their positions to attack the airport there.

charging through the tricky coral channel to spill hordes of Marines onto the beach promptly at the zero hour.

Two more infantry waves followed closely on the first, and since ours was the fifth assault wave, we moved into the tight landing craft rendezvous area to await our turn. Just as we lined up, one of the few remaining heavy shore batteries laid down a barrage that caused us to hug our armored bulkheads and mutter the first prayers that came to mind.

At first we thought the way was clear when we spurted forward to commence our own run, and we drove to within 500 yards of the beach before the Japs showed their hand. Then swishing mortar shells from every direction pounded the surf all around us. Two great blasts rattled shrapnel against our armor plate. The landing boats ahead were caught on a coral reef, blocking us off.

We zigzagged out of range while the Japs pounded the boats on all sides. All of us in the half-track huddled together in the tiny cockpit, thankful for the protection.

A FEW minutes later, I chanced a look around with my field glasses. I'll never forget the sight before me.

Some 500 yards off shore, after leaping and tumbling out of their boats, snagged on the reef, more than a hundred Marines were wading slowly toward the beach in neck-deep water, weapons high over their heads. Not a man, as far as I could see, attempted to seek shelter in any of the boats. I shouted something and Corporal Clyde E. Legg screamed: "They haven't got a chance. Those Japs on the beach are giving them hell!"

All around the beleaguered Marines, Jap mortar and machine gun fire whipped the water white. Red-haired Private Joseph E. Lewis, Jr. started yelling, "Can't we get 'em?" But that was out of the question.

I watched the infantrymen slough grimly forward, some disappearing beneath the water every few yards. Many Marines were assisting buddies and all of them were having a hard time of it. Finally I saw a cluster of them flounder ashore and plunge to the beach. The distance was far too great to determine how many had survived the murderous fire.

Told to hit another beach, our wave swung to the east

and charged inland again. It was the same thing all over. Mortars, believed knocked out by the morning-long dive bombing, opened up in full fury. They gave us the works the minute we moved into range. Shallow coral reefs and heavy shell-fire drove us back again.

On the fourth run, four of our lighters carrying tanks were picked off. Several men were wounded. Another, carrying the No. 2 half-track, suddenly was all action. We saw a naked Marine plunge overboard, swim to a floundering buddy, and drag him back to safety. Today we learned the hero was Sergeant Joseph V. Ossiginac. Joe, a "Guadal" veteran, simply said, when asked about the rescue, "It was nothing; I needed a bath, anyway."

LATER we made our fifth and last assault run. With four tanks already gone, Lieutenant Robinson said we couldn't afford to lose any more equipment. We soon discovered that despite the heavy bombing and strafing, which was intensified after each wave had been repulsed, those devilish mortars still were waiting for us. We were caught in a straddling crossfire, and pulled out of range to await nightfall.

Now all of us were good and sick of the water, and anxious to reach the beach. But there was nothing we could do about it. Pfc. John R. McCall sensibly broke out his "C" rations and sat down to supper. Then we all followed suit, grumbling, but resigned to a night in the bay.

Shortly after dark, battleships protecting our numerous transports lit the sky with a brief, furious barrage of antiaircraft fire. The tracer pyrotechnics were as vivid as a July Fourth celebration back home.

"It's about time the Japs sent a few bombers after us," declared Sergeant Monay. But the antiaircraft fire ended as quickly as it had begun, and we sat on our half-track watching the night shelling of Tarawa, counting the clusters of scarlet shell globes in their lobbing flight to the atoll.

I slept fitfully on the half-track turret, above the lighter's armor plate, until about 4 a.m. I'll never really know what awakened me. I remember a swishing sound, not unlike a locomotive idling in a roundhouse, and then I started moving. I half-rolled, half-dived into the cockpit, landing flush on Pfc. Mendel and Cantlin. Even before their startled "Ooofs," four rocking explosions cascaded alongside our lighter, spewing us with salt water and biting shrapnel.

That was my introduction to "Washing Machine Charley," the night-flying Jap bomber, whose nuisance raids were legendary on Guadalcanal. Said Sergeant Monay, "You can expect him every day now . . . at the same time."

By dawn we were ready to move shoreward again. The Japs apparently had little left except machine guns and snipers. But troops ashore sorely needed ammunition and water. The control vessels kept us sitting in the bay until almost sunset.

When we finally were ushered in, we came alongside the 600-yard supply pier, midway on Betio Beach. A Jap who had swum out to a shattered sampan, opened fire with a heavy machine gun, spraying the congested area at the pier's end. Two casualties were put aboard our lighter, and we were ordered to take them to medical aid.

We found a destroyer anchored nearby and deposited

the wounded there. The crew generously loaded our haggard, hungry group with pots of piping hot coffee, two gallons of steaming stew, and three loaves of delicious bread. We pounced on it with great gusto.

Later on we learned we would have to spend a second night on the water, and, grumbling more than a little bit, we turned in. We still are awaiting the tractors to tow us over the coral. Snipers still are active and we're crouched low in the half-track.

I just discovered a .25 caliber puncture in my typewriter. The machine had been lashed to my back, but I can't recall feeling the bullet strike.

MEDICAL CORPS WAS ON THE JOB

(The following was written by Sergeant Pete Zurlinden, a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent.)

MORE than 100 men were treated in a "pill-box" hospital during the first 36 hours after Marines struck Tarawa. Of the entire group, only four men died.

Despite the fact that Japanese snipers were hidden in the pillbox at the time, Lieutenant Herman R. Brukardt, USNR (Medical Corps), and three indefatigable corpsmen worked the entire stretch without sleep, administering to fallen Marines. Pharmacist's Mate First Class Robert

E. Costello said that shortly after Marine snipers had cleared the pillbox of the machine gun group, Lieutenant Brukardt and his men moved in and began their grim task immediately.

"We used up four flashlights during the first night," reported Pharmacist's Mate Second Class James R. Whitehead "and about an hour after we'd been working like fury with the first wounded, Japs sneaked in. We were so busy we didn't notice it until one of the walking wounded fired a shot into a corner. It's a wonder we didn't ruin the lad we were working on, so startled were we at the rifle report.

"Then before we started working again, Marines dragged a sniper's body out of the pillbox and we all made a close inspection. We found one other and a Marine smashed him on the head with a rifle butt."

The little pill-box hospital was situated directly on the front lines the first two days of the brief but bitter Tarawa fighting. But despite the fact that constant Jap machine gun bullets thudded in the little doorway, the naval crew refused to relax its efforts to save Leatherneck lives.

"We had so many casualties standing around that we had to keep them outside, where they deployed to keep out of enemy fire," said Lieutenant Brukardt. "Then, when we would be ready for one, we'd holler out, 'Next,' and they'd come scooting across the clearing and barge in the door on the double." Many Marines, with slight wounds, remained



These 5.5 and 8-inch naval guns on Tarawa Island were used by the Japs against Marines landing there.



Jap prisoners taken by the Marines walk along the beach at Tarawa under guard of their Leatherneck captors. The stooped positions they are walking in prevent their making any surprise attack or dash for freedom.

around the pillbox for hours helping carry the more serious cases in to the doctors.

"I've never seen a man with more sheer nerve and a real ability to bring a human life from the brink of oblivion back to safety," marveled one of these, referring to the Navy doctor. "The man performed feats of surgery that were miraculous, and the record of that scantily lighted pillbox stands to confirm my own opinion," he added.

Lieutenant Brukardt, a black-bearded, bespectacled wisp of a man, looked all in when I found him the next day, still at work, this time at a shore aid station where sniper victims were being brought in. "My only regret," he said, "is that we didn't have enough medical supplies in that place to save those four who died."

He then reported that the wounded Marines he attended were "the bravest youngsters I've ever seen. They were torn and shattered by all type projectiles, but most of them were calm and quiet when we got to them. When our anesthesia gave out, I had to perform some painful operations, but very few of them let out a whimper."

SENTRY STOPS FIRE ATTEMPT

(The following story was written by Sergeant Hy Hurwitz, a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent.)

A JAP attempt to burn the heavily-laden pier piled high with American ammunition and other supplies was frustrated by an alert Marine sentry, Pfc. Thomas F. Deese, the second night the Marines were on Tarawa. Deese observed a large can of gas moving underneath the pier and heading toward the badly needed supplies, which were stacked up at the foot of the pier. His challenge unanswered, Deese put two slugs from his rifle into the can. From behind it a Jap popped out.

"I shot him," Deese reported, "and he dropped dead."

"I had been warned that Jap snipers were working under the pier," Deese reported. "One of our guards had shot a

Jap earlier in the evening. I didn't see the Jap I got until I hit the gas can, but I felt that kind of stuff doesn't move under its own power."

"The Jap was unarmed, but he had a fuse in his pocket, as well as some ammunition."

In commenting on the incident, First Lieutenant Wilford R. Saylor, who was in charge of Pfc. Deese's guard detail, declared, "While the Jap wasn't caught in the act of setting the pier on fire he appeared to have all the intentions and equipment with which to do it."

COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHERS GET PICTURE STORY

THE dramatic story of U. S. Marine combat photographers who landed with the first waves at Tarawa was brought back to Headquarters in Washington by Warrant Officer John Frederick Leopold, USMC.

Under the direction of Captain Charles Louis Hayward, USMC, former motion picture actor, 15 officers and men of the Second Marine Division's photographic section accompanied the Leathernecks through the entire 76 hours of fighting, photographing everything from the transport preparations that preceded the landings to the killing of thousands of Japs and the arrival of the first American plane on the newly-won airstrip. Some of these pictures are published in this issue.

"Before the landing," WO Leopold related, "we photographers decided we could get better action pictures up in the front lines. So we armed ourselves with pistols, took rations for one day, and joined different Marine assault units. It was worse than anything we had seen before. Many of us had been at Guadalcanal, and had taken pictures under fire there, but you can't speak of the two in the same breath."

"Two of our men were killed at the pier. Another was wounded. Some of our equipment was lost in the surf. We were lucky, at that. Our cameramen were everywhere, in the Higgins boats, on the beach, all over the island."

The pictures they took show the difficulties under which they worked. Many of them had to alternate between their pistols and cameras."


The pictures, showing the landing and fighting on the atoll, include some 900 still photographs and approximately 5,000 feet of color movies. They were brought back to this country by WO Leopold, who took one of the first planes off Tarawa after the island was securely in American hands.

"The combat photographers," he said, "deserve the highest commendation. Like every Marine who took part in the attack, they were fighting men first."

GILBERTS INVASION FORCE COMMENDED

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, has sent the following message to the Central Pacific Force:


"The Gilbert Islands were quickly wrested from the enemy because of excellent coöordination among all services in careful planning and courageous execution. I am proud of all officers and men who took part. The memory of those who gave their lives will inspire us to apply ourselves with increased diligence to hard future tasks. All forces have helped create and can take pride in the unbeatable combination we have forged."



THE GILBERT AND MARSHALL ISLANDS

The official Navy map shows Makin and Tarawa atolls in their relationship to the rest of the Gilbert-Marshall group. Navy reports indicate new raids on the Jap-occupied Marshalls, and no doubt land-based American planes from the Gilberts will soon be added. The inset shows at a glance the strategic importance of these island groups in the South Pacific Allied offensive.

BOUGAINVILLE



↑ Marines go over the side for the landing at Empress Augusta Bay. Note the "dog of war" being lowered in a special sling.



An LVT or "buffalo" speeds ashore ready for action.



↑ A group of Raiders crouch in the dense jungle undergrowth ready to move forward.



↑ Jap shells burst near the landing craft as they speed toward Bougainville.



→ Rushing down the open ramp of an assault boat, Marines take cover in the jungle.

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Leaders confer on Puruata Island. Left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, Major General Allen H. Turnage, and Brigadier General A. H. Noble.

→
Marine Raiders, wet and tired after an all-night vigil in foxholes, return to their base along the lane from Cape Torokina to Piva Village. Though they carry rifles, their instructions in night operations were to use only their knives.



← Two Marines of a patrol hunt for snipers in mopping up operations on Cape Torokina.



→ A wounded Marine is carried aboard a landing boat at Empress Augusta Bay to be taken aboard a transport for medical care.



The Landing on Bougainville

By Lieutenant Jack De Chant, USMCR

SOON after a blood-red dawn broke over the Northern Solomons the morning of November 1, 1943, United States Marines invaded Bougainville—the last and biggest Japanese stronghold in the Solomon Islands. I was fortunate enough to have a 50-yard line seat to watch the invasion, which marks the beginning of the end for all Japanese forces still in the South Pacific. For four hours before dawn, our twin-engined Marine Ventura plane patrolled over the invasion transports and the vessels of their covering naval task force.

As the night mists cleared over the Empress Augusta Bay area, the sea-borne invasion force took form on the ocean below. The troop-packed transports were pointed in an arrow directly at Cape Torokino, on Bougainville's southwest coast, and at the closely adjacent Puruata Mission. Hovering around the line of transports at dawn, as they had been during the moonless night, were the naval forces which started shelling the beach area at 0601.

As our plane cruised back and forth over the invasion area, we could see the heavy guns of the fleet battering the shoreline. Suddenly, far to the south, we saw another barrage of naval firing toward the tip of Bougainville. Worried that it might be a Japanese interception, I inquired and was told that the shelling to the south was being done by a U. S. naval task force which had shelled Buka Passage airdrome to our north, at midnight and was now hitting the Shortland-Poparang Islands—the site of a Japanese float plane base.

Half an hour later, the guns aboard the troop transports opened up as they neared the shore. Their firing was directed against the cocoanut groves on the beach, and while they steamed toward shore and made their turn, they raked the small spit of land—Cape Torokino—and the little Island of Purata, which lies just west of the Cape.

The invasion, which took place just to the north of the headwaters of Empress Augusta Bay, obviously came as a surprise to the Japanese forces ashore in that area. From the air, not a single shore battery appeared to answer the thunderous softening-up bombardment.

Weather over the landing area was excellent for the amphibious forces and the fighter planes protecting them. There were no huge clouds to hide Jap dive bombers and torpedo planes for a sudden attack on the shipping. A thin wafer of clouds and mist hung over Bougainville itself—a light screen which stretched far inland to the mountains and from the once-powerful Kahili airdrome clear up to Buka Passage.

After the mist had cleared over the shoreline, this site of the second great Marine invasion in the Solomons looked very much like the first one at Lunga beach on Guadalcanal.

It has the usual cocoanut trees and a flat shoreline which extends inland for miles in plateau fashion. Back from the small white patch of beach along the shore, the terrain moves through the cocoanut plantation into jungle, which seems to congeal into a slimy green wave which roofs Bougainville back into the mountains.

AS we were a lone plane without escort, our pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Frank H. Schwable, Staff Sergeant Robert I. Ward, and I constantly searched the sky for Japanese planes coming down from their two fields at Buka and Boina.

Not a single Japanese plane appeared to challenge the landing during the vulnerable first daylight hour of the invasion. During that time we had undisputed control of the air—with dozens of Navy and Marine Corsairs, Army P-39's, and New Zealand P-40's maintaining high, medium, and low cover over the shipping, and ranging far out around the perimeter of the beachhead area.

From our assigned altitude we had no trouble watching the proceedings below through field glasses. As we passed back and forth over the shipping, I was able to take both movie and still pictures of the stately procession of the transports and the vehement, white-waked moves of the naval forces.

At 0630, the leading transport bent the arrow formation and turned left to parallel the beach. The other transports followed.

By this time, the incessant naval barrage lifted its line of fire and began shelling further inland—firing over the transports. The guns aboard the troop ships took over at the beach and continued to pound the shoreline with every weapon above decks, including tracer fire from small anti-aircraft guns. Finally, we could see small boats hovering close to the transports, while Marines climbed into them from cargo nets.

Now the sun had risen high from behind Bougainville itself. Its path pouring out over the water made a splash of blood orange. Curiously enough, as we passed over the scene, the path of the sun on the water bisected the line of transports, making a gigantic orange and black "X"—as if to mark the spot.

Our patrol work done, we moved off station and headed home, just as several of the small boats moved away from the transports toward the rendezvous area.

A formation of American torpedo planes then bombed the beachline. Douglas dive bombers followed them in on the target. Immediately after that, Marine fighter pilots reported, the first wave of Lieutenant General A. A. Vandegrift's Marines hit the beach at Bougainville.

I pray thee, fear not all things alike, nor count up every risk. For if in each matter that comes before us thou wilt look to all possible chances, never wilt thou achieve anything. Far better is it to have a stout heart always, and suffer one's share of evils, than to be ever fearing what may happen, and never incur a mischance.—*Herodotus, Book VII.*

Guarding the Crossroads

The Seventh Defense Battalion in Samoa

WHEN war broke out, one of the crucial danger points in the South Pacific was American Samoa. This is an important crossroad in the Pacific on the main communication and supply route between the North American continent and Australia, New Zealand, and the Southwest Pacific islands.

Guarding this important American outpost was a single battalion of Marines—the 7th Defense Battalion—under the command of Colonel Lester A. Dessez.

The 7th Defense Battalion was organized as such at the Marine Corps Base at San Diego, California, 16 December, 1940. Colonel Dessez, then a Lieutenant Colonel, was appointed to its command, joining the battalion from Headquarters and Staff, 8th Marines. The total strength of the battalion was 21 officers and 392 enlisted men but subsequent joining brought the total enlisted strength to 424.

The battalion, especially organized for its mission, was composed of a headquarters company, a company of infantry known as Company "A", and a battery of artillerymen known as Battery "B". In addition there was a detachment organized and trained as reserve.

From 16 December, 1940, to 26 February, 1941, the battalion was engaged in organizing, equipping, and drilling for the task ahead. Even before the organization of the battalion itself, however, an advance detachment had been organized by the commanding general at San Diego under authority of the Major General Commandant and had proceeded to Samoa. This detachment consisted of Captain H. McFarland, USMC, commanding, First Lieutenant R. H. Ruud, USMC, and 20 men. It had sailed from California, on 11 December, 1940, arriving at Tutuila, Samoa, on 21 December 1940.

The battalion itself left San Diego on 27 February 1941 and proceeded to Pearl Harbor. Here, other units were debarked from the ship which sailed again on 9 March for its final destination. At this time it was provided with a light cruiser as escort.

The battalion arrived at the United States Naval Station at Tutuila, Samoa, on 15 March 1941, becoming thereby the first unit of the Fleet Marine Force to operate in the Southern Hemisphere. As measles had broken out en route, debarkation was not permitted until 18 March at which time unloading had been completed and provisions made for reinforcements of the battalion some distance from the naval station where an encampment had been erected by the advance detachment.

For the next few weeks all hands were busily engaged in securing supplies, constructing buildings, improving roads and company streets, installing plumbing, etc. In March the camp was named Samuel Nicholas after the first commandant of the Marine Corps and a ceremonial parade was held at which the order was read.

While the battalion was in quarantine, the advance detachment was in quarters at the naval station and continued

there with the installation of the guns. With the lifting of the quarantine on April 11, the advance detachment joined the battalion and the unit and the battalion took up its task of fortifying and defending the island.

While some preparation had been made in advance of the landing, looking toward the defense of Tutuila, it remained for the battalion to install itself. Release from quarantine, therefore, marked the beginning of a season of intense activity. Possible landing places and beaches were reconnoitered and barbed wire entanglements and pill-boxes installed on both coasts. Frequently it was necessary to improve old trails or build new ones before matériel could be brought to the point of installation. Material installed on the north coast was largely carried by sea.

Telephone communication between the camp and the naval station and to the batteries and outposts was established. Initially 70 miles of wire was laid, much of it through brush and over mountains. This activity was continued as part of defense expansion until 170 miles of wire had been laid on January 1942.

During this period, barracks, mess halls, galleys, etc., were erected at the various gun positions and occupied by the personnel of Battery "B" as completed. Contracts had been let also for construction of barracks and other buildings at Utelei, the site of a native village adjacent to the naval station but nearly to the harbor mouth. Unfortunately, however, the battalion never had the pleasure of occupying these.

The building of a rifle range at Mormon Ranch was also undertaken by the battalion and 200, 300, and 500 yard firing points and a portion of the butts completed, together with the water supply system.

October was marked by high winds, causing slight damage, and the commencing of the rainy season. On November 4, the parade was held at the naval station at which time the Commandant, Captain L. Wild, USN, presented the battalion colors. Much interest was taken in the ceremony by the Samoans, who surrounded the parade grounds by the hundreds and applauded enthusiastically.

On November 26, the island was visited by a mild hurricane which caused damage to plantations, native houses, and tents.

ALL thoughts of the hurricane and other local events were overshadowed on December 7 when the radio reported that the Japs had struck at Pearl Harbor.

The outbreak of the war found 50% of the battalion already at its active station. This was in conformity with local orders. The sounding of "General Quarters" was the only announcement necessary to complete the 100% war footing establishment.

In addition, the declaration of war brought the mobilization of the colorful Samoan reserves. The organization of a native reserve battalion had been a part of the original

task of the 7th Defense Battalion. Authority had been granted in May 1941 for establishment of the native battalion. Their organization and training had been taken in hand and 160 had been enlisted by December 9, 1941 on which date they were called to active duty. They were assigned to both gun and beach positions. At the same time, 30 members of the Fita Fita Guard from the naval station were also assigned duty at gun positions. Shortly after war was declared, the governor-commandant, Captain Wild, moved his headquarters from the naval station to the battalion command post until reinforcements commenced. About this time, two officers of the New Zealand forces in British Samoa visited the naval station and command post on a liaison mission.

Reinforcements soon began to arrive. Shortly before Christmas, an army tug came into the harbor towing a barge containing refugees from the Canton Islands who had had a perilous and uncomfortable voyage. On December 31, a ship arrived with evacuees from various outlying islands.

AT 0230, on January 11, 1942, the battalion received its baptism of fire. At that time a small enemy ship, believed to be a Japanese submarine, shelled the naval station from a point off the north coast. From 12 to 25 5.5-inch shells fell in and near the naval station. The shelling lasted approximately seven minutes and apparently came from a single gun on one ship. The sea was calm, the wind light, and the atmosphere clear with the moon silhouetting the island from the position of the firing ship. The fire was not returned. Casualties and damage to property were slight.

Two men were slightly wounded—a naval officer and a member of the Fita Fita Guard. The medical supply buildings, dispensary, and carpenter shop were damaged. Some shells dropped into the bay harmlessly. This was the only enemy action against the post during the period of occupancy of the battalion.

From December 7, 1941 to January 19, 1942 however, there were a number of alarms, mostly by night. These generally proved to have no foundation but vigilance did not relax. During this time, a great deal of work was done, in the preparation of the military personnel of the naval station.

Road blocks were put in, more barbed wire placed, beaches mined, and demolition plans completed.

On January 19, an alert was sounded because of the report of ships pouring in from all directions. Soon, however, these were reported as friendly and later, planes identified as ours flew over the island, one of them landing in the harbor.

On the 20th, a convoy arrived, containing the 2d Marine Brigade (reinforced), commanded by Brigadier General Henry L. Larsen, USMC, who assumed the title and duties

of military governor. The 7th Defense Battalion, which, with its small force of less than 500 Marines, had manned the defense of American Samoa for the first month and a half of the war, was absorbed into the 2d Brigade which thereafter took all defense of the island on a considerably larger scale.

Thereafter the work of the 7th Defense Battalion was a part of the activity of the 2d Brigade. Company "A" was relieved from its existing battle stations and, together with headquarters company, was transferred to Pago Pago Valley for station and duty. Harbor defense continued to be manned by Battery "B."

On February 24, Company "A" was tactically assigned to the 8th Marines together with the 1st Samoan Battalion, MCR, commanded by Captain Ruud, USMC.

IN March reinforcements were received consisting of 8 officers and 478 men. The occupancy of Pago Pago Valley, which continued until March 27, was marked by hard physical labor by the battalion in establishing barracks, mess halls, galleys, and communications. All of this was done amidst continuous rains, this valley being probably the wettest spot of Tutuila.

On March 28, the reinforced battalion left for detached service in Western Samoa, having, in a little over a year, fortified, garrisoned, and held, during a critical period, an important outpost of the Navy and paved the way for its occupancy by a much larger force.

Upon arrival in Western Samoa, the reinforced battalion took over the task of defending this area which is British territory. The New Zealand defense force, consisting of approximately 2 officers and 80 men, reported to that battalion for duty as a tactical part of the battalion. Thus, for the first time in our history, a New Zealand fighting force came under the orders of an American Marine commander.

The 7th continued its defensive operations in Western Samoa for the rest of 1942. During this period, it established outposts at various islands.

From May up to December 16, 1942, all hands were busily engaged in organizing and carrying on the defense of a new American air base. The high light of this period was the visit in October of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, who inspected the 3d Marine Brigade.

In its two years of service, the 7th Defense Battalion had the unique distinction not only of being entrusted with the defense of an important naval base but also of denying to the enemy a group of islands, the possession of which is vital in this war. In addition, this battalion was the first unit of the Fleet Marine Force to operate in the South Pacific. Thus, although it did not engage in actual combat with the enemy, the 7th Defense Battalion had the honor of initiating the campaign in that important theater of operation.

LOOKING FORWARD*

By the Hon. FRANK KNOX
Secretary of the Navy

THE foul treachery at Pearl Harbor two years ago was calculated by our enemies to cripple our sea power at one vicious blow. Instead, on that day, the United States raised its bloodied head and vowed before God to utterly destroy the power of those international brigands to threaten or imperil world peace for a hundred years.

That vow approaches its fulfilment. The doom of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan is not only inevitable. It has become discernible, not to us alone, but to the once-arrogant high priests of the gangster nations themselves. This anniversary of Pearl Harbor is not a day from which to look back in anger and in sorrow, but a day of looking forward to the victory that is being compounded from the blood and labor and the tears and the sweat of the United Nations.

Some day, soon, we will celebrate Unconditional Surrender Day. But our task will be less than half done when the last enemy finally capitulates. We shall drive Hitler to the gallows, and Tojo to hara-kiri, but we shall not have secured our heritage of liberty and individual freedom with the mere destruction of our military foes.

Ours is not a war merely against evil men, who must be destroyed. It is a war against a persistent, perverted concept of power, more loathsome to decent men, than leprosy, or bubonic plague, is to the healthy. The world has almost conquered the terrible scourges of epidemic diseases of the body. The conquest is being achieved by unceasing vigilance and unselfish coöperation. The fight is constant, the guard against plagues is never lowered. We do not wait until an epidemic is loosed. United effort is directed against each single, individual appearance of the disease.

Exactly thus must the epidemic appearances of predatory conquest be fought, and conquered. Call it Fascism, the Axis, or the Holy Alliance, the recurring blood-lust which afflicts nations will only be cured when it is caught in its incipient stages. It can only be thus detected, and quelled, if there is maintained a constant vigilance, alert to detect, and swift to halt, the first signs of the madness.

Obviously that is more than one nation can, or should do. The cure would be as bad as the disease. The need be-speaks *mutual* effort by the nations historically dedicated to the principles proclaimed in the Magna Charta or the Declaration of Independence.

But, no matter how numerous that company, no matter how vital the part other nations must necessarily play in the detection, and quarantine, of aggression, I unhesitatingly affirm, as my studied opinion, that the security of the world depends in very large measure upon Anglo-American leadership.

I am not here to praise, or to promise, Anglo-American amity. Amity we have had for 130 years; not always undisturbed, let us frankly admit, but never broken. The glory and the inspiration of that unique relationship, between the great English-speaking commonwealths, lies in the fact that their quarrels have been during that period, satisfactorily resolved to the abiding welfare and lasting benefit of both without war. Sometimes one had to make the concession, sometimes another; for the most part, none was the loser in the settlement.

It is the very fact that the British and the American commonwealths have had their vigorous disputes, and for more than a century have settled them without recourse to arms, that gives substance to the hope that Anglo-American leadership provides for the rest of the world.

OF supreme importance is the fact that at the Moscow Conference the whole spirit of international coöperation, now and after the war, was revitalized and given practical expression. The Conference thus launched a forward movement which, I am firmly convinced, will steadily extend in scope and effectiveness. Within the framework of that movement, in the atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence which made possible its beginning in



U. S. Navy Photo.
The Secretary of the Navy.

*Address given December 6, 1943, before the English-Speaking Union in Chicago.

Moscow, many of the problems which are difficult today will as time goes on undoubtedly become more possible of satisfactory solution through frank and friendly discussion.

In the preservation and expansion of that unique relationship rests, in large measure, our hope of a durable peace. Whatever structure of international organization is erected after this war, it can rest upon no firmer foundation than such close economic and military co-operation among all the nations as has existed between the English-speaking peoples for a century and a quarter.

There are 260,000,000 of us to whom English is the mother-tongue, or about one-eighth of the world's population. But this one-eighth of mankind constitutes the largest single language group—an empire of ideas and speech that covers the earth. It is the language of diplomacy, the governmental language of one-third of the world's population. More than half the world's newspapers are printed in English, more than three-fifths of the world's radio broadcasts are uttered in our tongue. Thus we can see happening, to all the world, what has happened in the United States of America. One third of this country's population traces its ancestry to other than English-speaking stocks, but to the millions of our immigrants of alien tongue, English swiftly became a secondary language and, to their children, the mother speech.

We are reminded, of course, of Bernard Shaw's acid epigram that Americans and Englishmen are two great nations, divided by a common speech. Mr. Shaw would rather be clever than correct. It was from the mutuality of language, and not from common ancestry, that this unique relationship grew. The ability of two parties to sit down together, and plan an enterprise, or settle a difference, in a common tongue, is a priceless asset.

See how that bond has helped us in our histories! It enabled the great nations—our United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa—who stemmed from the English motherland, to acquire a priceless heritage of common law, so vital to the democratic processes. The English language has been the medium of a world literature; not an American, or a British, literature, but one in which Will Shakespeare and Walt Whitman, Rudyard Kipling and Jack London, speak to a world of understanding people.

It was that bond of language which, 120 years ago enabled George Canning and Richard Rush to devise in London the policy known as the Monroe Doctrine. It is too little known, too little appreciated that the Monroe Doctrine is—and always has been—an Anglo-American instrument which might have failed disastrously had it not had the tacit support of the British fleet. It was a silent partnership, implicit rather than contractual. It was a silent partnership at the insistence of Rush and John Quincy Adams; the British government was prepared to make it an open alliance.

As Walter Lippmann says in his new book, *U. S. Foreign Policy*:

"Because the informal alliance with British seapower was concealed, and was displeasing in their self-esteem, the American people lost the prudence, so consistently practiced by the founding fathers, of not understanding the risks of their commitments, and of not over-estimating their own power."

And right here I want to digress, for a moment, to chal-

lenge that stupid, that unpatriotic falsehood, that America always comes out on the short end of any transactions with the British. We all know for what cruel purpose that lie is uttered, and repeated, and embellished, with cartoons and caricatures, but God knows why the perpetrators seek to destroy a working although silent agreement which has helped the United States to keep militaristic aggression away from our hemisphere. These propagandists of despair picture Uncle Sam as a fatuous moron, who repeatedly rushes into the embrace of Britannia only to have his pockets picked for his pains. The falsehood is apparent. Not apparent is the psychosis which finds delight in self-ridicule, virtue in imbecility, and progress in the perversion of fact,

THE pages of history are open. We know that for long after the War of Independence, Britain held the power of life and death over the infant republic. What preserved us as a nation then was the fact that there were probably more champions of American Independence in England itself than on this side of the water. I can say with the late Lord Lothian that "it is not my idea, but one borrowed from many British historians, that the American war for independence was not only a victory for us, but it was also a victory for the British common people, misruled themselves through the manipulation of the rotten boroughs, taxed without representation, oppressed by archaic laws enforced with bigotry, by a Crown which sought to gather into its own hands the powers that had gradually been won by the people."

While England continued the war with the French Empire, it had the patience to listen to the American argument that the neutral United States had the right to carry on commerce in non-contraband goods with England's enemies. The British government, absolute masters of the ocean, conceded the point and paid \$11,650,000 in damages for American ships and cargoes seized by its fleets. Does that sound like hornswoggling?

We went to war with Britain again, and for the last time, in 1812. Five days after Congress voted the declaration, Parliament withdrew the obnoxious Orders in Council which incited the conflict. Alas for the tardiness of communications of that day! We fought a war, unpopular with both nations, for causes which had been removed by negotiation. But how many remember that when the imperialists in London sought to send the hero of Waterloo to conquer the Yankees, that the Duke of Wellington demurred? How many remember that the unfortified Canadian-American border, of which we properly boast today, was one of the stipulations in the treaty that ended that unnecessary conflict?

It is one of the fallacies of education that history is popularly written as a serial story of warfare. Thus it takes pains to learn that it was Britain's at least passive acquiescence that made the Louisiana purchase possible in 1803. A few years later, when the European powers were viewing with alarm the fruition of Magna Charta and the Declaration of Independence in the western world, came the Monroe Doctrine which we have reviewed, and which has developed into the Good Neighbor Policy as a pattern for post-war organization. Let us not forget that Britain offered to recognize the sovereignty of Texas only if human slavery

were constitutionally abolished. England did not join in the force exerted by European power politics to prevent the annexation of Texas, and England curtly refused Mexico's offer of California at bargain prices.

The virus of jingoism so infected the United States at the time as to inspire the belligerent slogan of "54-40 or fight" over the Oregon boundary. Sensibly, that dispute was simply and equitably settled by merely prolonging the existing Canadian-American border to the Pacific along the 49th parallel.

We flick the pages rapidly, and come to the strained relations between the two great English-speaking commonwealths during the Civil War. How was friendship restored? Britain paid \$15,500,000 in gold to the Union for damage suffered to American shipping by two Confederate commerce raiders the British permitted to go to sea from her shipyards. Work on two others was halted by government order upon consideration of President Lincoln's protests. Does that sound like a moronic Uncle Sam getting his pockets picked by a perfidious Albion?

We have not the time to search the truths in unbiased history for the total refutation of the pathological anti-British propaganda. We can but briefly refer to the references, such as the settlement of the Newfoundland fisheries dispute, the regulation of pelagic seal hunting, the intra-family solution of the Canadian-Alaskan boundary difficulties. In 1896, and again in 1902, when Britain was tempted against the vehement protest of her liberal leaders to a show of force against Venezuela, the proud Empire was not ashamed to withdraw at American insistence and abide by arbitration which awarded England less than she claimed; and when Germany, then mounting rapidly to a challenging position in the world, balked—the British rallied to our support although a co-litigant with the Germans. From the time the British fleet in Manila Bay interposed itself between the bellicose German warships and Admiral Dewey's, so the American could do what he had to do; until the establishment of the neutrality patrol and the transfer to beleaguered Britain of the 50 over-age destroyers in exchange for off-shore bases, the spirit of understanding between the two countries has produced magnificent rewards, not only for the contracting parties, but for the world's welfare.

PERHAPS I have spent too much time in review, having said at the outset that this was an occasion for looking forward, not back. It is, however, on the historical record that we must predicate the future relationship. We can look forward eagerly and with confidence to the greater inter-dependence of post-war Anglo-American relations by virtue of the historic pre-war coöperation.

I have spoken of the community of speech, through which our peoples so readily express the community of ideas and ideals, so that Gladstone—no sentimentalist, indeed—was able to describe the American Constitution as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." Probably the Constitution could not have been written except as a codification of English common law. At least without the spirit of British common law, it would have been a very different Constitution. The peoples of the English-speaking nations today

have also this in common. None wants a foot of territory; none wants to exploit another nation; none has any greater ambition toward the rest of the world than to freely give to all races the advantages we have painfully won for ourselves.

That is the passive quality of our mutual character. It has passed from the passive to the active stage in this war. We are determined, we of the heritage of Runnymede, that no aggressor shall have a foot of territory not his own; that no despot nation or despot philosophy shall exploit any people. It is a power, and a responsibility, that neither can discharge alone.

Ours is a code which allows the individual to lead his own life according to his pattern of conduct, subject to respect for his neighbors' rights. It is a code of self-restraint through laws he helped to frame, reserving the right to repeal those laws if the majority so wills. It is a code dedicated to the abolition of special privileges of race, or class, or caste, to the abolition of military ambition and conquest. It is a code which decrees that the state, and those who direct it, shall be the servant, not the master, of the people.

It is a code that lives, and no living thing can exist without growth. It must grow or it must decay. From this point forward we either progress, or we begin to slide back in accelerated descent to catastrophe. The course is obvious. It is forward, dynamically and together. A welcoming world awaits us. Already we have strong, sturdy partners to join us in the greatest crusade in history, in the governments of the nations allied to us.

In Secretary Hull's speech is found this pregnant paragraph:

"To this end, the four governments declared that they 'recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small.' I should like to lay particular stress on this provision of the Declaration. The principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security will be the foundation stone upon which the future international organization will be constructed."

And in every land, even in the enemy nations, the common people, the average man and his wife, hope and pray that we lead them forward to the greatest victory the human race can hope to attain, the victory over incarnate evil. That, my friends, is our mission—and we dare not fail.

Perhaps some cynics may impeach me for an idealist. It is an indictment to which a man should be ashamed to plead not guilty. To the possible critics let me administer a dose of realism, to neutralize their mental biliousness.

If ever there was a spurious ideal, an utterly impracticable and impossible goal, it is isolationism. Of all the so-called European wars fought since 1492, Americans have participated in all but five.

Consider the United States today. Even without the Philippines, its territory spreads out over 125 degrees; 175 degrees if you include the imprisoned Philippine Commonwealth. That is very nearly half way around the earth. We have pledged the inviolability of the entire western hemisphere.

Without Britain's navy we could not have maintained our position, unless we had supported a military and naval establishment larger than any possible combination of nations could muster. Strategically, we are most vulnerable, even if we contract ourselves to the narrow limits of the North American continent. Though we build and maintain two navies, each capable of defending an entire oceanic frontier, and though we conscript an army, constantly large enough to repel an invasion on either coast, we still would concede to any potential enemy the inestimable advantage of choosing the time and the place for aggression. Those false prophets who bid us retire from the world, and thus arm ourselves to ward off any intruder, are bidding this nation to live on rationed food and gasoline, and to struggle along under an unbearable tax load, forever! Now, what sort of advice is that!

And now absurdity is heaped upon absurdity as the progress of aviation brings Europe within a half day of Chicago. It might have been possible, had the American people been willing to so order their lives, in slavery to isolation, for us to build a spite fence around our habitation, before aviation shrank the Atlantic Ocean to one-tenth of its pre-war size, and all other distances in proportion. But not now!

We have experimented with a quasi-isolationism and an impracticable pacifism, and, as a result we have been cobelligerents in two world wars in a single generation. But the apostles of hermit life demand that we take more of the medicine that made the world sick. What sort of patriotism is it that bids us cower behind fortified walls, expending our God-given resources to antagonize the world? How secure would such an America have been, on a globe divided between a triumphant Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo?

From the viewpoint of the crassest sort of materialism, the dogma of isolation is false and destructive. But are we to be a nation without morals, without responsibility, in the sight of God, for the benefits divinely provided in our rivers, plains and hills? Are we to be a latent force for evil on earth, or a positive power for good?

Those are rhetorical questions. The answers are obvious.

For 130 years, the great English-speaking commonwealths have demonstrated to the world the pattern for international behavior. Time and again that pattern has been challenged and disturbed by the champions of brute force, the robber barons of the modern age. Twice it has required costly war to preserve our chosen way of life, not to count the half-dozen threats quelled by evidence of Anglo-American solidarity for peace before the enemy dared risk war. The two wars of the Twentieth Century—history will probably regard them as one war with a 25-year interlude—could have been avoided if the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations had had the implements they now possess to enforce the peace.

A SHORT time ago I returned from the European battlefield where I saw an American army, half composed of Britishers, and a British fleet, half composed of American ships, assailing Fascism on its native soil. I could not help but think how much cheaper in money, in goods, and in precious life, it would have been had a fully implemented

combination of United Nations' power been exerted against the enemy philosophy at its conception.

What I saw brings to mind what the British Ambassador, Viscount Halifax, said about the identical scene. "We have pooled all our knowledge and skill in staff planning, in research and the like," he said just the other day. "So have we also pooled our physical resources; our food, our ships, our raw materials as well as our weapons and equipment. *We are getting more and more mixed up, and I think we are finding it is not too bad a mixture.*"

That co-mingling of strength and skill with that of the United Nations must be continued after this war is won. The unity that is winning the war must be exercised in peace to the preservation of the victory, and to the extension of its benefits to all mankind.

The present instruments of military coöperation must be maintained, as a police force, a fire department, a sanitary squad, against another outbreak of war rabies and international gangsterism. Other nations shall, and will, contribute to the armed guard, according to their location and abilities, but I repeat to you, again, that all means to preserve the peace will fail unless they be founded on the coöperation of the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China and the other United and Associated Nations.

That coöperation needs no creation. There is the present working agreement between the British and American navies which assigns to the British fleets control of the eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The United States Navy guards the western Atlantic and the entire Pacific. When the ships of either nation pass into the control areas of the other, they pass into the command of the controlling navy. There is the backbone of our post-war naval police force, already organized and functioning. The coöperation of the technical missions, and the maintenance of economic balance, we use today, in war, can without interruption, be used tomorrow in peace, and for peace.

If it is worthwhile to resist aggression by united action, it is even more worthwhile to remain united to prevent aggression.

If we can be successful in uniting to win peace, we can be successful in uniting to preserve it. The century and a quarter of Anglo-American history is invoked as evidence.

If the United Nations can fashion a wall of fire and steel against despotism and lust for power, then by united action they can weave the economy and social fabric of peace with which to garment the world in abiding comfort.

The rehabilitation of the world will come no quicker than the movement of goods and services to repair the war's dreadful damage. With the end of this war the United Nations will control the aerial and oceanic highways, and the aerial and oceanic fleets to ply them. Nothing less than a mutual policy of planning and administration will insure the adequate utilization of highways and carriers for the benefit of all peoples, no matter how remote they live from the sea. And, by that same process, wherever the blood-lust again manifests itself, there shall we be, together, to stamp it out, before it becomes epidemic again. To that holy mission we must jointly dedicate ourselves, or prove unworthy of our ancestry, and our God, and shamefully perish in the end, the victims of our own cowardice.

Prisoners of the Enemy

By Lieutenant Clifford P. Morehouse, USMCR
Member, War Prisoners' Aid Committee, YMCA

AS Marines make new gains, island by island, on the road toward Japan, their grim determination is reinforced by the memory of some of their companions who arrived there nearly two years ago—as prisoners of war. Not the least of their desires, as they press forward toward their ultimate goal, is the liberation of such of these as may survive the ordeal of Japanese prison camps for the duration—since there is little hope that they will be exchanged while hostilities are in progress, as civilians have been on the two mercy errands of the *Gripsholm*.

As of December 7, 1943—two years after Pearl Harbor—the Navy Department listed 1,954 Marines as prisoners of war. In addition, 653 were listed as missing and some of these are, undoubtedly, prisoners of the Japanese.

Most of these men were taken prisoner in the early days of the war, at Wake and Guam islands, in China, and in the Philippines. Today the tide of war has turned, and few Americans are being taken prisoner by the Japs, though some are captured from time to time—aviators forced down in enemy territory, shipwreck victims drifting ashore, etc.

Wide publicity has been given to stories of repatriated newspapermen and other civilians, telling of the hardships of Japanese prison life. Undoubtedly Marines and other American fighting men who have been captured have had to suffer many indignities and privations. The execution of fliers who bombed Tokyo aroused the indignation of the civilized world, and shows the depths to which our enemy can descend in treating those unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. But for the most part, prisoners of war suffer more from the neglect and indifference of their captors, and from inadequate food and lack of clothes than from outright cruelty. Life even in the best of Japanese prison camps is none too rosy; but thanks to the efforts of the International Red Cross and the YMCA—the only two relief agencies permitted to serve prisoners of war—the circumstances are not as bad as they might otherwise be.

For nearly a year after Pearl Harbor, it was virtually impossible either to obtain any reliable information about Americans imprisoned by the Japanese or to get any relief supplies to them. Gradually names of the prisoners began to be received through neutral sources, and to date ten lists of captured naval personnel have been released by the Navy Department.

From the outset of the war, the International Red Cross has been attempting to get relief supplies to prisoners, in accordance with international treaties and the precedent of former wars. These efforts at last began to bear fruit, though with many setbacks and disappointments. The first shipment of medical supplies and other articles was carried to the Orient by the *Gripsholm* on its first exchange trip a year ago, and was reported to have arrived safely and to have been distributed. A second cargo of about \$1,500,000 worth of food parcels, medicines, clothing, and comfort

articles was carried by the *Gripsholm* on the second trip, from which it has just returned. These items were consigned to prisoner of war camps in the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, as well as in Japan and occupied China. A report has been received of the receipt of about 21,500 cases of these supplies in Manila on November 8, 1943, but reports of the distributions made to the camps has not yet been received.

Another Red Cross plan, worked out in conjunction with Soviet Russia, is as yet ineffective because the Japanese have not yet carried out their part of it. Under this plan Russia—neutral in the Asiatic conflict—allocated 1,500 tons of shipping space each month on vessels moving from west coast ports to Vladivostok. These relief supplies are to be reshipped from Vladivostok, under neutral Red Cross supervision, for distribution in all Far Eastern points where American prisoners and internees were being held. But the Japanese have not yet picked up the supplies from the wharves in Vladivostok. Negotiations are continuing towards consummation of this means of providing a steady supply of relief to the Far Eastern camps.

Early in the summer of 1942, the International YMCA also made arrangements to extend its services to prisoners of war in Japanese territory. This is done through a committee of four prominent neutrals (two Swedes and two Swiss) resident in Tokyo, who administer affairs for the War Prisoners Aid—an authorized War Chest agency in this country. To this group have been forwarded all the funds they can use, and reports have been received through Swedish diplomatic channels that some supplies had been purchased and distributed. These do not duplicate the supplies handled by the Red Cross; they are rather in the nature of occupational and morale-building goods.

By the end of May, 1943, this committee had distributed goods throughout camps in Japan, Korea, and Formosa. These included sports equipment, musical instruments, indoor games, seeds and gardening tools, carpenter supplies, and books. At least 8,800 of these were procured, including English classics, history, geography, popular science, and fiction, as well as over 200 Bibles. These books are divided into travelling libraries of 200 volumes, which are exchanged between camps and sub-camps every three months. Similar supplies were sent on the *Gripsholm* on its second trip, and a further shipment is scheduled.

THE entire cargo of the *Gripsholm* on its latest trip consisted of 1,350 tons of American Red Cross supplies, 160 tons shipped by the Canadian Red Cross, 13 tons by the YMCA War Prisoners' Aid, 2 tons by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and 80 tons of next of kin parcels and letter mail. These were transferred to the Japanese exchange vessel, *Teia Maru*, which sailed from Mormugao, Portuguese India, on October 21, 1943. Also

loaded there were 891 cases of British medical supplies for Singapore.

The *Teia Maru* stopped at Singapore about November 1, presumably unloading British medicines and about 180 tons of Red Cross supplies, of which 14,000 food parcels were for Malaya and the balance of the supplies including food, medicines and clothing were for Java.

The *Teia Maru* arrived at Manila about November 7th and presumably unloaded about 750 tons of supplies, notably 78,000 food parcels, 73 tons of drugs and medical supplies, 80 tons of clothing and 30 tons of toilet articles. The ship then proceeded to Yokohama where it arrived about November 14 and unloaded about 350 tons of supplies for Japanese camps. The ship did not stop at Hong-kong or Shanghai. About 100 tons of supplies for Hong-kong and 150 tons for Shanghai will presumably be carried to these ports from Yokohama on the next outward bound repatriation ship.

The Japanese have requested that negotiations for a future exchange be delayed until the current exchange was completed. The State Department is reported to have commenced negotiations for another exchange of American nationals, but it seems doubtful if the next exchange can take place before late spring or summer. It is now quite evident that repatriation ships will not sail often enough nor provide sufficient shipping space to carry the amount of relief supplies needed in the Far East.

RECORDS of Marines reported to be prisoners of war are maintained by the Casualty Division at Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington. This division maintains close liaison with the office of the Provost Marshal General of the Army, which receives all information on this subject from the State Department, the International Red Cross, and other sources. This office also maintains a Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

As soon as the Casualty Division receives definite word that a marine is a prisoner of war, a letter of notification is sent to the next of kin, who is further advised to keep in touch with the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, which maintains a file on each case.

As long as a marine continues in the status of prisoner of war, his allotments are paid the same as when on active service, and his pay and allowances accrue to his benefit. Changes in allotments can be made when necessary through the procedure set up by Public Law 490 for that purpose. If a marine is reported authoritatively to have died in a prison camp, his account is closed out and payments made to his beneficiary in the same way as if he had died in active service.

The Casualty Division has reports on all men taken prisoner in North China and at Wake and Guam islands. Reports on those taken prisoner in the Philippines have been very slow in being received, and not all of these have yet been accounted for. Undoubtedly some of the men reported as missing in action in the Philippines were taken prisoner, but it is anticipated that ultimately they will be so reported by the Japanese through the International Red Cross. The Japanese are also very slow about reporting deaths of men in prison camps.

After the next of kin is officially notified by the Marine

Corps that a man has been taken prisoner, further information, when available, is sent by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. This agency, though a part of the War Department, acts as a central clearing agency for information about all prisoners of war, including personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps—and, incidentally, including Axis prisoners in this country. When the prison camp is known, that information is given to the next of kin, together with directions for sending mail to him.

MAIL to prisoners of war in Japanese hands is, of course, very slow, but there is ample evidence that for the most part it does get through, if it is properly addressed and does not contain material objectionable either to the American or the Japanese censorship. Japan insists that letters to prisoners "must not be more than 25 words in length," and they should be typewritten to facilitate censorship. Anything illegible in a letter is likely to prevent or delay its delivery. Mail has been carried by the *Gripsholm* on both of its exchange trips, but at present, there is no regular adequate mail route to the Far East. Negotiations to induce the Russians to carry mail on Soviet ships across the Pacific have not yet been successful. Another route involving air transport is also being studied.

The International Red Cross has been informed that the Japanese authorities have set up a central post office for prisoners of war at Higashi Shinagawa, the main Tokyo camp. This post office is charged with the forwarding and distribution of mail to prisoners of war held by Japan, both in the homeland and in occupied countries. Its staff is made up of American and British officers who make every effort to send mail to the proper address; but insufficient addresses make their task very difficult. There is apparently no limit on the number of letters that may be sent to prisoners, but the number they write is controlled by the Japanese and varies in the different camps.

Cables to prisoners of war in Axis countries are handled by the International Red Cross through its Geneva office, but it is not certain that these are delivered as no acknowledgment is possible, except through a subsequent letter from the prisoner. In any case they are limited to emergency cases, such as a birth or death in the prisoner's family. Packages cannot be sent to the Far East, even by the next of kin, at the present time.

MESSAGES from prisoners of war in Japanese hands are infrequent, and take anywhere from six months to a year in transit. Naturally they cannot contain details of prison life or discuss hardships and inadequacies except in the most general terms, since they must pass rigid enemy censorship. Yet often they do contain interesting notes and sidelights.

Mrs. Samuel L. Howard permits us to share with his fellow-Marines two letters received from her husband. Colonel Howard was the Commanding Officer of the Fourth Marines, the story of whose gallant fight against overwhelming odds on Bataan and Corregidor is a glowing chapter in the history of the Marine Corps. Taken prisoner on the fall of Bataan in April, 1942, Colonel Howard (who has since been selected for promotion to Brigadier General) was unable to write until December 4, 1942, and his letter

was not received by Mrs. Howard until September, 1943. He said in part:

"This is the first letter that I have been permitted to write. Last month we were allowed to write a broadcast which I hope reached you. Johnny's letter dated June 3 has arrived. It took five months to get here. . . .

"I now weigh 132 pounds but am as well as can be expected. Please send me some chocolate nut bars and soluble coffee. . . . We have a vegetable garden here but have not harvested any crops as yet. I spend so much time wondering how you are getting along. We received some things from the Red Cross today. I have received two decorations. Give all the family my love. I understand we will be permitted to write every three months, but don't count on it too much. I am all right and will make it home one of these days after the war is over."

It was five months before Colonel Howard was able to write a second letter. This was dated 21 May, and was received by Mrs. Howard in Washington shortly before Christmas. He wrote:

"Only writing a few lines to let you know I am still well and in fact, since the first of March, have gained a few pounds. I now weigh 134. A few weeks ago we received some Red Cross supplies consisting of canned food and cakes of soap. It was all most welcome. . . ."

A letter from an army officer, sent from Zentsuji war prison camp in Japan January 26, 1943, gives more details about the fate of soldiers and marines captured in the Philippines. Many of the officers among these, as well as among the survivors of Wake and Guam, were taken to Zentsuji, a large prison camp across the Inland Sea from Osaka. This officer writes his family:

"I will take advantage of the first opportunity to write to you I have had for nearly a year. I wrote you a letter last February while in Bataan, but doubt that it ever got through. . . .

"I was one of a large group of war prisoners moved to Japan from the Philippine Islands last November. We are quartered in large two-storied barracks, sleep on mattresses with plenty of blankets, and have plenty of room. There are English, Australian, and New Zealand war prisoners interned here; also some American sailors and marines from Guam and Wake. These fellows have treated us swell since we arrived here. They are all in good spirits, healthy and optimistic, and our morale has risen considerably since our association with them.

"We have received toilet articles, sewing kits, tobacco, and some food from the American and Canadian Red Cross. The Japanese army gave us overcoats and additional clothing to supplement our light tropical clothing. It gets quite cold here during the winter, the temperature going below freezing."

A marine captured at Wake writes from the same prison camp: "Here we are in barracks with a room about 30 x 20 for six of us, Herbie, two Dutch officers, two Australians, and myself. The entire group of prisoners have complete freedom in a large compound. We have daily classes in a wide variety of subjects of our own selection, then exercise, play cards, or 'acey-ducey.' We are living each day for the happiness in it—may you do the same until we can be reunited."

FROM other sources it is learned that Zentsuji is one of the best of the Japanese prison camps—though that is perhaps rather faint praise. John Cotton of the American Red Cross has written the following in the *Prisoners of War Bulletin* for July, 1943, based on a report from a neutral investigator:

"The camp of Zentsuji was opened on January 16, 1942, and is situated in the northern part of the large island of Shikoku, four miles from Tadotsu near the Inland Sea. It comprises six acres of a fertile plain between two hills covered with pines. The climate is good, and there are no diseases endemic to the neighborhood. The first report from an International Red Cross Committee Delegate who visited the camp stated that the men were at work clearing a nearby hill for planting potatoes, vegetables, and wheat, and that they were paid for this work; while others, working within the camp on necessary upkeep, were being paid somewhat less. The latest report received shows that there were 234 American prisoners (including 54 officers), and 62 Australian officers, in a total camp population of 320.

"The buildings comprise two Army barracks two stories high, well ventilated, with the kitchen in a separate building. The barracks have recently been divided into rooms containing from one to fourteen camp beds, each having five thin blankets, a pillow, and a counterpane. Officers have mattresses in addition. Heat is supplied by what are described as 'modern stoves.' Sanitation facilities were reported to be clean and sufficiently distant from the main buildings. Hot baths are permitted once a week, or twice a week for laborers; cold showers are available every day.

"Clothing at the camp was reported to be insufficient at first, but later reports indicate that captured uniforms and overcoats had been supplied to prisoners, and that these were sufficient for cold weather.

"The daily food ration is reported to be 300 grams (10½ oz.) of bread; 300 grams (10½ oz.) of rice; 160 grams (5½ oz.) of wheat; plus potatoes, vegetables, fish, and eggs. Working prisoners in divisional labor camps are given some extra food. The average weight of the men in one working party was reported to be around 144 lbs. on March 9, 1943—after about a year of captivity.

"Some of the working parties going out from this camp are tilling the soil, loading and unloading goods at neighboring railway stations, and laboring in a village bakery. Within the camp the prisoners are raising rabbits to supplement their rations and at last reports there were 200.

"There is an infirmary in the camp and a military hospital nearby. One Japanese doctor is permanently attached to the camp and is assisted by three prisoner doctors. There is a monthly medical inspection of all prisoners.

"Sports space is provided for baseball, cricket, and deck tennis, with a 'gymnastic excursion' outside the camp once a week. Radio is available, for local reception, and a library of some 500 books was obtained from the American Embassy formerly at Tokyo and the Nagoya Imperial University. Daily English editions of the *Japan Times Advertiser* and *Osaka Mainichi*, as well as the *Weekly Times*, *Contemporary Japan*, and tourist library booklets are provided. (These are all propaganda publications. Ed.) Officers are offered lessons in Japanese, but reports show little interest in this sort of study. The camp has three portable gram-

phones and a hundred or more records. Efforts are being made to provide the prisoners with more records and reading material, which they have requested.

"The prisoners' chief concern, however, as reported to the delegate, was that they were not hearing from home; but this complaint was made by newly-arrived prisoners. Others had received mail. Further mail from home for this camp was probably among the 150,000 letters for prisoners of war in the Far East which, according to a report dated February 26 last, had still to be distributed. Letters from the camp at present are limited to from five to ten per man per year.

"A recent statement from the International Red Cross Committee Delegate in Tokyo reported that, late in 1942, Red Cross supplies were sent to the Zentsuji camp. These supplies consisted of 5,280 standard food packages, 130,000 cigarettes, tobacco, toilet articles, and clothing. They were shipped from the United States about a year ago on the *Gripsholm*.

"A comparison with reports which have been received on other Japanese camps suggests that Zentsuji is probably among the best."

ANOTHER prison camp in which there are, or have been, a considerable number of Marines is Kiangwan, near Shanghai, in occupied China. The senior officer among the prisoners at Kiangwan, and their spokesman, is Colonel William W. Ashurst, USMC, who was the Commanding Officer of the Peiping detachment. He is assisted by Major Luther A. Brown, USMC, who was in command of the Tientsin detachment, and a British officer. Medical attention is given to the prisoners by one of their own doctors, Commander Thyson, USN, who was attached to the Marine units. American military personnel there, as of February 1943, totalled 721, but it is probable that some have died or been transferred elsewhere since that time.

A neutral investigator, under the auspices of the International Red Cross, reported a year ago that health conditions at Kiangwan were fair. Meals were sufficient in quantity but lacked quality, variety, and necessary vitamins. They consisted mostly of rice and vegetable stew, with some meat (mostly pork) and fish, bread, and tea. There were no fruits and few fresh vegetables. Clothing was poor in quality and inadequate for the winter. But the Red Cross has since been able to get some supplies to this camp, and conditions should be somewhat better this winter.

As for recreation, the facilities were not as good as those reported at Zentsuji. There was a library with 4,000 English books, and provision for indoor games. There was no space for outdoor sports, though the prisoners were hoping to receive permission to clear a nearby area for that purpose. Occasional hikes through the countryside under guard were the best opportunities for exercise. Protestant religious services were occasionally held by a Japanese minister. A request for Protestant services by one of their own pastors, or a neutral one, had been refused; a request for visits by a Catholic priest was under consideration.

Kiangwan is today the only camp in Occupied China reported to have any considerable number of American military prisoners, though there are several other civilian

Addresses for Next of Kin

The following are the addresses to which next of kin and other interested individuals may write for information in regard to prisoners of war in Axis countries:

Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Office of the Provost Marshal General, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

The American Red Cross, National Headquarters, Washington 13, D. C.

War Prisoners' Aid of the YMCA, 347 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Correspondence about the military status, pay, or allowances of a marine who is an enemy prisoner should be addressed to The Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

internment camps. Conditions in these have heretofore been generally better than in military camps, though repatriates on the *Gripsholm* have reported these as "progressively worse" owing to the indifference of the Japanese.

OTHER prison camps in which there are reported to be American military personnel are:

In Japan proper—Fukuoka, Hakodate, Himeji, Hiroshima, Kawasaki, Kobe, Moji, Osaka, Tokyo, Yokohama, and Zentsuji.

In the Philippines—Davao, in Mindanao, and Cabanatuan, on Luzon. There appear to be several navy nurses at Los Banos, a civilian internment camp, and there may be military personnel at Bilibid Prison, now a prison hospital; but most of the other prison camps in the Philippines have apparently been closed and the prisoners transferred to Taiwan or to Japan.

In Manchoukuo—Mukden, where there were 1,300 Americans at last reports, including both military personnel and civilians.

In Taiwan (Formosa)—Heito, Karenko, Taichu, Taihoku, and Tamazato.

In addition, American military prisoners are reported at the prison camps (primarily British) in Singapore, Moumein (Burma), and Thailand (Siam).


American prisoners taken in the Philippines have been transferred to Japan and to other occupied areas in large numbers. Of several thousand American military prisoners reported at Camp No. 1, Cabanatuan, shortly after the fall of Corregidor, a large proportion were transferred to camps in Japan, Manchuria, and Taiwan. Many of the higher ranking officers were sent to Tamazato camp in Formosa. On the other hand, a considerable number were sent to camp near Davao, in Mindanao.

Prisoners from Guam were taken to Zentsuji, in Japan and the civilians among them were later transferred to Kobe. Marines from Wake and from North China were originally sent to Woosung and later transferred to Kiangwan, near Shanghai. At one time 1,450 marines and civilian contractors from Wake were reported at this camp. Some of these were later transferred to Japan.

Marine Artillery in Guadalcanal

The Story of the 11th Marines

By Brigadier General Pedro A. del Valle, USMC



Part II

Artillery fire direction center on Guadalcanal.

ON 18 September, 1942, the 7th Marines arrived on Guadalcanal with our 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which reverted to artillery control upon landing. They were assigned bivouacs in the vicinity of the regimental ammunition dump and the battalion and two batteries were installed in the edge of a palm grove, with a primary mission covering the south of the perimeter east of the Lunga River which was occupied by the 7th Marines. One battery was temporarily emplaced with the batteries of the 2d Battalion with the primary mission of covering the west of the perimeter. These troops arrived and took position under a short but severe hostile naval bombardment.

Meantime, patrols located enemy troop concentrations about 800 yards up the Lunga River. An attack force consisting of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, plus some raiders under Colonel Edson, was sent after them. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, was in direct support of this operation. They were registered in the target area at 0800 and continued to fire in support of Colonel Edson's force throughout the day. On the 21st the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, supported the 7th Marines in a defense against a Japanese night attack along our southern front. It is probable that this attack was merely the breaking-in process for the 7th Marines, as no enemy casualties were discovered the next day by the patrols.

At this time the 1st Battalion, less "C" Battery, faced normally to the south in support of the 7th Marines. The 2d Battalion, plus "C" Battery, faced normally north and west in support of the 5th Marines, while the 3d Battalion continued in direct support of the 1st Marines with normal missions north and east. The 5th Battalion was in general support, prepared to fire in any direction. On 22 September all batteries of the 1st Battalion were registered. At this time new commanders were assigned to infantry units as follows: 5th Marines, Colonel Edson; 7th Marines, Colonel Sims; Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Griffith.

The enemy employed the latter part of September and October in a mad rush to pour sufficient troops into Guadalcanal to defeat the Marines decisively. Two infantry regiments, some replacements, and some medium and light artillery units, both field and antiaircraft, were got ashore. Early in October, another infantry regiment arrived with a battalion of independent mountain artillery, a trench mortar battalion and a medium tank company. Later on, in the early part of November, elements of the 38th Japanese Division began to arrive, landing in the area east of Koli Point. Our aviation and naval forces inflicted great losses upon these troops while they were approaching the island and attempting to land.

During the early part of October the Japanese field artillery began to shell us heavily and the Navy was obliged

to stop using Kukum Beach for unloading purposes. The tempo of these fires was gradually stepped up until the night of 13-14 October when a large naval force, including two battleships, shelled Henderson Field and its environs for over three hours, damaging some of our planes and interrupting many of our communications, as well as inflicting some personnel casualties.

On 24 September two reinforced rifle companies of the 5th Marines made a reconnaissance in force to the southwest. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, prepared fires in advance in support of this operation and registered in the target area. No fires were called for by the infantry. On the same day the artillery made a reconnaissance of the new front line defenses along the 5th Marines' front and located OPs, target areas, base and reference points. Aviation continued to harass the enemy forces to the westward, sinking their landing barges and starting fires.

ON 25 September the 2d Battalion, plus "C" Battery, were emplaced facing west, as a precautionary measure. One battery of the 5th Battalion was attached and run forward. On this date Colonel Puller's battalion of the 7th Marines made a reconnaissance in force to the southwest toward Mount Mambula. This force ran into a considerable number of the enemy and, lost seven killed and twenty-five wounded. Batteries attached to the 2d Battalion fired in support of Colonel Puller, inflicting considerable losses on the enemy and assisting the withdrawal of his battalion and a rifle company of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which accompanied him. Control was by forward observer who accompanied Colonel Puller, using radio. An enemy surface force consisting of one light cruiser and four destroyers approached Cape Esperance on this day, apparently bringing troops. Our aviation were unable to contact them and they got away.

On 26 September the artillery surveyed in new battery positions in the vicinity of the fighter strip being completed south of Kukum. "C" Battery attached to the 2d Battalion, fired in support of a unit of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, having registered on a check point for this purpose. This day was a record day. No air raid, no sea bombardment, no land combat. Our patrols from the east and south reported another abandoned enemy bivouac where they found one machine gun and considerable other equipment, all of which they destroyed. Puller's force broke off its engagement near Mount Mambula and returned toward the perimeter. The Raider Battalion was ordered to make a reconnaissance to the westward of the Matanikau, as the Division had plans for a limited offensive toward the west. The artillery surveyed in battery positions for the 2d Battalion and for one battery of the 5th Battalion about 1500 yards south of Kukum. An artillery reconnaissance was ordered to proceed westward toward the Matanikau to locate advance artillery positions, should the infantry operation require a displacement to the west.

On 27 September the Fire Direction Center and "D" and "F" Batteries of the 2d Battalion, "C" Battery of the 1st Battalion and "N" Battery of the 5th Battalion were emplaced in advance positions to the west under the tactical control of the FDC of the 2d Battalion. On this date we fired two batteries of the 5th Battalion in support of



An observation post on Guadalcanal.

Puller, who had again contacted the enemy. In the morning we fired a preparation with the same two batteries in support of the Raiders. At 0800 the 2d Battalion FDC took over the mission of supporting an attacking force under Colonel Edson attempting to push the enemy over the Matanikau. At 1327 twenty-three enemy bombers and eighteen Zeros got through and came at us at low altitude, dropping bombs from Kukum to the airfield. The artillery command post was again straddled. Two "daisy cutters" landed at the mouth of our communications center dug-out, destroying two jeeps and much signal gear. Two 500 pounders dropped in the Special Weapons Battery bivouac and wrecked one jeep and two trucks. Two 500-pound jobs landed just outside the operations dug-out and wrecked all our housekeeping and tentage. We suffered five casualties. On Monday, 28 September, we supported Edson's force in continued attacks to the west.

This force attempted to cross the Matanikau at its mouth without success. An attempt by the Raider Battalion to move around the enemy's south flank was also unsuccessful. Another attempt was made by two rifle companies moving by boat to the west of Point Cruz. They were able to make a landing, but suffered heavy losses and withdrew before dark. We had 125 casualties in this operation, including Major Bailey of the Raider Battalion, killed; Lieutenant Colonel Griffith of the Raider Battalion, wounded; Major Rogers of the 5th Marines, killed. The artillery maintained two batteries of the 2d Battalion and all of the 5th Battalion on switch positions west, prepared to cover our infantry if required. We fired harassing fires against the enemy during Tuesday, the 29 September.

On that date the daily air raid came over with twenty-six bombers and nineteen Zeros at 1345. This raid was intercepted and we downed twenty-three bombers and two Zeros. The enemy jettisoned their bombs. The field artillery fired harassing fires all day along the Matanikau, and the Army's P-400s worked them over again and again. We received reports that Clemens, the British agent, and some native police had found a 5" gun, seven steel landing boats,

one machine gun, and a large quantity of .25 caliber ammunition and rice in the vicinity of Taivu. All these were destroyed, except some of the ammunition and rice which was taken for the use of the native troops. They reported many Jap dead in the vicinity of Taivu and only a few small units of them operating in the eastern half of the island. For several days we continued harassing artillery fires and air bombardment of the enemy areas between the Matanikau and Kokumbona.

ON 1 October Admiral Nimitz arrived and presented medals to Generals Vandegrift and Rupertus, Colonel Edson, Lieutenant Colonels Pollock and Carlson, Major Smith, Major Gaylor, and a number of others. The enemy made two air raids that night and set a fuel dump on fire. On 2 October plans were made for a coöordinated attack on the enemy between Matanikau and Kokumbona. Our 2d and 5th Battalions were to be in support.

At 0800 on 2 October the 1st Battalion was displaced westward to the new fighter strip to continue harassing fires against the enemy west of the Matanikau. At 1230 on this date the enemy delivered an unsuccessful bomber attack which was intercepted in the vicinity of Savo, where they jettisoned their bombs. On 3 October there were two bombing attacks, neither of them successful. Enemy bombers dropped bombs at Koli Point by mistake. A battery of the 1st Battalion fired harassing fires all night on the area to the west of the Matanikau.

During the day the personnel of "Easy" Battery of the 2d Battalion commenced to arrive from Tulagi. At 1200 on 3 October a considerable number of Zeros made a strafing attack on our installations. The Wildcats got seven, the Special Weapons Battery, 11th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, each got one. During the night of 3-4 October three air raids were delivered by the enemy, who dropped bombs on each occasion. A force of one enemy cruiser and eight destroyers was reported headed our way.

On 4 October, 1942, the 11th Marines ceased harassing fires at dark. During the hours of darkness a battery of

105s was emplaced in the near fighter strip south of Kukum to continue firing the following day.

On 5 October we continued the harassing missions and covered the withdrawal of one of our patrols from beyond the Matanikau with "Dog" and "Easy" Batteries, the latter having completed its movement from Tulagi to Guadalcanal. There was no ground activity except for the aforementioned patrol, but aviation sank a Japanese light cruiser and made an attack on Bougainville and Isabella Islands.

On 6 October the 11th Marines continued to fire harassing missions on enemy installations to the west of the Matanikau. The continuous fighting, air raids, sea bombardments, bad living conditions and food, and the effects of disease began to be felt. This was manifested by the number of persons who had to be evacuated because of shell-shock at about this time. Our aviation continued to attack the enemy surface forces which were disembarking troops and material in the vicinity of Cape Esperance.


On 7 October the 11th Marines fired a regimental concentration for ten minutes in the vicinity of Matanikau in support of the 5th Marines who advanced to the river. The 1st and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, were displaced to positions in the fighter strip under cover of darkness for the purpose of supporting the divisions' attack toward the west. The 2d Battalion was emplaced in the hills just east of the Lunga. The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, was emplaced with one battery each, to the east, to the south and to the north, thus giving us 360° coverage.

ON 8 October the 1st, 2d and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, supported the attack of the division to the west by preparation and successive concentrations. The regiment, meanwhile, unloaded some 75mm ammunition which had arrived from Tulagi in a YP boat. Five enemy destroyers which were discovered in our vicinity were not attacked by our aviation because of the bad weather conditions.

On 9 October the division continued its attack to the west. The rain, however, slowed down the progress of the



Artillery bivouac area on Guadalcanal.



Brigadier General Pedro A. del Valle, extreme left, and Major General William H. Rupertus, extreme right, watch a 105mm howitzer in action against the Japs.

infantry. The holding attack was in the direction west across the Matanikau while the main effort was made along the high ground north of the Japanese main positions. After penetrating a few thousand yards, these forces swept north, clearing out the Japanese forces between them and the sea. During the night of 8-9 October there were two air raids. On 9 October our aviation sank an enemy heavy cruiser and downed five Zeros. The weather was very poor. It rained hard and the trails were barely passable.

On 10 October the 11th Marines continued to fire in support of division operations to the west until they were concluded and then covered the withdrawal of these forces from the corridor between the Matanikau and Kokumbona. During the night the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which was not withdrawn, was engaged in interdicting the beach road while the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, displaced to its normal positions, leaving only one battery in the switch position to the west. Two batteries of the 2d Battalion and one battery of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, fired in support of our front line units still engaged along the Matanikau. During the night the 5" battery of the 3d Defense Battalion engaged enemy submarines in the harbor with results unknown except that the submarines left. Naval gunfire could be heard in the west, indicating possible surface combat. One Japanese heavy cruiser and five destroyers were known to be in that area. The daily air raid came at 1200. Our own aviation could not make contact. At 1600 reinforcements arrived for our overworked aviation.

On 11 October the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, continued interdiction of the beach road to the west of the Matanikau. During the day the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, replaced the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, in forward positions to the west and the latter was withdrawn to its normal bivouac and emplaced covering the south. On completion of the operations to the west, our lines extended to the Matanikau River. We had about forty killed and two hundred wounded. The enemy lost four hundred dead; we captured maps indicating the direction of their main effort in their next attack. Our aviation sank a heavy cruiser and got a probable hit upon another, scored several

near hits on some destroyers and shot down seven naval bombers and five float Zeros.

On 12 October the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, which had displaced the day before, relieved the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, on harassing missions to the west. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, covered its normal zone to the south. One battery of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, continued to face to the east while the other two covered the north. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, had two batteries facing the north while one battery was laid south to support Hunt's battalion of the 2d Marines which was making a patrol to Mount Mambula. The air raid on the 12th lasted from 1200 to 1500. Eighteen enemy bombers came over preceded by swarms of Zeros. The sky was overcast. The enemy lost six bombers and four Zeros. During the night of 11-12 October flashes of naval gunfire could be observed from the beach and the swarms of Zeros and other planes in the air gave us an indication of an approaching attack.

On 13 October the 11th Marines registered from its new positions on targets in their respective fronts including Mount Mambula. The 164th Infantry arrived and relieved the 1st Marines who were holding the east sector. The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, remained in direct support of the sector. In view of the threatening situation, a battery from the 3d Battalion of the 10th Marines, which was on Tulagi, was requested and sent. 2,600 rounds of 75mm ammunition arrived; we had less than five units of fire of either caliber on hand.

While no complete reports were available, there were many rumors concerning a naval battle and it was pretty well established that one of our naval task forces had engaged the enemy. Our aviation was extremely active in attacking the enemies' surface forces and transports which were apparently headed our way in some force. They reported sinking one light cruiser and two destroyers.

BETWEEN 13 and 18 October, the 11th Marines were constantly engaged on harassing missions, interdiction, and counter-battery fires. In spite of a severe naval defeat suffered by the enemy and the loss of most of his transports, he managed to land a considerable number of troops estimated at 10,000 in the vicinity of Kokumbona as well as some 105 and 150mm guns or howitzers with 12 to 20,000 yards range with which they shelled our airfield and other positions within range. In conjunction with our dive bombers, the 11th Marines did everything possible to counterbattery these guns which the enemy kept shifting from one position to another.

On the night of 13-14 October the Japanese struck the airfield and vicinity with a terrific naval bombardment; battleships, cruisers and destroyers participated. A naval 14" shell burst into the regimental command post of the 11th Marines destroying all installations and habitations in the vicinity thereof. There were further naval bombardments the following three nights interspersed by air raids day and night indicating an all out effort to drive us from our beachhead. We received some air reinforcements during this period and some naval task forces were standing by while B17s from other bases made raids upon the enemy.

(To be concluded)

The Framework of Marine Aviation

By Captain Garrett Graham, USMCR

IN the November issue of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Major General Roy S. Geiger, who had but lately been relieved as Director of Aviation, Marine Corps, to accept his present command in the South Pacific, stated briefly the mission of Marine Aviation. He thus defined it:

1. To provide air support for the capture of advance bases.
2. To provide the air support for the defense of advance bases until their occupation and defense are assumed by Army forces.
3. To furnish the air support necessary for the occupation and defense of areas for which the Navy is responsible.

In amplification of this, it might be of interest to show the present organization of Marine Aviation as it has been developed to accomplish these purposes.

In any landing operation, the procedure is essentially the same even though the location of the objective, the terrain, and logistical problems will vary with every situation. The missions to be performed by the Marine Corps supporting a landing and the advance inland following such a landing, may be listed as follows: Preliminary operations to reduce the effectiveness of the defense prior to landing; general support in the transport area; special support to troops disembarking and en route to the beaches; the strenuous attack on beach defenses to cover the landing itself, and direct support to the troops as they advance inland to secure the beachhead.

To perform these missions, it is necessary that aircraft operate from carriers, from nearby bases, and from fields within the objective itself, as soon as they become available. Under present arrangements, the carrier operations are performed entirely by the Navy, which leaves the Marine Corps with the problem of operating from nearby bases, and being prepared to occupy and operate from newly constructed airfields or seized enemy airfields within the objective. This mission requires that Marine Corps Aviation be completely self-sustaining for at least ninety days.

The normal procedure followed for a landing operation supported by Marine Corps Aviation will be somewhat of the following order: Aviation engineers will be landed with the landing force and begin preparation of landing fields immediately they are available. Following the engineers, our headquarters and service squadrons will disembark and prepare the necessary facilities on the field to receive and operate airplanes. The next step is to get Marine Corps Aviation onto the field. This may be accomplished in two ways, either by flying in the planes if supporting bases are within range, or bringing them in by carriers as was done in Guadalcanal.

In the occupation of Guadalcanal, aviation was not available to the landing force for thirteen days after the initial successful landing. This was due to the fact that sufficient aviation engineers were not included in the landing force nor was the ground personnel in the Marine Aircraft Group together with their equipment. These were sent up by separate ships after the landing was made. However,

when they did arrive, the Headquarters Squadron and Service Squadron of Group 23 had sufficient aeronautical supplies and machine shop tools to maintain the group in operation until a regular supply system could be set up in the rear areas.

THE proposition of operating airplanes from land bases is considerably different from carrier operations in that the necessary supplies, gas, oil, bombs, and ammunition, must be transported to the area, unloaded, and placed at the field. In addition to this, camp equipment must also be obtained and set up. These requirements are a logistical problem that requires a solution all its own.

After operations began on the new land-based field at Guadalcanal, it was found that the composite group was not satisfactory. It was necessary to set up homogeneous type commands to operate successfully in the defense of Guadalcanal, and to begin offensive operations later on. The air command at Guadalcanal was organized by General Geiger into two subordinate commands, a fighter command and a bomber command. Later on as the number of airplanes available increased and offensive operations began, additional subordinate commands were created, the eventual set up being: Commander Aircraft Solomons, with subordinate commands of fighters, light bombers and torpedo planes, a search and reconnaissance group, and a heavy bombardment group. This organization placed all planes of one type, used for the same purpose, under one group commander. This organization has withstood the test of battle for almost a year, thus proving its soundness.

The most important phase of planning operations is the logistical planning involved in landing and in land-based operations. Each unit needs the service troops required to support its operations under its command, and a separate section of the executive staff charged with the supervision of logistical planning and the employment of these service troops.

To perform all these missions and to carry out the procedure outlined, it has been necessary to organize Marine Corps Aviation on a different basis than either the Army or the Navy. Beginning with a squadron, it is organized as a completely self-sustaining unit. It is prepared to build its own camp, run its own mess, service its own airplanes, and make necessary minor repairs up to and including changing of major assemblies such as wings, engines, landing gear and so forth. It has sufficient transportation for its own needs.

Each group has a headquarters squadron, and a service squadron. The headquarters squadron has a communications section, ordnance section, operations and intelligence section, and an aerological and photographic section. This squadron has personnel and equipment to maintain communications from group headquarters to each of its squadrons, and also to maintain radio communications between ground and group planes in flight. Its ordnance section is equipped to handle all the necessary ordnance repairs for the group and to deliver ammunition and bombs to the



PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT

A naval carrier task force visited Wake Island October 6th to spread ruin and pave the way for a later full-scale attack to redeem this bit of American soil. This plane is about to drop a 1,000 pound bomb in memory of the marines who gallantly fought there.

squadrons. Each headquarters squadron differs slightly according to the type of group to which it is attached.

The service squadron is the same for all types of groups. It has a repair and salvage division, a base upkeep section, a transportation section and a supply section. The service squadron has a complete set of shop equipment for maintenance and repair of aircraft. It is capable of doing all repair work on airplanes up to that which requires manufacture. This includes instrument repair, propeller repair, oxygen transfer, and similar activities. The transportation section can effect practically all repairs required to motor vehicles. The supply section has a quartermaster officer in charge, and has sufficient Marine Corps and standard aeronautical material to support the group for ninety days of normal operations.

The tactical squadrons, the service squadrons, and the headquarters squadrons and an air warning squadron, are combined together into a Marine Aircraft Group. This group is commanded by a colonel. The group staff is a four-section staff with an officer in each of the four sections: personnel, intelligence, operations and training, and supply. This supply officer, or logistical planning officer, is an

executive staff officer, distinct from the group quartermaster who acts in the capacity of a naval supply officer. Each of the Marine Corps groups is a homogeneous one.

The Marine Aircraft Wing, comprises a composite unit capable of independent action for a reasonable period of time. The present organization of the Marine Corps provides for one Marine Aircraft Wing to each division of ground troops. The wing is commanded by a major general who has a four-section general staff headed by a brigadier general, chief of staff. The Marine Corps has four photographic squadrons and some separate service units, such as Marine aviation depots, repair and salvage squadrons, and Marine air base squadrons.


Marine Corps Aviation has been organized with a view to being self-sustaining, and capable of operating from any place that a plane can be landed and taken off. Probably the Marine Corps has the only aviation units capable of independent sustained action. It goes into action with the supposition that no help will be available for some time after the initial landing has been accomplished. If help then comes earlier than is expected, the fighting units regard that as an unlooked for blessing.

Raid On Wake Island*


HERE is photographic evidence of the job Navy fliers are doing to make it hot for the Japs on Wake Island. These shots, taken by carrier-based planes during a recent two-day attack against the Japanese-held island, show the enemy caught napping—their bombers left wrecked and blazing on the runways. Out of 18 medium bombers on the airfield, all were destroyed except one, which was in an isolated part of the field and already dismantled. These planes were largely *Nells*, the principal bomber used in the conquest of the Philippines and East Indies, and *Bettys*, one of Japan's most modern aircraft and a consistent raider in the Southwest Pacific Area (A circles at left).

Photo below shows some fighter planes, *Zekes* and *Haps*, caught on the field during the attack. Many of these were destroyed on the ground or in the air. Heavy damage to concentrations of buildings and water storage facilities is not shown in these photos but the low oblique (below) shows two of the fuel dumps blasted and left burning.

*ANALYSIS OF PHOTOS BY NAVY PHOTO INTERPRETATION CENTER, ANACOSTIA, D. C., reprinted by courtesy *Naval Aviation News*.



- A. Fuel dumps belch black smoke, flames
- B. Revetments built to protect planes
- C. Trenches and barbed wire positions
- D. Trenches, barbed wire circle island



Planes and the Pacific

By Captain Richard G. Hubler, USMCR

MARINE air operations in the South Pacific islands continue to be interesting but inconclusive. Complete data on the forays in the Gilberts as well as Bougainville is not yet available.

There are some facts, however, worth noting. In the original landing at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville, the air umbrella was reported to consist of more than 200 Marine planes. Other squadrons neutralized the nearby base of Kahili and other Japanese airfields in the vicinity.

In the campaign against the Gilberts, the newspaper accounts gave a round figure of 1000 planes. These were undoubtedly Navy planes. Marine planes were among the first to land on the captured strip. Most of them must have come from aircraft carriers since there are few known bases near enough to the captured islands to make fighter flights feasible.

The thousand-plane strength is a formidable figure for the South Pacific. If true, it is the largest single essay of air power yet made in that combat area. It indicates that the stockpile of men and matériel in the field of aviation there is sufficient to warrant such a relatively vast air umbrella. The European theater itself has not too often seen a 1000-plane raid.

It is likewise of interest that little air opposition from the Japanese stood muster at the original landings. There were a few skirmishes over the Bougainville beachhead as the Marines got ashore. But there was virtually no air opposition to the strike against Tarawa.

For a long time it has been the contention of the air strategists that the war-plane production of Japan has been exceeded by her losses—combat and operational—as well as her air needs on the various fronts. The deterioration of the Zero as a fighting plane, too, has been steadily under way, necessitating factory retooling and new models. And the Japanese bombers have never been anything, in pilot parlance, other than “sitting ducks.”

The enemy losses in a single theater alone have been well above an average of 200 a month. This, taken with the fact that the Japanese have only lately begun attempts to rescue their pilots (a departure from their propagandized desire to die for Emperor and country), adds up to a profoundly disturbed enemy air force.

At this moment, Japanese air power strategists find themselves much in the position of the boxer who is constantly kept off balance by the blows of his opponent. So

far they have shown no ability to recover from the early and crushing defeats which were administered to them in the Guadalcanal and Munda campaigns of the sky.

What this means it is hard to say. The enemy may be preparing what they hope may be an all-out try in the air and husbanding their efforts against the day. But contrasted with the rapid and continuing growth of Marine and Allied air power in the Pacific, this appears to be a last-ditch conclusion.

There has been some newspaper criticism of the preparations made for the Bougainville and Tarawa landings. Not all of the prepared Japanese pillboxes were knocked out at Empress Augusta Bay. Many were reduced in hand-to-hand fighting. This was bitterly true again at Tarawa where the Japanese had taken shelter behind heavily-armed dugouts built of coral and five-foot concrete walls with palm-logs imbedded in them. It was the opinion of military observers that it would have taken direct hits from 2000-pound bombs to shatter such posts of steel.

This criticism was in part justified. The official explanation, tacitly accepting the criticism, pointed out that the reason the four-hour naval barrage and the assault with bombers was not continued longer lay in the fact that every second in those hostile waters laid the great invasion fleet open to attack by Japanese submarines or torpedo planes.

The final criticism was of the aerial reconnaissance. This evidently failed to present clearly to intelligence officers the location and depth of reefs outside Tarawa, a difficulty which did not appear to be present in the Empress Augusta landing. One Marine officer remarked that they had the best reconnaissance available. If he was quoted correctly, it means that some method must be found to supplement present means now in use.

Aside from these, however, the latest advances in the South Pacific, spearheaded by Marine and Navy planes, present a clear picture of optimism. There has never been much doubt about the superiority of American and New Zealand pilots to those of the Japanese. Nor has the Zero been able to equal the performance of such planes as the F4U Corsair or the F6F Hellcats. The need has always been for more planes and more pilots.

This need now seems to be adequately supplied. The rest is up to time.


The Art of Generalship

FOR what art can surpass that of the general?—an art which deals not with dead matter but with living beings, who are subject to every impression of the moment, such as fear, precipitation, exhaustion—in short, to every human passion and excitement.

The general has not only to reckon with unknown quantities, such as time, weather, accidents of all kinds,

but he has before him one who seeks to disturb and frustrate his plans and labors in every way; and at the same time this man, upon whom all eyes are directed, feels upon his mind the weight of responsibility not only for the lives and honor of hundreds of thousands, but even for the welfare and existence of his country.

A. VON BOGUSLAWSKI.



BEFORE THE BATTLE

Marines attend Mass aboard a troop transport before the landing on Tarawa. Although they are hearing Mass, Marines manning the gun (left, background) and landing barge (right, background) stay close to their posts, ready for instant action.

Bringing the Church to the Marines

By Captain Robert D. Workman, Ch.C., U. S. Navy

LONG time ago, I served as a noncommissioned officer in an expeditionary force of Marines in a tropical land. The Church did not follow the Marines in those days and those of us who desired to worship God had to seek out native churches and, sometimes, astonished missionaries in order to accomplish our purpose and desire. Perhaps that is why I am so keen about the present policy of the Navy Department, which strives to provide the ministrations of religion to those men who desire it wherever the Marines serve.

To that end, the Chaplain's Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel has had a share in seeing that every combat unit of the Marines has a chaplain. The division chap-

lains, for the most part, are experienced regulars who have served with Marines in times past, and some wear ribbons for service in Marine expeditionary forces. In addition, a senior regular (Chaplain Alfred deG Vogler, USN) has been assigned to the staff of the Commanding General of the Fifth (Marine) Amphibious Corps. In order to correlate the work of the chaplains of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, one of the famous chaplains of our Navy (Chaplain W. A. Maguire, USN) has been detailed to headquarters at Camp Elliott. Efforts are now being made to furnish a Jewish Chaplain with each Marine Division and it is hoped that within a short time such may be the case. In assigning chaplains to a division, the Bureau of Naval Per-

sonnel takes care that leading denominations are represented on the roster, and that the proper proportion of Catholics and Protestants is realized.

The Marine bases and shore stations are not neglected. In every instance it is the aim of the department to furnish an adequate roster of chaplains to provide real religious ministry. On some Marine posts, beautiful and inspiring chapels have been built, and it is the universal testimony that such edifices have increased the interest and attendance of all hands. Reports keep coming to my office that where Houses of God have been built, services for the worship of Almighty God are crowded each Sunday and consequently the spirit and the morale of the post is lifted to an appreciable degree. In every man's life religion should have its place; a fact which more and more men are coming to realize. I hope that money may be provided so that every Marine post may have adequate, attractive chapels for the worship of God.

NOT all chaplains who enter the Navy are prepared to serve with the Marines—by reason of age, temperament, and training. No chaplain is nominated by my division for this duty unless a board of chaplains is satisfied that he possesses those characteristics which will enable him to fall in with and carry on the high traditions of the Corps in which he will serve. Such chaplains as are selected from the graduating classes of the Chaplains' School are then sent to the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico for further instruction and indoctrination. In those schools they take up studies in the classroom and in the field with Marine Reserve officers. They soon become acquainted with those details of combat which will make them an asset and not a liability on the field of battle. In addition, a strenuous course in "combat religion" has been set up at Camp Elliott, California, to train chaplains who are about to go overseas. This is over and above the training at Quantico. This course contains physical conditioning, first aid, a course of map reading, field trips with troops, participation in a night attack problem, instruction in field sanitation, cure and prevention of war neuroses, and the observation of many motion pictures which vividly portray the right and wrong way of serving as a chaplain with the United States Marines.



A chaplain talks informally with a group of Marines in the field. While chaplains are officers of the Navy, they may wear Marine uniforms, with the permission of the CO, when serving with Marine Units.

The Navy Department has placed a chaplain near you. That chaplain knows a great deal about your training and ability to fight, because he has been through the training with an infantry company in the field. The chaplain was appointed to the Navy because he was properly trained as a clergyman and was given to the Navy by a Church which provided that training. Thus the Navy Department has brought the Church to you through its representative, the chaplain. If you are looking for an opportunity to worship God, you will not be compelled, as I was, to seek out civilian services which are unfamiliar and sometimes not understood. Instead you will find close at hand a worthy chaplain striving to serve those who wish the values of religion and the religious life. More than this, I want to believe that every chaplain is prepared to help his men with other matters—their problems, their plans for the future—in fact with any matter of a personal nature, they desire to discuss with a friend. The chaplain is every Marine's pastor and friend and stands ready to help you.

Navy Develops Paper Parachute for Supplies

THE Navy Department has developed a paper cargo parachute and orders for its production are now being placed by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Such a parachute is expected to be especially useful in dropping supplies, as in cases where troops in combat areas are cut off from their lines of supply.

The new cargo parachute is made from specially creped kraft paper and has been in the process of development and testing for the last four months by the paper commodity section in the stock division of the Bureau of Supplies

and Accounts. The parachute will safely carry a load of 100 pounds when released from a plane flying at a speed of 180 miles per hour. It is 16 feet in diameter when open, and will withstand any kind of atmospheric condition, not being damaged by rain or other climatic factors.

To be used only for dropping supplies from the air, the paper parachute costs approximately one-fifth as much as the standard escape parachute and will effect a considerable saving in nylon and other fabrics used in ordinary parachutes.

"Seek, Strike and Destroy"

The Anti-Tank School at Camp Elliott

By Lieutenant Martin J. Maloney, USMCR

With illustrations by Pfc. Harry Jackson, USMCR

ON the 75mm. firing range at the Training Center, Camp Elliott, the ponderous-looking half-tracks whirl in a great cloud of dust. The gun crews, each man in his action station, cling to the steel sides of the 9-ton vehicles. After a few seconds of maneuver, the half-tracks straighten so that the 75s mounted on them point toward the targets—stationary silhouettes 1,200 yards away.

Before the vehicles come within 15 feet of their stopping place, the gun commanders turn to their crews.

"Action!" they call; and the men begin to unlimber the guns.

Then come the fire orders; and the loading of the weapons; and then the gunners, crouched behind their telescopic sights, say: "Ready—fire!"

Almost together, the guns blast heavily, and in a second or two puffs of dirty smoke framing the red flash of explosive blot out the target.

"Short!" say the gun commanders.

In such exercises as these the Marines attached to the Anti-Tank Section, Training Center, Camp Elliott, spend many of their hours in training. "Anti-tank men must be as good marksmen as we can make them," says Lieutenant W. J. Luzmoor, officer in charge of the school. "We believe in doing all the range work that time will permit."

The Anti-Tank Section was activated in November, 1942. From November until April, it continued to function successfully; but was then temporarily discontinued because of an impending oversupply of anti-tank personnel. The school was recently reorganized, and now turns out a new class of trained anti-tank weapons men every two weeks.

Assignment to the Anti-Tank Section is much sought after by most marines who are sent to the Training Center for combat instruction. Anti-tank training is "good duty." The men enjoy the work, take pleasure in the chance to study, strip and fire the assortment of weapons which are the anti-tanker's equipment. Out of a single battalion in training, as high as one hundred men have volunteered for training in this school, when only fourteen could be handled. Consequently, from among these men, instructors are normally able to pick men well-qualified for the work.

"We like to get men who have had extra experience with weapons, especially those who have attended Armorers School, or something similar to it," they comment. "And men who have some knowledge of tanks or tank weapons are naturally good material."

In addition to men with technical training and experience, the Anti-Tank Section is now beginning to get a fair percentage of students who have had combat experience.

Like the other special schools at the Training Center, the Anti-Tank Section sets its objectives and plans its

courses in terms of Marine Corps experience in past wars, as well as the present one.

"We now have detailed information on how anti-tank weapons were used in the Solomons," Lt. Luzmoor remarks. "We know that they were often used more as mobile artillery than as tank destroying tools. For instance, 37mm. guns were used, loaded with canister, against enemy personnel, while 75mm. guns mounted on half-tracks were employed as maneuverable artillery to shell anything within range, including ships off-shore. So we feel that we must train men to be as versatile as possible in the use of their weapons, at the same time concentrating our main effort upon training in the destruction of enemy tanks."

LIKE other schools of the Training Center, the Anti-Tank Section divides its curriculum into basic, technical, and tactical training. Basic training here means basic infantry work: scouting and patrolling, security, cover and concealment, creeping and crawling, and so on. But it is infantry training with a difference, being slanted to the peculiar needs of anti-tank work. A man who ships out with a battery of anti-tank guns, or as a member of a tank-destroyer unit, has no assurance that he will spend his time serving or firing the big guns, or driving a truck. The anti-tank weapons in combat frequently require security units to protect them against enemy snipers or infantry. So the anti-tank men must be skilled in the use of small arms, in cover and concealment, in camouflage, and in effecting security measures.

Camouflage training for anti-tank crews goes far beyond the training which the average rifleman receives. These





men are taken into the field, taught the rudiments of individual camouflage, and then graduated to the difficult tasks of making the 37mm. guns and their prime movers, and even the big half-tracks and 75s, invisible to enemy ground and air reconnaissance.

"Camouflage is something an anti-tank man can't know too much about," said one NCO instructor. "These weapons are just twice as good targets to the enemy as most. In the first place, they're poison to mechanized attack and must be knocked out for that reason. In the second place, they're big and fairly hard to hide. So we learn how to hide them well."

But the staple of technical training in this school is weapons instruction. The school states its objective in this respect: "We try to teach our men to handle all small arms weapons, as well as the heavier guns which are used against armored vehicles." The heavier weapons are, of course, stressed. The men learn to use and care for any kind of weapon which will damage or destroy a tank or armored vehicle; and such a program of study today includes a surprising variety of weapons. They learn to strip, assemble, clean and make minor repairs on the .50 caliber machine gun, the 37mm. and 75mm. guns, the new AT rocket discharger, the rifle grenade and AT mines. They are taught the fundamentals of demolitions: how to set explosive traps for enemy tanks, how sticky bombs and Molotov cocktails are made and used, how anti-tank mines may be improvised out of odds and ends from the messhall and sick-bay.

Finally, blending the various skills they have acquired in the previous seven weeks, the anti-tank crews spend their final week of training on anti-tank tactics. They learn the theory and practice of mechanized warfare: where, how, and with what purpose enemy tanks and armored vehicles may be expected to attack. They learn to identify at a glance the tanks and armored vehicles of the United States, of the other allies, and of our enemies; this skill is essential, since the gun commander, gunner or scout of an anti-tank crew must be able, in the dust and smoke and confusion of battle, to spot an armored vehicle, classify it instantly as enemy or friendly, know its strength in defensive armor and fire-power, and make his plans accordingly. Small scale models of enemy and allied tanks and armored cars and trucks

are made available to them for this study. Then they are taught the potentialities of anti-tank weapons in dealing with armored blitzkrieg methods: how the half-tracks and fargo mounts may be maneuvered and the weapons deployed; what constitutes a good cover position, or firing position; when to stand fast and maintain fire, when to shift positions.

Much of this information comes to the men in the form of practical knowledge, gained through experience; for the Anti-Tank School frequently works out problems in co-operation with the men of the Tank Battalion, another unit of the Training Center. Plans are at present being made for an even more extensive demonstration problem, in which tanks, anti-tank weapons, infantry, paratroops, and planes will take part. Such realistic, large-scale problems have been found to be the most profitable kind of training.

NOT the least important detail of both tactical and technical training in this field is the actual firing of AT weapons. During their training, the men have ample opportunity to fire the .50 caliber machine guns, the 37mm. and 75mm. guns. Much of this firing is combined with exercises in the tactical movement of vehicles and weapons, and with gun drill.

But the men do not fire their weapons full caliber without hours of preliminary training and subcaliber firing. Plans are now under way to permit trainees from the Anti-Tank Section to use the facilities of the Waller Gunnery Trainer, a complex electrical device which lets gunners fire at moving targets projected on a screen, totaling their scores of hits and misses automatically. At present, a large proportion of time devoted to marksmanship is taken up with subcaliber firing. Both 75mm. and 37mm. guns are fired subcaliber. The subcaliber device, consisting of the firing mechanism of a 1903 rifle with an elongated barrel, is fitted into the bore of the weapon to be fired. In firing, the sights and trigger mechanisms of the pieces are used as they would be used in expending regular caliber ammunition, and the accuracy of the devices, at relatively short ranges, is great. Tracer ammunition is always used in subcaliber firing, so that the effects of firing can be readily observed. Thus, this device permits an exceptional amount of realistic and valuable firing practice without the expenditure of great quantities of ammunition.

That subcaliber firing and other training devices have paid dividends is apparent from the high standard of marksmanship attained by the men in an extremely short space of time. Firing full caliber, the men aim at stationary silhouette targets set up from day to day on the anti-tank ranges. For 37mm. guns, moving targets are employed. A new anti-tank range is now under construction for the Training Center, complete with a complex system of moving targets, which will permit a great variety of ranges and elevations of targets to be fired at, as well as a great deal of latitude in maneuvering the target. But whatever the type of target, the men quickly adapt to the new firing conditions and acquire a remarkable degree of accuracy.

Night operations climax the tactical training offered by the Anti-Tank Section. "Night problems must be stressed," Lieutenant Luzmoor comments. "Our men must learn how

to handle their weapons and vehicles by night, and on unfamiliar terrain, since that is exactly what will be expected of them in combat. They must, above all, be able to bring up anti-tank weapons and put them into position under cover of darkness. We even have our people manhandle the split-trail 37s over rocky, hilly terrain and put them into firing positions."

Most difficult of the night problems are "tank hunts." Anti-tank men learn to hunt tanks by night, much as a Rocky Mountain hunter goes after mountain lion. Whatever vehicles are available at the time of the problem are manned and taken to a "bivouac area" on one of the combat ranges, where they are dispersed and camouflaged. These vehicles, together with their crews, represent the enemy armored force. An attacking force of anti-tank men, led by officer and NCO instructors, who are not informed of the location of the "enemy" position, moves off to locate and destroy the hostile vehicles.

The attackers send out reconnaissance patrols to locate and survey the bivouac area. If they are successful, the attacking force splits into small parties in order to enforce the attack. In each party there is a scout, a demolitions man, a man armed with an automatic weapon, a patrol leader, and a rifleman. Several separate parties, thus constituted, may attack the spread-out bivouac area at the same time. Their duty is to get into the bivouac area—unseen and unheard, if possible—and place explosive charges on or in


the vehicles, wherever they will do the greatest amount of harm.

The "enemy" is permitted the use of their usual weapons, together with booby traps and smoke.

These problems, simulating as they do many of the most trying features of combat at night, have proved to be excellent training for both officers and men. The men take part in them with enthusiasm. It is not unusual for men from previous classes to ask permission to go on later night operations of this type.

The training background of instructor personnel in anti-tank work has been uniformly good, both in respect to theoretical training and combat experience. A large percentage of NCOs have had previous experience in the Marine Corps with the same weapons they now handle as anti-tank instructors, or with similar weapons. Several of the instructors are graduates of the Army Tank Destroyer School at Fort Hood, Texas; one of them has had six years' experience in the Field Artillery, U. S. Army; and several have seen service in the Pacific area during the present war.

The general consensus among staff officers of the Training Center is that the Anti-Tank Section is likely to continue to expand in the near future, as much as it has in the immediate past. Anti-tank training has already proved its value in recent Pacific campaigns, and is likely to become even more useful when the war expands into the larger and more highly mechanized terms of land fighting.



Respective Ages of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps

DURING the first half of the year 1775, the American colonies raised their own military and naval forces. These troops and vessels all belonged to the individual colonies.

On June 14, 1775, Continental Congress *Resolved* "That six companies of expert riflemen be immediately raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia; that each company consist of a captain, three lieutenants, four sergeants, a drummer or trumpeter, and sixty-eight privates. That each company, as soon as completed, shall march and join the Army near Boston, to be there employed as light infantry, under the command of the Chief Officer in that Army. . . ."

(*Journals Cont. Congress, 14 June 1775, II, 89-90*)

"On the 15th of June, 1775, the Army was regularly adopted by Congress, and the pay of the Commander-in-Chief at five hundred dollars a month." (Irving, *Life of Washington, I, 413*).

It is recorded that "After much debate, Congress decided to raise an army, and on June 16, it created a military establishment consisting of a commander-in-chief, two major generals, eight brigadier generals, one adjutant general, and numerous subordinate officers."

"On June 30, 1775, it adopted army rules and regulations."

"In this legislation of June 1775, the Continental Army originated." (*Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1927, 1158*.)

The Regular or Continental Navy may be said to date from October 13, 1775. For, on that date, Continental Congress *Resolved* that two naval vessels be fitted out, one of which was to be manned with "eighty men" (including Marines); and on that same date appointed a Naval Committee of three members.

On November 2, 1775, Congress authorized the Naval Committee to "agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and command the four vessels that had been authorized."

On November 10, 1775, Congress authorized the raising of two battalions of marines. Samuel Nicholas received a commission as captain of marines signed by John Hancock on November 28, 1775—the date of the Rules for the Regulation of the Navy. This commission precedes that of any Naval officer.

The Continental Army (New Army or Regular Army) came into existence January 1, 1776. General Washington marked this memorial date in his orderly book with a general order reading, in part, as follows: "This day giving commencement to the new Army which in every point of view is entirely Continental."



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Loss and Gain at Tarawa

THE Marines have taken as heavy losses as those upon Tarawa before and come back fighting. The losses in the Gilberts in the space of 76 hours amounted to more than 3500 men. Over a thousand were killed and two and a half times that many were wounded in that now-famous amphibious operation.

Compared with the number of men involved—which is not that given in newspaper guesses and which must remain a military secret—this is a heavy loss. But recent Marine history shows that our troops could take as heavy losses concentrated in a much shorter time and return in a few weeks to combat duty.

At Soissons in September, 1918, during the last war, the Sixth Regiment (in which the retiring Commandant, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, commanded a battalion) lost 1331 men out of 2100, most of them in less than an hour. There were 65 officers in the regiment and 53 were casualties. One company went into the Soissons affair with 168 men and four officers. One officer and sixteen men came back.

At Tarawa, the Marines had to storm a strongly-fortified and bitterly defended coral atoll. At Soissons, twenty-five years ago, they had to attack hastily prepared German positions across an open, rolling wheatfield.

Though the Marines did not have to face quite the concentrated and modern firepower such as the Japanese had, they had even less protection against the German machine-guns and .88 millimeter cannon. Yet in a few weeks they were ready for front-line duty again.

It is interesting to note that the Twenty-seventh Division of the Army, in which one regiment—the 107th—suffered the heaviest casualties in the history of the Army—

about forty percent—during its attempt to break the Hindenburg line in September, took Makin Island in the recent action with comparatively light losses. Makin was garrisoned with less than a tenth of the Japanese forces on Tarawa and lightly fortified.

The Marine Corps is not happy about the heavy losses at Tarawa. It is never happy about losses. But the Corps is proud to say that it is a Marine tradition that the units who have suffered most have always come back and come back fighting.

New Year Prophecy

AN AMERICAN who has spent many years in Japan and who knows the Japanese people intimately sends us this significant observation and prophecy. His name and position can not be indicated because of the danger of reprisal against his friends and former associates still under enemy control. He writes:

"I am so glad the *Gripsholm* is bringing back another lot of people. I know so well what is in their hearts and I hope a third trip can be made. The people who are locked up must be having to go through hell. I only wish some of the military prisoners could be exchanged but I am afraid that can't be done. Ahead of us are some dreadful stories of unbelievable suffering. We still have a long way to go until we get to the heart of that huge Japanese octopus. What I fear more than anything else is this growing wave of optimism of our people and newspapers that victory is in the bag. We are still without adequate bases in the Pacific war and we still have far to go to vanquish the formidable Japanese enemy.

"There is absolutely no chance of internal collapse within Japan until she has been absolutely defeated. They will fight until they cannot fight any longer. They are formidable because of their regimentation, their training and their will to see it through. The only answer to their endurance is that their army means business. In Japan, the soldier comes first, last, and always. Economically speaking, Japan treats its civilians as ruthlessly as it treats the enemy. They are forcing their people to live at the very lowest possible point of subsistence.

"To them this is as much psychological war as anything else. They have become so imbued with a spiritual strength through their military propaganda machine that they have an over-rated misconception of the strength of the Japanese army and the 'softness' of the American troops. I believe their highest military leaders are working on a theory something like this for ultimate victory. They have a confidence that maybe America will come to terms before our troops can regain lost territory. This, when you analyze their thinking, is not as foolish as it may sound.

"The Japanese military leaders hope to attain this goal, first by exaggerating what they hope to accomplish in the war. Secondly, they hope to create in our minds, how costly in lives, time, and equipment a continuation of the war would be. Thirdly, at the proper time after Germany has collapsed, the military cabinet in Japan will fall and be replaced by a conservative party. Nevertheless, the military party will remain in power. The Americans, with the instigation of a conservative, civilian cabinet in power, will be anxious to come to terms.

"I believe this clique believes that the peace talks will



Authorized

U.S. INFANTRY
U.S. MARINE CORPS

AUTHORIZED SHOULDER INSIGNIA



1st Marine Division



2nd Marine Division*

THE MARINE CORPS today wears more shoulder insignia than ever before in its history. Corps, divisional and even unit patches in varicolored designs now emblazon the left shoulder of the uniforms of Marines on leave and on duty—safe in the forward combat areas.

From the two insignia used by Marines in World War I—the Star and Indian Head of the 2nd Regular Army Division, of which the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments were a part; and the Fifth Brigade insignia of the 11th and 13th Regiments—the Corps has expanded its authorized shoulder insignia to no less than a dozen such different patches, shown on these pages.

Origin of such insignia generally is attributed



1917-1918, 2nd Div., A. E. F.

to the Allied forces in World War I, and originally adopted for purposes of swift identification of units on the field of battle—mainly by the British and their colonial forces. In the present war the British forces still use the shoulder patch (with a corresponding hat band in many cases) for identification purposes. But the Americans, with few exceptions, prohibit divisional insignia from being displayed in any area where it may be seen by the enemy.

It has been said that such insignia is the modern phase of the heraldry of ancient times—and support to this is given by the fact such insignia are worn on the **left** shoulder, as the left arm of the knight of old was the one which carried his shield, emblazoned with his rank or

* Drawn from verbal instructions.



Defense Battalions



Paramarine Units




5th Amphibious Corps



Raider Battalions

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS



1st Marine Amphibious Corps



1918 A. E. F. 5th Marine Brigade

crest. In America the first such shoulder patch was authorized by General George Washington in the American Revolution, for purposes of distinguishing rank in battle, and the present Purple Heart Medal was originally a shoulder patch, and also worn on the left shoulder of the uniform.

Such shoulder insignia are comparable to the college colors and the fraternal emblems so widely displayed. It is important, in its military usage, not only as an aid to recognition but as an element to instill pride of outfit into the wearer.

General use of shoulder insignia, however, began with the official approval in World War I when the Eighty-first Division, enroute to France in 1918, created their Wildcat shoulder patch,

made of felt, and sewn on the left shoulder. Subsequently all Divisions, both at home and abroad, received authorization for individual designs, and soon special branches, Army Corps and other units had their distinctive markings. There are more than 125 such insignia now in existence in the forces of the United States.

In designing a new shoulder patch the first rule is that it shall not conflict with nor closely resemble any existing one, nor any

used by the enemy. Instant recognition of any insignia is a primary essential. Only one such insignia may be worn at any time by any member of the armed forces—and always on the **left** shoulder. Wearers may continue to use the insignia until joining another unit having its own design.



3rd Marine Division



Aviation Engineers



Service of Supply



SUPPLEMENT TO

Headquarters Bulletin

JANUARY, 1944

This Supplement Furnished By THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

continue for several years and in that time the Japanese will exploit what American and British territories remain in their control and when the time comes for signing the peace terms, Japan will refuse and will set the stage for World War III. These, in my estimation, are some of the things we are going to have to guard against happening. Our problem with the Japanese is to get them to conceive of defeat. That I fear can only be accomplished by wrecking their lines of communication, by setting up an effective blockade, and by bombing their cities and industries.

"I hope you have read Hugh Byas' *Government by Assassination* and Hillis Lory's *Japan's Military Masters*. I do not think we can effectively win this war unless we have widespread understanding of the spirit of the motivating force behind this whole conquest of East Asia that Japan has undertaken. We must especially drive home to all our men preparing for our particular service that they will not be effective unless they understand this 'driving power' behind Japan's whole war effort.

"At the same time we have got to prepare our fighting men for a whole new understanding of racial understanding and we have got to make every man and woman and child of these United States open their eyes to the vast new horizon this war is opening up for the world of tomorrow. True, the cancer lying behind the military drive of the Axis must be completely carved out, but when peace does come, we have to recreate a world wherein all men of every race, including the enemies of today, can count on justice and order and law. The Churches are making a magnificent effort in studying Ways and Means to a Just and Durable Peace, but the Churches have got to put the same kind of intensive drive that our armed forces are putting in for the defeat of the enemy, if the rank and file of our beloved country are going to measure up to the kind of peace we want."

Marine Corps Journalism

MARINES are more noted for fighting than for writing; nevertheless, during the past two years, the rapidly increasing size of the Corps has led to a corresponding increase in journalistic activities and today the Marine Corps has a sizable and respectable press of its own.

First of all comes our old friend, the *Leatherneck*, which has blossomed forth with its December issue in a new and fancier format. Printed by gravure, the new *Leatherneck* seems to combine many of the features of *Life*, *Collier's*, *Look*, and the *Saturday Evening Post*, with passing respects to the old *Police Gazette*. The first issue in the new style contains a bit of everything from "A Christmas Thought" by the Chief of Chaplains to a discussion of what makes a pin-up girl, illustrated by Betty Grable.

No doubt some will like the *Leatherneck* in its new dress and some will deplore the changes. There is no doubt, however, that the stepping up of the tempo of our breezy contemporary represents genuine journalistic enterprise on the part of Captain Walter W. Hitesman, Jr., and his editorial associates.

Another magazine that has undergone a considerable change is the *Headquarters Bulletin*. Formerly a mimeographed official notice sheet, this has become a full-fledged monthly magazine with a colored cover and a variety of

contents. The editor is Major Milton V. O'Connell, a veteran of Guadalcanal and Rendova.

Of the newspapers published at posts and stations, the oldest is the *Quantico Marine Sentry* now in its ninth volume. A noteworthy feature of this paper familiar to most Marines is the column entitled "Our Corps" by "Old-Timer"—MT/Sgt. Percy A. Webb (Ret.).

Camp Lejeune has a lively weekly in the *New River Pioneer*, of which Captain Cecil S. Stowe is the executive editor. This newspaper does much to create a sense of unity at this huge base which covers so much territory. Sections are devoted to each of the many activities at Camp Lejeune, including a column for the women Marines in training there. Its features include a sports page, a society column, and a post gossip column entitled "Strictly Scuttlebutt."

Largest and most ambitious of the post newspapers is the *Chevron*, published by Marines in the San Diego area. The Officer-in-Charge is Captain James E. Parsons, assisted by a staff with its own artist and photographers. The *Chevron* is not only distributed to every Marine in the San Diego area but dozens of copies are sent to every Marine unit overseas and to every post, station, and barracks in this country. The *Chevron*, therefore, has a cosmopolitan character and features reports from combat correspondents and special correspondents in all parts of the world. In addition there is a column entitled "This Week" containing a summary of war news for the special benefit of Marines overseas.

While these are the best known of post newspapers, other periodicals, large and small, are to be found almost everywhere our Marines are stationed. One of these entitled *Front Lines* is published "Somewhere in the South Pacific," and doubtless there are others that have not come to our attention. We are always glad to receive copies of these periodicals.

These are our contemporaries. Each of them is doing a good job in its own field and we send all of them our greetings and best wishes for the coming new year.

"Biphibious" Tactics

TWO appointments in the combat area of the South Pacific are worth more than congratulations. One is the announcement of Major General Ralph J. Mitchell as commander-in-chief for air in the Solomons. The second is the elevation of Major General Roy S. Geiger to the command of the Bougainville theater of operations at Empress Augusta Bay.

Both officers are key men in Marine aviation. Both have formerly been Director of Marine Aviation. The names of both, especially that of General Geiger, are linked to the earliest days of American flying.

It is perhaps significant of the rôle that Marine aviation is taking in the South Pacific. For a long time the air arm has been doing great things with less than a measure of credit. Now, however, with Pacific air power going to new peaks of offensive strength and the Marines in the forefront of it, the larger responsibilities of the high-ranking officers of the air have been matched with rank.

It is legitimate to speculate upon such a policy. The just desserts of Marine aviation, of course, remain in step

with the desserts of the line officers. But these promotions, especially under the aegis of a new Commandant who is keenly aware of the contribution of air power to the future of the Corps, may be the herald of even more all-embracing tasks.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill coined the word "triphibious" to cover combined land-sea-and-air operations. To describe the Pacific jungle and ocean needs of campaigning, another word must be minted. It is "biphibious," a sea-and-air operation. The volcanic islands of the Solomons and the coral atolls such as Tarawa are not well suited for land fighting. On one, the jungle and terrain prohibit the traditional troop maneuvering; the seizure and retention of a relatively small area will secure an island ten times or more the size of the occupied territory—a fact which was evidenced on Guadalcanal and emphasized on such islands as Santa Isabel, Choiseul, Kolombangara, and others in the Solomons group.

What was done at Pantelleria by the Army Air Force cannot be duplicated in the South Pacific because of the wide difference in locale, supplies and degree of settlement. But in small areas the task of reducing the enemy's works might be accomplished to such a degree that the land troops might have no more than a mopping-up job.

The theory of the use of biphibious operational tactics is not intended to deprecate the importance of ground troops. The latter will, in the final analysis, always be the force which takes and keeps a position. But their lives can be saved and their objective more easily won by the emphasis upon the biphibious plan in the early and middle phases of the coming battles of the South Pacific.

New Magazine Section

BY authority of the Commandant a magazine section has been set up in the Historical Division at Marine Corps Headquarters. Its purpose is to encourage and expedite the writing and publication of articles of current interest by commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Corps, and to secure a flow of such articles to general and service magazines.

Any such articles, if deemed to have sufficient merit, will be cleared for security and submitted to editors or publishers thought to have the greatest interest in the subject. Whatever fees may accrue will be sent to the author.

A few simple rules should be followed by those who feel an urge to write about their experiences in this war.

First they should have something to say, and a reasonable amount of aptitude for saying it on paper. The magazine section quite naturally is not prepared to conduct a primer course in basic English, nor to teach aspiring writers how to break into the magazine field.

But if a member of the Marine Corps has knowledge of or has participated in some episode that would reflect credit upon the service and that would, at the same time, be of interest to the intelligent reading public, his written account of this will be welcomed by the new magazine section.

Material must be compatible with facts, and in good

taste. Controversial subjects should be avoided. While every American has the right to hold and express whatever political, religious, or economic views he sees fit—that is one of the principal things for which we are fighting this war—the magazine section of the Historical Division has no intention of becoming involved in acrimonious disputes about anything. It is not going to help grind any axes.

The basic rules of security should be pretty well known to every Marine. Movements of ships or troops, details of future plans and policies, criticism of strategy or tactics, invidious comment about our allies or other branches of the American service, description of equipment, are all obviously taboo.

Some stories can possibly be better told in fiction than in straight articles. This is perfectly all right, if it's publishable fiction. Poetry might be permissible, but a man should know something about poetry before he tries to write it.

The distribution of material will be handled through the magazine section of Navy Public Relations. The personnel of this section, in both its Washington and New York offices, is composed of officers who have had wide experience in magazine publishing and editing, and who are familiar with the current needs and policies of leading publications.

There are many Marines with past writing experience. Undoubtedly there are some without previous experience but with definite talent. It is hoped that those in both categories will submit material. They should first ask themselves if their ideas are unshackled, authentic, interesting to intelligent readers, in good taste, and in the best interest of the service. Stories and articles meeting these requirements should be sent to Officer in Charge, Magazine Section, Historical Division, U. S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington 25, D. C.

A Marine Corps Reader

NEARLY all branches of the service have published "Readers." These are mostly collections of short articles which, taken in their entirety, constitute a more or less comprehensive picture of what the organization stands for and what it is doing in the war to date. The Commandant, Marine Corps, has authorized the Marine Corps Association to publish a *Marine Corps Reader*. Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf will act as editor. The Association will sponsor the project and receive profits, if any, which accrue from the royalties on the book. Since the Association is not a profit organization, the main purpose will be to get the largest possible book for the least money. It is hoped that we will be able to retail the book for about \$3.00. Suggestions of published articles that might be included will be welcomed.

A drive for pre-publication sales will be started in the following issue of the *GAZETTE*. The wholesale pre-publication price will be considerably less than the normal wholesale price on books. Individuals will be allowed to place pre-publication orders at a corresponding reduced price.

The *Reader* will be published about April 1, 1944.

The Japanese Rahambu

By Captain Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., USMCR (Inactive)

OF the Japanese weapons likely to be captured by American troops from time to time, and suitable for turning against their original owners, probably the most important and useful is the Model 96 1940 ("Rahambu") light machine gun. One of these is included in each Jap infantry squad, replacing the 1922 Nambu.

The M96 would be the first choice to turn against the enemy, as it is undoubtedly the most reliable Japanese automatic small arm. The following notes are intended to be helpful to any American marine or soldier into whose hands this weapon may fall, to enable him to understand it and use it effectively. A subsequent article will deal similarly with other Japanese small arms.

Name and designation: JAPANESE MACHINE RIFLE, TYPE 96 ("Rahambu"), CAL. 6.5 mm. (also later models probably 7.7 mm.).

Date of adoption: 1940. This is the latest Jap LMG.

Origin and source: the Model 96 is a conglomeration of features taken from the French M1924 LMG (Hotchkiss), the Czech ZB, and the Bren gun. However, it has certain features which are not similar to either weapon. The breech locking system is probably attributable chiefly to the Japanese. On the whole it appears that the basic features are closer to the French than to the Czech-British. The rear sight is especially similar to the British Bren, however.

Weight, empty, without bipod: approximately 18 pounds.

Weight, including bipod: approximately 19.5 pounds.

Weight of leather sling with snap hooks: 0.5 pounds.

Weight of magazine: approximately 0.8 pounds.

Length overall: without flash hider. 41.5 inches. (Length of flash hider approximately 3.5 inches, or total overall length with flash hider approximately 44 inches.)

Length with bayonet: approximately 60 inches. The Model 96 has standard bayonet lugs and mounting shaft on the end of the gas cylinder plug for adaptation of the standard Arisaka rifle bayonet, an unusual feature in a light machine gun.

Length of barrel without flash hider: 21.5 inches.

Weight of barrel: approximately 5.8 pounds.

Barrel changing: the Model 96 barrel is fixed, and assembled apparently with permanent threading and drift pins in such manner as to require the services of an armorer to change the barrel. The barrel is air-cooled with radiating rings running the full length.

Magazine capacity: double column detachable box magazine holds approximately 30 rounds. (Some reports indicate that the Japanese have a 20-shot magazine as well.)

Location of the magazine: similar to the Bren, French M1924, Czech ZB, Danish Madsen, Mexican Mendoza. The magazine is located on top of the receiver, the cartridges feeding down and being engaged by the top edge of the breech block in feeding into the chamber. Gravity as well as the tension of the magazine spring forces the rounds


into position in the feed lips. The disadvantage of this location of the magazine is in the fact that it interferes to some extent with the operator's field of vision in picking up targets. The advantage is that the magazine does not stick out underneath the gun, as with the B.A.R., permits the gun to be placed very close to the ground, and the magazine is kept out of the dirt and mud when the operator is forced to take a position under such conditions. It is also easier to remove the magazine from the top than from the bottom when changing magazines. However, the movement involved in changing magazines on top of the gun may in some instances give away the position of the gun crew.

How loaded and fed: the cartridges are inserted into the detachable box magazine in the same manner as the B.A.R., Bren, etc. It is not known whether a loading machine is provided, such as the Bren magazine loader. The detachable magazine being filled with cartridges, the magazine is grasped in the right hand, the protective hinged cover over the open-topped breech is opened to permit the introduction of the magazine, and the forward end of the magazine is thrust into the forward end of the magazine aperture, the rear end then being dropped down forcibly to engage the magazine latch. The magazine latch lever extends upward from the receiver and at first glance might be mistaken for a battle peep sight as it has a large hole bored through its center. This latch being securely engaged in the magazine, the cartridges are fed from alternate sides past the feed lips by the forward motion of the breech block.

Cyclic and deliverable rates of fire: the cyclic rate of the Model 96 is probably 500-600 rounds per minute. The gas adjustment nut on the front end of the cylinder bracket provides five different-sized gas port holes numbered one through five inclusive. Number one is the smallest and number five is the largest. The variation in cyclic rate permitted by these adjustments probably gives a range of from 450 to 650 rounds per minute. The larger holes of course are normally used when the gun is fouled up, sticky or dirty. By firing full 20- or 30-shot bursts with one function of the trigger, and changing magazines within 3 to 4 seconds



The Rahambu Type 96 6.5mm Light Machine Gun. This is the latest model Japanese machine gun, patterned after the British Bren and French M1924 Hotchkiss.



Breech details of the Rahambu.

deliverable rates of 200-250 rounds should be maintainable for short intervals of several minutes without undue damage to the barrel.

How fired, how cocked: full automatic fire only. There is no semi-automatic fire control. The gun is cocked with the breech block open, as with the Bren, ZB, B.A.R., etc. Pulling the trigger drops the sear out of engagement with the breech block permitting it to close and lock. The final stroke of the piston shaft with solid lug hammer strikes the firing pin and fires the round. This action keeps up until the trigger is released or until the gun is empty when the breech block remains in the closed position, unlike the Bren which is held in the open position when empty. The change lever on the left of the gun is set for full automatic when pointed forward and for safe when pointed upward.

Sights: The sights are offset on the left of the gun, as with the Bren, ZB, etc. The front sight consists of a square post with blade approximately $\frac{1}{8}$ inch wide, protected by two vertical ears similar to the U.S. M1917 Enfield. The front sight is attached to the forward cylinder bracket. The rear sight is almost identical to the British Bren except that windage is provided. The elevating wheel which is set on the left side of the receiver permits movement in 100 meters of range from 200 to 1600 meters inclusive. The body of the elevating drum is cut out so that each range is signified by a large, clearly readable figure, 2 to 16 inclusive. As the knob is thrown beyond the 1600 yard elevation, like the Bren, the sight leaf drops back to the 200 yard point. The elevating wheel turns a cam which forces the sight leaf upward in an arc, the sight leaf being urged downwardly against this cam by a strong spring.

Rotating the elevating wheel of the sight toward the operator raises the sight and rotating the wheel away lowers the sight.

An unusually interesting feature of the Model 96 is the windage adjustment, not found on any other European weapon either of the rifle or light machine gun type.

Ammunition used: 6.5 mm. Japanese. (7.7 mm., similar to British .303 in some later models.)

Muzzle velocity: Model 96, with 21-inch barrel: 2400 foot seconds. (In 7.7 mm. the bullet weighs 174 grains, case is of rim type. Velocity at muzzle same as 6.5 mm.)

Extreme range: maximum elevation, probably 2800 yards.

Effective combat range: 400-800 yards.

Description of automatic operation: The action is of the gas type, the gas being taken from a port approximately $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches back of the muzzle. Powder gas impinging upon the piston, which is approximately .75 inches in diameter, drives the piston shaft assembly rearward. After a short interval of travel, permitting the pressure to drop in the chamber, the angular cam surface on the piston shaft extension contacts the vertically-positioned rectangular-shaped breech lock riding in vertical slots in the receiver, the top cross-section engaging a slot in the breech block. The further action of the cam on the piston shaft extension forces the breech lock downward, thereby disengaging the breech block from the receiver. This permits the breech block to be carried further rearward by the piston shaft extension. The latter stops against the back end of the inside of the breech block through the contact of the vertical lug, also serving as a hammer, which rides in a slot through the bottom of the breech block.

As these parts move rearward a stop-lug in the side of the breech block is cammed across by the cam channel in the receiver. This causes the stop-lug to obstruct the piston shaft extension hammer lug so that it cannot move forward against the striker until the parts have returned to the forward and locked position, at which time the continued forward motion of the piston shaft actuated by the driving spring provides sufficient force to strike the firing pin and fire the cartridge. During the backward stroke the driving spring is compressed. As the breech block passes to the rear, the ejector on the left side of the receiver is cammed across the face of the path of the breech block. This forces the empty shell out through the ejection port on the right hand side of the receiver, the port being normally covered by a spring-hinged flap designed to keep dirt and dust out of the action at all times.

Primary or initial extraction of the empty case is aided by a slight angle in the locking shoulder in the breech block. This movement provides for slower initial extraction and eliminates the oil pump which the earlier Jap Nambu and M92 require.

Notes on Operation: *To load*—Grasp the cocking handle on the left-hand side (same as B.A.R.) of the receiver just ahead of the front end of the magazine aperture, and pull the handle fully to the rear, keeping the face away from the operating handle extension shaft which will extend out past the end of the receiver. The action being cocked open, slide the cocking handle forward to the closed and normal position. Open the magazine loading cover by pressing upward with the right thumb on the spring detent of this cover at the left top side of the receiver. Insert the fully-loaded magazine by engaging the forward end and dropping the back end down to engage fully with the magazine latch. To fire, throw the change lever into the forward position or to put on safe, raise the change lever into the vertical,



THE RAHAMB FIELD-STRIPPED

Parts not shown: back plate and spring guide shaft assembly (block with about one foot shaft extending), the mainspring, the bipod assembly, the magazine.

upward position. When the trigger is pulled the weapon will continue to fire until the trigger is released. On the last shot the breech block will remain in the closed position. If the action seems sluggish open the gas port to a larger hole.

To change magazines—Push forward on the top of the magazine latch with the heel of the right hand and at the same time grasp the magazine body with the fingers and thumb of the right hand and urge the top of the magazine slightly forward and up past the now disengaged magazine latch. Pull the magazine forward and out of the receiver, and replace the next magazine as described above. (Make sure that the magazine has not been damaged or the ammunition dirty or muddy when loading the piece.)

Stripping: To strip the Model 96 light machine gun for cleaning or emergency repair, first make sure that the weapon is empty, opening the magazine cover on top of the breech, pulling the handle back and forth, and then leaving the moving parts in the forward position, handle forward, change lever on "fire."

1. Grasp back plate retaining knob on lower left rear end of receiver, and rotate towards rear and upward. When the pin is in the upward position pull it out to the left.

2. Grasp the knob on the back plate, lower side, pull back hard on the back plate. This will pull off the back plate to the rear, including the mainspring or driving spring guide rod which runs inside of the piston shaft extension.

3. Pull out the driving spring (mainspring).

4. Grasp the carrying handle in the right hand, elevate the muzzle to 45 degrees if practicable, but otherwise grab the operating handle and pull it smartly to the rear. This

movement will urge the breech block and piston shaft extension assembly rearward and out of the rear end of the receiver. It may be necessary to shake the piece a little or reach in with the fingers and grasp the back end of the assembly in order to withdraw it. In doing so care should be taken not to drop the parts so that they will become lost.

5. Breech block and piston shaft extension assembly being removed from the gun, this unit may be disassembled as follows:

6. Lift the breech block up off from the hammer lug on the piston shaft extension.

7. To remove the striker, with the point of a bullet or any similar tool push the striker lug rearward to lift the striker up and out of the bottom of the breech block where it lies in the slot.

8. The hammer stop lug which lies in a slot on the side of the breech block may be removed by pushing it out through its slot from the breech block. Care should be taken especially not to lose this piece as the weapon will not function safely without it. This should suffice for field stripping.

Special Directions for assembly:

With the hammer lug of the piston shaft extension assembled into the assembled breech block, insert the piston through the rear end of the receiver, and carry the parts forward into alignment with their guide slots in the receiver. The breech block will not enter unless the parts are in this position as the hammer stop lug will protrude and interfere in the channel provided for it. (It should be noted that this component normally rides with its cam end into the breech block and can only open so as to permit the

hammer lug to move forward and hit the striker when the parts are in a closed position, at which point the cam channel of the receiver is cut away to permit this lug to swing outwardly.) The mainspring or driving spring is assembled to the guide shaft on the back plate assembly, seated in the hole in the piston shaft extension and pressed forward, the operating parts being in a forward position.

With the operating handle drawn to the rear the operating handle shaft can be disengaged. In assembling the operating parts the operating handle should be pushed into the forward position preferably.

Comments: in comparison with other gas-operated light machine guns of the same general type, the Model 96 is particularly simple. Field stripping for a normal cleaning and care in the field involves less than a dozen parts.

Unlike the Jap Nambu and the Jap Hotchkiss the Type 96 does not appear to require oiling of the cartridges, as proper primary extraction is provided through a slight angle of the lock abutments.

Being a type of weapon with the breech block cocked open, the Model 96 has a definite advantage in that the breech is so well protected, especially the ejection port with its flapper. In fact that is about the most appealing point on the weapon in comparison with others.

For a weapon of this type it is not badly balanced, although this is not of too great significance in view of the fact that it is impractical to fire it from the standing position on moving targets. It is definitely not an off-hand piece, although no worse in that respect than the 21.5 pound B.A.R. with its two-pound bipod mounted on the flash hider. Such, however, is not the mission of these weapons, which are primarily designed for bipod fire.

The Japanese have nothing special in their latest-type light machine gun. Its ammunition is considerably less powerful than that of the United Nations.

In fighting a defensive war the Japanese infantry squads will use a lot of these weapons. Their effectiveness should not be underestimated.



Clasps and Stars for Major Campaigns

CLASPS to indicate participation in the major campaigns of the present war, and bronze stars, indicating action in the principal engagements, may now be worn on Area Campaign Ribbons authorized for Navy personnel. Authorization to wear a campaign clasp is given by Fleet Commanders, who may grant permission only for combat with the enemy or for duty which, in their judgment, is equally hazardous.

The clasps are small bronze numerals, worn in the center of the Area Ribbon. The numeral indicates the number of campaigns in which the wearer has taken part. In addition to the campaigns specifically named, Fleet Commanders may authorize the wearing of clasps for armed guard, escort, anti-submarine or special service such as service aboard a minesweeper or supply ship, though only one special service clasp for minor engagements may be authorized.

Small bronze stars may be worn for each major engagement in which the officer or man has participated.

The campaigns for which clasps may be worn, and the dates covered by the respective campaigns, are as follows:

Central Pacific; beginning December 7, 1941, terminal date to be announced.

Asiatic Campaign; December 8, 1941 to March 3, 1942.

Corregidor-Bataan Campaign; December 26, 1941 to May 6, 1942.

Aleutian Islands Campaign; beginning June 3, 1942, terminal date to be announced.

New Guinea Campaign; November 1, 1942 to January 24, 1943.

Northwest Africa Campaign; beginning November 5, 1942, terminal date to be announced.

The engagements to be indicated by the bronze stars are:

Pearl Harbor, December, 1941; Wake Island, December, 1941; Macassar Straits, January, 1942; Marshall-Gilbert Raids, January-February, 1942; Lombok Strait, February, 1942; Java Sea, February, 1942; Wake-Marcus Raids, February-March, 1942; Salamaua, March, 1942; Tokyo Raid, April, 1942; Coral Sea, May, 1942; Midway, June, 1942; Makin Raid, August, 1942; Guadalcanal-Tulagi Occupation (includes Battle of Savo Islands), August 7-9, 1942; Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal, August 10 to later date; Battle of Eastern Solomons, August 23-25, 1942; Battle of Cape Esperance, October 11-12, 1942; Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, October 26, 1942; Algeria-Morocco Occupation, November, 1942; Battle of Guadalcanal, November 12-15, 1942; Battle of Lunga Point, November 30-December 1, 1942; Wake Island Raid, December, 1942.

The Secret Weapon That We Do Not Possess

By Lieutenant Colonel John S. Letcher, USMC

Obedience—military discipline—is “the secret weapon that we do not possess,” in the opinion of the writer. Other experienced officers may challenge his contention, particularly so far as the Marine Corps is concerned. But at least his viewpoint and suggested remedies deserve thoughtful consideration.

WHEN the present war began there were many rumors of secret weapons which were said to be the cause of the brilliant victories scored by the German armies in the Polish campaign in 1939 and in Flanders and France in 1940. Since that time the phrase “secret weapon” has been used to describe the values and virtues of everything from canned meat products fed to our soldiers to the technical knowledge of our munitions makers. The advertisements of our magazines teem with announcements that our troops have a secret weapon in this or that product which is advertised.

There is however one secret weapon which we definitely do not possess. It cannot be seen like a new airplane or tank, but its presence or absence in a military organization can be quickly felt. This weapon is not new. It is as old as the profession of arms and it is the keystone of a successful military organization. It is called *obedience*, and is that which causes a soldier to obey orders. Our soldiers do not possess it.

This statement may be challenged. Some persons may contend that our troops are obedient, though I do not believe that the persons who contend this will be those who have served with troops since the beginning of the national emergency. To meet this contention if it arises I will state facts which bear out my statement that our troops are not obedient. In doing this let me say that it is not my desire to air dirty linen by stating these facts and bringing to light the shortcomings of our service. This article is written for publication to service personnel and has as its only object the thought of correcting existing conditions. If that can be even partially accomplished any damage done to our reputation will be more than compensated for by the increased efficiency of our corps.

In the Marine Corps, wherever I have served, every 4 x 4½ ton vehicle, better known as the “jeep,” has had to be fitted with a shackle and a padlock so that the gears can be locked whenever the vehicle is not in use. This is done in order that the vehicle will not be stolen. Now, if we cannot prevent our soldiers from stealing vehicles to such an extent that every vehicle must have the gears shackled and locked we certainly cannot say that our soldiers are obedient to our orders which prohibit the unauthorized use of government-owned vehicles.

Again, in one organization in which I served, it was ordered that men would carry their weapons whenever they left the camp. This order was necessary because the camp

was in the combat area and enemy stragglers might have been encountered. The order further stated that weapons would not be fired except at the enemy. The order was duly promulgated to all personnel. On the Sunday following the issuing of this order I walked into the jungle a distance of two miles from the camp. During the hours that I was in the jungle from about nine o’clock in the morning until two in the afternoon I conservatively estimated that I heard not less than one thousand rounds of rifle, Reising gun, and carbine ammunition fired at birds, beasts, fish in the streams, or at just nothing at all. Of a half dozen men that I accosted and asked if they had not heard of the order, all admitted that they had, but said they thought “they were far enough away from camp,” “allowed to hunt,” or told some similar story.

These examples of lack of obedience to orders which I have cited could be added to by many others, but I believe that they are sufficient to meet any challenge to my contention that our soldiers are not obedient.

The steps which we must take to remedy this situation are: first, correction by example; second, correction by education; third, correction by coercion.

The first step, correction by example, is by far the most important. By that I mean that all officers and non-commissioned officers must be made to set an example of obedience to the enlisted men under their command. To do this the following principle must be recognized and adhered to from the top of our service to the bottom. This principle is that *the higher the rank of a commissioned officer or enlisted man the more strictly must he be held accountable for obedience to orders and for proper performance of duty*.

If an enlisted man be absent because of drunkenness he will invariably be brought to office hours and awarded punishment varying from deprivation of liberty for a week with extra police duties to a Deck Court, which may award reduction in rank, confinement for twenty days, or loss of pay. Generally the punishment awarded to a private will be more severe than that awarded to a noncommissioned officer. The punishments given in these cases are in inverse ratio to the rank of the offenders. The principle which I set forth above is reversed and becomes “*The lower the rank of a commissioned officer or an enlisted man the more strictly shall he be held accountable for obedience to orders and for the proper performance of his duty*.”

Rank carries with it extra pay and many privileges, but it also above all else carries with it a greater responsibility for

obedience to orders and proper performance of duty. Rank either among officers or enlisted men must never under any circumstances be allowed to carry with it the privilege of disobedience to orders.

IT is imperative that the leaders of a military organization, the commissioned officers and the noncommissioned officers, set an example for the enlisted men under their command. They must obey orders and perform their duty in such a manner that their actions are above reproach and are an example to their men. Place yourself mentally in a private's uniform and think what your reaction would be to the case where an officer is unable to be present for duty and goes unpunished, and where the private commits the same offense and is punished. (And do not believe for one instant that the private does not know about it.) Your reaction would be resentment and probably determination to get away with anything you could. When you were exhorted to do your duty as a soldier and to obey the orders of your superiors you would listen with your tongue in your cheek. The American soldier will never respond to the kind of leadership in which the officer says, "Do as I say, and not as I do." He will obey his superior officers only if they are superior to him in obedience and soldierly virtues.

To carry out the principle which I have enunciated, and to cause the officers and noncommissioned officers to set an example for the enlisted men under their command, requires that all commanding officers set a high standard in themselves in obedience and in the performance of duty and to rigidly exact the same from their subordinates.

It will be extremely unpleasant for commanding officers to discipline officers whom they have perhaps known for a long time, or officers who because of the nature of their duties are in close association with them. No military duty is more difficult to perform and more unpleasant than this, but the commanding officer holds a position of trust from his government which carries with it an unalterable mandate to enforce obedience to orders and to require the proper performance of duty of all officers under his command. He cannot allow sentiment or friendship or sympathy to cause him to deviate from his duty.

Enlisted men will be quick to respond when they see that the pace in obedience and the proper performance of duty is set and maintained by their superior officers, and that more rigid obedience is exacted from their officers than from them. Correction by example will eliminate many of our disciplinary troubles.

The second step, correction by education, means that we must educate our men to the importance of obeying orders.

The American youth, who is now a soldier, has been taught all his life to regard military authority and military orders with repugnance. Such teaching has been a principle of our educational institutions. The youth of America have been assiduously taught that discipline and military obedience are un-American so we have to combat an educated hostility to obedience. The result is that the American soldier must now be educated to obey orders.

To overcome this hostility to obedience we must, I believe, explain to our men the reason for orders which they must obey. If we can explain the reason for the order and show how disobedience to the order jeopardizes our health

or lives and our chances for victory most men are intelligent enough and are generally desirous of doing what is right so that they will carry out the orders.

Some officers will say that it is a bad policy to explain the reason for orders because we should have unquestioning obedience, or when the time comes when we receive an order for which we cannot explain the reason, then the men will not obey the order. I do not believe that this is the case. As I have pointed out, we have an educated hostility to obedience to orders which we must combat and I believe that explanation is one of our best weapons to combat that. A very large majority of our men are anxious to do their duty towards winning the war, but they have been educated to be critical of military authority and we must by showing them the reason for orders, get them on the side of obedience to the orders.

IN furtherance of this education of their men, battalion and company commanders must learn to speak to their men in such a way as to lead them. When they have an order to explain to their men they must present it clearly and in a manner which appeals to their intelligence and engenders coöperation and a desire to comply. If they present the matter dictatorially and in such a manner that hostility is produced, obedience to the order will not be secured. On the other hand during an explanation of an order great care must be exercised. Officers must never allow any criticism or discussion of the order to arise which an agitator may sometimes attempt to promote. The officer explains the order, gives the reasons for the order, but brooks no discussion or criticism of it and no compromise in regard to obedience to it. He must remember that he is a military leader when he speaks to the men, and that they are called to hear him and not to conduct any round-table discussion or criticism of the order in any way.

Perhaps an illustration of the explanation of an order might help at this point. Let us say that a battalion commander of a battalion in the field receives an order from higher authority which requires all men to shave daily. Now, shaving daily in the field does not seem necessary to many of the men. It entails shaving in cold water and using a helmet or canteen cup as a wash basin. Many men will see no reason for the order and will resent it. They will insist that a few days growth of beard on their faces does not reduce their fighting ability.

The battalion commander at an assembly of the battalion has the order published. He then says that the order will involve some discomfort, but that it is necessary because men who don't shave become untidy and slovenly generally in their dress and person. Such a condition causes them to lose the self-respect which a clean-shaven man has and causes them to fail to keep themselves bodily clean. Being unclean they become more likely to contract diseases and thereby endanger their health and that of their comrades. He points out that the principle of a soldier's keeping himself clean and neat is found in the world's best armies and that in the armies where cleanliness and neatness of person are disregarded morale is low and disease prevalent. He states that the Marine Corps must be the best force in the world and that it can be with every man doing his part to make it so. He states that if everyone went

about unshaven, the forces would soon resemble a cross between a band of gypsies and the insurrectionists of a banana republic, rather than the first class fighting force which we wish to be. He then dismisses the battalion.

Now there is no question in my mind that obedience to the order will be far better in the battalion when such an explanation is made for the reason the order was given than if no explanation is given, and that if the order is simply published and disciplinary action taken when it is not obeyed.

Sometimes of course orders will be given for which the commanding officer cannot give good reasons. In such case he must then fall back upon merely stating that it is a soldier's duty to obey orders whether or not he understands the reason for them and he must himself set a rigid example of obedience to the order, but if an explanation can be given it should be I believe.

Another step which may be classed as education in obedience is close order drill. Since the introduction of the simplified close order drill in 1939, there has been a sharp decline in the smartness and military bearing of our personnel. Men no longer march with smartness unless they are on parade.

The present drill is so simple that it may become monotonous and uninteresting in a few minutes. The intricate movements of the squad, platoon, and company which were required by the old drill regulations required the attention and concentration of nearly all men and noncommissioned officers. The movements maintained interest in the drill because all men had a part to play in them. It was possible to keep men alert and interested during a long period of drill. At present, there are so few movements and they are so simple that the drill lags and its value is lost.

Close order drill was formerly a primary means of developing confidence and leadership among noncommissioned officers. When the old close order drill regulations were in force, noncommissioned officers took great pride in being able to drill a platoon or company. The long periods of drill which were necessary to teach the movements of the old drill gave NCOs a more frequent opportunity to act as drillmasters. The drill developed their bearing and manner of giving orders and developed their leadership by giving them pride and confidence. It was almost axiomatic that a good drillmaster was a good noncom. The present drill is so simple that a moron can understand and give the commands for every movement, so there is small accomplishment now in being a good drillmaster. The qualities of leadership in our NCOs have diminished and this has led to a lessening of discipline and obedience among our troops.

I well realize that a return to the old type of close order drill is impractical at the present time. So we must do the best we can with the present drill to use it to secure smartness and obedience by requiring that more time be given to close order drill and that the movements be smartly and properly executed.

To advocate that more time be spent on close order drill will undoubtedly bring sneers from some persons who will declare that close order drill does not win present day battles and that all of our training time should be devoted to battle training. They may quote from various articles

written by German officers which will say that they give little time in the German Army to close order drill and train always for battle. To these contentions, I have answers. The answer to the first is that we have much time that we cannot devote to battle training and which could be devoted to close order drill without detriment to our battle training, and second that the German soldier has been indoctrinated from childhood to obey orders without question. From the day that he was born he has been taught to revere military authority so the problem of teaching our soldiers obedience cannot be compared to theirs. Their soldiers have it when they enter the army. Ours do not have it and it must be developed in them. Well conducted close order drill will help to develop it.

THE third step of producing obedience to orders, coercion, is generally needed by only a small percentage of the men in a command, but if the coercion is not applied firmly and severely to recalcitrant personnel the disobedience of these men grows rapidly to where it can be a very grave menace to the efficiency of an organization. Other men see the recalcitrants "getting away with" disobedience and may be tempted to follow their example. Always soldiers' respect for the military organization is diminished when they see offenders being inadequately punished or not punished at all.

The disciplining of personnel by a commanding officer is a problem which requires the most careful study. He must always control his temper, he must be just, and he must be careful to distinguish between men who are wilfully disobedient and those who are merely improperly imbued with the spirit of obedience necessary in a soldier.

The punishments prescribed in Navy Regulations are, I believe, of sufficient severity to discipline all but the most hardened characters, if the punishments can be and are properly applied. Unfortunately, when troops are in the field, conditions are such that often punishments cannot be given which are adequate to bring a recalcitrant soldier to a condition of obedience to authority. It should be impressed upon all officers that the time to teach obedience is when the troops are in garrison, where punishments can be carried out. If obedience is not learned before the soldier enters the field, it will be too late to teach it there.

There are several things which I believe will help in our efforts to secure obedience by coercion of recalcitrant personnel. The first that I propose involves a change in Navy Regulations. The change is that the convening authority and not the members of a court martial award the punishment for an offender. The convening authority is responsible for the discipline of his command. He should, therefore, be allowed to order whatever punishment he sees fit upon a guilty offender, the punishment of course, being one of those which is allowed by Navy Regulations. The court-martial should only determine the innocence or guilt of the offender. The convening authority should award the sentence.

The reason that I urge this change of court-martial procedure is because as I have said, the convening authority is responsible for the discipline of his command. If an offense is committed and the offender is tried and found guilty and the punishment for the offense is given by members of the

court who are not responsible for the discipline of the command, we have a situation which is improper. When we make the commanding officer, who is the convening authority, responsible for the discipline of his command, we should let him alone set the punishment for offenses and not have the court set the punishment. If we let the court set the punishment, the responsibility for the discipline of the command is partly taken from the commanding officer.

In addition to the above, the practice of the court setting the punishment rather than the convening authority creates awkward situations. Here is an example. The commanding general of a division orders that all men found asleep on watch shall be tried by general court-martial. He convenes general court-martials in all regiments. In the 1st Regiment, the court tries an offender for sleeping on watch, finds him guilty, and awards a sentence of two years imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge from the service. In the 2d Regiment, the court tries an offender for sleeping on watch, finds him guilty, and awards a sentence of six months imprisonment and a bad conduct discharge. Both courts come to the convening authority for his approval. What shall he do? Perhaps he believes that the sentence of the 1st Regiment court was a proper sentence and he would like to approve it, but the offender in the 2d Regiment was convicted of the same offense and received a much lighter punishment. Both men belong to his division, and his sense of fairness makes him loath to approve the sentence of both courts as they stand, because one offender would be much more severely punished than the other. He cannot increase the punishment of the 2d Regiment court, so while he may feel that the punishment ordered by the 2d Regiment court is inadequate for the offense, he nevertheless, in fairness to the offender tried by the 1st Regiment court feels that the only thing to do is to reduce the 1st Regiment offender's sentence to the same sentence as was awarded to the 2d Regiment offender.

Now if the court-martials had merely found the men guilty and the convening authority had awarded the sentence in both cases, the situation would have been much more simple and just. The punishments awarded by convening authorities would be, I am certain, more uniform, and fairer to all personnel, officers or men who were tried and the adequacy of punishment would be placed where it should be, in the hands of the officer responsible for the discipline of his organization.


WHERE it is necessary to use coercion on personnel to obtain obedience, a properly conducted brig is an absolute necessity. The recalcitrant soldier is confined as punishment for his offenses. The object of the confinement is to cause him to mend his ways. With that object as the purpose of his confinement, it is important to make the period of confinement unpleasant, so that the offender will not wish to repeat it. Now by saying that I believe the confinement should be made unpleasant, I do not advocate any

unauthorized punishments, but I do advocate that the prisoner be deprived of smoking tobacco, all reading material, and required to perform hard physical labor for eight hours each day. In many brigs, prisoners are allowed smoking privileges, allowed reading matter, and required to perform very little physical labor. A period of confinement, far from being a hardship and a punishment under such conditions, becomes something in many cases easier than the performance of normal duties. The entire object of the punishment is lost and the recalcitrant soldier finishes his sentence with no reformation whatever. In fact, after such a period of so-called punishment any fear that he may have had of punishment is gone and he is more likely to be disobedient than he was previously.

It is my belief that where a soldier is recalcitrant and sets himself against the duly constituted authority, the principle under which we should act is that "the way of the transgressor is hard." We should make his period of confinement as unpleasant as we possibly can without violating Navy Regulations. If we act consistently on that principle, we will have fewer men to confine, and our reform of recalcitrant personnel will be hastened immeasurably.

As a step to securing properly conducted brigs and inculcating obedience to orders among our personnel I believe that the military police units must be strengthened. We must recognize their great importance. Too frequently the M.P.'s have been treated as step-children because they were not going to be in the front-line fighting. It is my belief that we must recognize that they are a vitally important part of our organization. We must constitute the military police of selected personnel in adequate numbers. I believe that by selecting and giving special training to high class soldiers of say thirty years or more of age who might not be able to stand the violent physical exertion required of troops in the front lines, that we could develop a corps of military police that would be of inestimable value. They would be specially trained just as our communication, ordnance, and other specialist personnel are trained. The operation of brigs and prisons, the security of dumps, the control of traffic, would be in the hands of personnel especially trained for these duties who would perform them in a consistent and proper manner.

The observations and ideas that I have set forth herein have been prompted by the belief that we do not possess the secret weapon of obedience and that is extremely important that we do. Many persons may disagree with the ideas which I have set forth. Their experience may have been different from mine. No officer can have served under all conditions or in all units or with all commanding officers of the Marine Corps. My opinions on the matter discussed in this article are based on what I have observed in the organizations in which I have served. These organizations have perhaps been only small cross-sections of the Marine Corps but these cross-sections have been, I believe, typical of our service.



Courtesy *Infantry Journal*.

BUNKER BUSTING*

By Captain Robert M. White, II, FA, Army

THE idea of bunkers, or jungle pill boxes, is certainly not new; however, the ingenuity with which the Japanese have employed them has proven a worthy challenge. At Buna the American forces found the enemy barricaded within a veritable jungle Maginot line with unfordable rivers and the sea on its flanks and rear. The links of this defensive chain were bunkers, organized in depth and mutually supporting.

The Americans used every trick in the book before their persistent and bloody attacks—canalized into narrow corridors by the swamps—finally breached the defenses. Again at Sanananda, the American and Australian ground forces fought bunker defenses; and from Salamaua and Munda, come reports of more bunkers. Despite the excellence of jungle overhead cover, aerial reconnaissance has definitely established that bunker defenses can be expected at most,

if not all, enemy bases in the Southwest Pacific area. Hence the importance of bunker defenses cannot be overestimated.

The reason the Japs used bunkers is geological: the surface of the earth in coastal regions of New Guinea and on most Pacific islands is but two or three feet above sea level thereby precluding the digging of the World War I dugout and its associated trenches. So the Japs turned to the bunker which is essentially a dugout built above the surface of the ground.

These bunkers fall into two general classifications: large, heavily bolstered bunkers located in more or less open ground; and smaller, less heavily bolstered bunkers located in thick jungles where direct laying by enemy (Allied) artillery or precision bombing is impossible.

The foundation for all bunkers is a trench varying in length, for the larger bunkers, from twelve to forty feet, and in width from six to ten feet. The depth of the trench is as deep as the water level permits. From the trench



Marines examine entrance to bunker built by Japs on Cape Torokina, Bougainville. Captain Gordon Warner (left) ran up the first American flag there after leading an attack that knocked out 18 Jap pillboxes.

foundation log columns and beams are erected. The logs are usually ten to twelve inch palm trees. Next, log reveting walls are built either by driving logs as pilings or by laying them horizontally in the traditional American log cabin fashion.

In some bunkers the walls are doubled, employing both types of construction. Following the building of reveting walls, a ceiling course is strung by laying logs laterally to the trench or in layers strung laterally and at right angles respectively. Only rarely are the Japs satisfied with fewer than two or three layers of logs in the ceiling course.

With the completion of this basic superstructure, the reveting walls are reinforced by rows of steel drums filled with sand, ammunition boxes filled with sand, steel plates, piles of logs, large rocks or anything else the Japs can find that will give them protection. Lastly, the entire structure is covered with a bursting course of earth and sand mixed with short logs, coconuts and rocks. For camouflage, the entire mound is planted with fast-growing jungle vegetation which almost overnight blends the bunker into its surroundings.

Bunker entrances fall into two general classifications:

direct openings from connecting fire trenches, or tunnels. In both cases, it is usual for the entrance to be angled or trapped so that the burst of a hand grenade inside the opening will not injure personnel in the bunker proper. Radiating from all bunkers are fire or communication trenches. These trenches are as deep as the water-level permits and lead to various firing positions nearby.

Some bunkers have fire slits in their walls; however, these slits vary in size and number from one or two single-rifle slits to enough slits to accommodate numerous riflemen plus a machine gun or two. Antitank gun and pom-pom slits are sometimes found.

THE primary mission of the bunker is to protect personnel from artillery and aerial bombardment. In practice, the enemy conducts his fire fight from nearby positions until forced by artillery fire or aerial bombardment to take cover inside the bunker. When the artillery lifts, or the aerial attack ends, the Japanese return to their positions and resume the fire fight.

Of course, in those bunkers with firing slits, fire is continued during artillery and air attacks. It should be noted

here that the enemy seldom cuts fields of fire or fire lanes from bunkers. Rather than give away the location of the bunker by cutting these fields, he resorts to fire direction (and observation) from snipers in nearby trees. However, when the tactical location of a bunker permits it a natural field of fire is used.

The true strength of bunker defense is brought into play when bunkers are organized in depth and mutually supporting. A typical example of a limited bunker defensive area was found at the so-called Triangle during the Buna Campaign.

In reality the Triangle was a fork in the Soputa track with one branch leading to Buna Village to the northwest, and the other to just below Buna Mission to the northeast. The track from Soputa was the only track approaching the Japanese right flank and was bordered by deep swamps through which the Americans had attacked and taken Buna Village and the area between Entrance Creek and the Girua River. In order to get into position to attack Buna Mission the Triangle had to be neutralized.

Between December 18 and December 28, 1942, when the Triangle finally fell, the area was subjected to almost daily attacks preceded by heavy mortar and artillery bombardment. After the first five days of persistent attacks (which failed to penetrate the Triangle's bunker defenses) it was ordered that the area should be isolated by driving a wedge through to the sea from across Entrance Creek through the Government Gardens.

After heavy fighting, the wedge was driven and the Triangle isolated from the remainder of the enemy perimeter. Then the Triangle was taken. It was found to include eighteen bunkers connected by fire trenches and skillfully organized to take full advantage of the surrounding jungle and swamps.

This example of neutralizing a bunker defense is not necessarily characteristic in that the position was taken by outflanking instead of direct attack as was the case of Buna Mission, and certain areas of the Cape Endaiadere front and Sanananda. However, the organization of the

position is typical and gives an accurate picture of Japanese employment of bunker defenses in general.

DURING the Buna Campaign, bunker-busting teams were developed. Since the campaign, bunker-busting has been further organized and implemented by specialized equipment. It is not possible to discuss in detail these developments; however, it can be said that, in general, bunker-busting teams break down into two forces. One force has a mission of temporarily neutralizing sniper and ground fire while the second force blasts out the bunker.

No one bunker-busting team operates by itself but works with several other teams, each with the destruction of a specific bunker, in a mutually supporting group, as its mission.

Dummy bunkers have been used by the enemy, and also the enemy does not necessarily continually man all available bunkers in a defensive area. This switching from one bunker to another gives a certain flexibility to the defense as a whole. However, constant pressure by the attacking force and immediate occupation and defense of any unoccupied enemy bunkers frequently facilitates later penetration.

Unfortunately there is a tendency among green troops to disregard unoccupied bunkers, only to have the enemy take them over for further use by counterattack or infiltration (usually at night). To guard against this it is important that the attacking unit be in sufficient strength not only to take, but defend limited objectives such as a bunker, or to be equipped to destroy by demolitions any enemy positions which would prove of value to them if retaken.

In the neutralization of any one bunker, it is also important for the attacking force to be certain all enemy personnel in a "destroyed" bunker are dead. All too often during the Buna campaign, Japs came out of "destroyed" bunkers behind our newly established forward positions to attack us from the rear. The numbers of these resurrected Japs were small and easily eliminated, but their nuisance value was considerable.



Advice From a Wounded Rifleman

THE Japanese are sneaky and treacherous. They shot and injured one of our men, who then started making his way toward our lines. The Japanese withheld their fire until he was within 100 yards of our troops; then the Japs shot him enough to break him down so he couldn't go any farther. They figured that we would send several men out after him, and that they could then kill them. After waiting some time for us to rescue him, the Japs finally killed the wounded man.

Never stand up to dig a foxhole. Lie on one side and dig a while, then on the other. If you are lying down when a mortar shell strikes near you, it won't hurt you so much—and you won't make a good target for a Jap rifleman or machine gunner. I was one of those who stood up to dig a foxhole—and now I'm in the hospital with a concussion. If I had listened to what I was told in training I might still be out there helping to get rid of those Japs. I was a good marksman but not a good soldier—because a good soldier takes every advantage offered. I've learned my lesson.

—*Infantry Journal*.

The Commandos Come Into Their Own*

By Hillary St. George Saunders

THE most distinctive attribute of the Commando troops is that, like the Royal Marines, they go into action from the sea. Landing craft to them are what a lorry is to mechanized infantry. Accordingly, Commando troops are essentially assault, not defense troops. They are expert killers. German propaganda cannot conceal the fact that their name spells fear to Nazi soldiers. A captured German document on the lessons learned from an encounter with Commandos in Crete contains this sentence: "The Allies' specially trained sabotage troops (Commandos) are too good for our defenses."

Night fighting, silent fighting and isolated fighting are part of Commando technique. They carry less equipment than other soldiers, yet must be able to fight as a one-man army. With their blackened faces, their rubber shoes, living on condensed food and on animals they kill, they have nothing to learn from the Japanese in the technique of war by infiltration. In stealth and speed they resemble Arab warriors.

This, in brief, is their story. One week after the fall of France, when the world thought Britain was beaten, a communiqué stated there had been "successful reconnaissance of enemy coastlines. Landings were effected at a number of points and contact made with German troops." The Commandos had made their first raids. The meaning of this astonishing announcement is that immediately after Dunkirk the British recrossed the Channel to attack. Britain, though almost defeated, immediately found out how to assault from the sea. The Germans, who have no sea traditions, have not managed to do this.

The Commandos were designed to act on the principle of the lever. Assaulting in small numbers but with long range, they were to harass enemy forces stronger than themselves.

The enemy's vast defended coastline stretching from Narvik to Biarritz, provided a perfect opportunity for raiding action. Even the lightest threat would compel the Germans, who were planning at that time to attack Britain, to organize heavy defenses and divert troops. To create this threat was the first rôle of the Commandos.

Carried by the Royal Navy, our troops were able to appear at remote places. In March, 1941 the Commandos reached into the northern fringes of Norway and raided the Lofoten Islands. In a few hours they destroyed eleven herring and cod oil factories and eight hundred thousand gallons of oil.

On December 24, the port of Vaagso, Norway, was devastated and German prisoners were brought to England.

On March 27, 1942, the Commandos landed on the Atlantic coast of France at St. Nazaire. Once again they accomplished results out of all proportion to their numbers,

for with the Royal Navy they destroyed the only dry dock on the Atlantic coast capable of holding the German battleship *Tirpitz*.

Then at dawn on August 19, 1942, came the heaviest raid of all—at Dieppe. Commandos silenced the heavy shore batteries that lay several miles inland, east and west of Dieppe, before the main assault by the Canadians on the town. The Germans were thrown into violent agitation throughout northern Europe and expected an invasion at any time. Instead, three months later we invaded northwest Africa.

In the autumn of 1940 three Commando units were sent to Egypt. It was hoped they would be able to play their part with General Wavell's gallant thirty thousand. But after the successful raid on Bardia in April, 1941, the entire Commando force was diverted to Crete. Here, they acted as "rearguards to the retiring army, for which they were neither suitably organized nor equipped." They surmounted this handicap and fought brilliantly to cover the main evacuation at Sphakia, enabling thousands of the Crete garrison to be carried by the Navy into Egypt. Three-quarters of the Commandos' strength was sacrificed in Crete.

Despite this crippling loss, the Commandos were reformed with locally raised volunteers. Two brilliant thrusts from the sea were the action at Litani River, which opened up Syria to Australian forces, and the assault launched from a submarine on Rommel's headquarters 250 miles behind the enemy lines.

The Commandos were in the forefront of the North African landings November 8, 1942, scaling cliffs and silencing batteries at Algiers. In the dash for Tunis, they landed with their American equivalents, the Rangers, far behind enemy lines. The gamble nearly came off, but bad weather hindered the armies in the hill country, and with great gallantry the Commandos and Rangers fought back to the main forces.

With the great amphibious operation against Sicily, the Commandos came fully into their own. Their initial assault on the southeastern coast was perfectly executed. By the dramatic landing in strength at Cape Scaletta, they exercised powerful pressure during the last of the campaign, reaching Messina almost at the same instant as the first contingents of the American Seventh Army coming from the west.

In Sicily the Commandos based on Britain linked up for the first time with their comrades who served in the Middle East. It was announced that "Commandos of the Eighth Army" were harassing the withdrawing enemy. Men who had raided in the snows of Norway, and by night in France, fought beside those who had come through the deserts from Egypt to Bizerte.

*Reprint from the magazine *Britain*, October, 1943.

Winning Medals and Alienating People

By Captain Richard G. Hubler, USMCR

AFRANK and, probably, heated discussion on the subject of awards for the second World War is not a pretty forum. To talk about tinsel and ribbon when death is the bitter fashion appears to be a travesty.

It is necessary for two reasons. First, the men concerned with the giving and taking of the honors—especially the latter—want to know about it. Second, the whole system of honoring American heroes is in danger of falling into disrepute.

All the services are concerned with awards. In order of size, they are the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. There is the Coast Guard; and the Army Air Force which enjoys a status in the Army comparable to that of the Marines in the Navy. The Merchant Marine and other civilian organizations also have their orders of merit.

Since the civilian organizations (which serve the war as well in their own way as the military) have inaugurated such awards as a temporary measure and are not concerned with more than honor due, they will be not entered in the argument. But services rendered and the recognition of such services is the vitamin content of the armed forces. Upon these depends promotion and prestige. Money and influence are in their wake. And, in most cases, such intangibles as tradition and romance.

The awards of the three main services (the Coast Guard and Marines share those of the Navy) are roughly synchronized, though the latter services have their own special medals. The requirements for winning one of these medals are roughly defined. But the only one which has—or, indeed, could have—a rigid rule of award is the Purple Heart. This decoration, originated by George Washington but disused until 1932, goes to any man wounded in action. It has been given to such wounds as a burn on the rear by hot shrapnel and is quite common.

Nevertheless, the Purple Heart award is sometimes given without just cause. A wound is a wound and action is action. Yet there have been instances where it has been reported to a family that a man has died "in action." A check of the records against a claim for a Purple Heart have revealed that the man died of malaria.

Where further difficulty of award begins is just to the north of the Purple Heart when degrees of difference in heroism have to be distinguished. A number of factors set in. As the dignity of the decoration increases, so does the potency of these influences.

One is the personal equation. There is, usually, a central board to determine awards in each service. They must act upon recommendations of superior officers.

It stands to human nature that partiality is shown to one's friends. It does not follow that this partiality puts the awards out of line with services done. But there have been instances of high officers decorating one of their own without compensating awards to the men in the ranks. These are rarely undeserved. But they are poor psychology for the enlisted man, to say the least.

Another is the presentation of the recommendation. This, the manner of its writing and its plausibility and

persuasiveness, often means the difference between a higher or a lower award—and sometimes for any award at all.

A third is the alertness of the commanding officers to the value of awards. One, a blunt, forthright commander, may not have the same standards of heroism as another and refuse to make recommendations; another, brought up in the tradition of bemedalling, may lean in the other direction. One recommendation recently called for the Medal of Honor. Study reduced the award to a letter of commendation.

Fourth is the so-called necessity of the moment. Colin Kelly of the Army is a case in point. He was credited with sinking a Japanese battleship in the early days of the war. Certainly such a feat (unduplicated, if it was done, by any other pilot) deserves the highest award of the Congressional Medal of Honor. On the record, Kelly's superiors could not justify more than the Distinguished Service Cross. A hero was needed at that moment. Kelly was selected for the honor and he remains in the official Valhalla.

Fifth, the attitude of the whole command must be taken into consideration. The Army Air Force is a highly publicity-minded outfit. They believe in medals and a lot of them. General Henry H. Arnold, the genial head of the AAF, came up in aviation when it was having its most desperate struggles to survive. He learned the value of publicity and has never forgotten it. The musical play, *Winged Victory*, done by Moss Hart, a hired Broadway writer, is proof of it. So is the efficient and outsized staff of the AAF publicity bureau. Result: a mort of publicity and a mort of medals.

Sixth, the air forces in action generally have more of a chance to win medals than the ground troops or the sailors in action. A Navy or Marine pilot has five chances of glory (the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Air Medal). The Army has the like except that the Navy Cross is supplanted by the Distinguished Service Cross. The ground and sea fighters have only three chances, and the "responsibility officers" two.

THE various boards of award in the services do their best but it is, like patriotism, not enough. Pressure from all these various directions has twisted the system of awards badly awry.

A command may use it to secure publicity in the great civilian channels of newspapers, radio, books, and magazines. This, in turn, secures the position of that command with the government and enhances the prestige of the commanding officers. Such an accusation has often been directed at the Army Air Force.

It must be added that such accusations lack specific confirmation in most cases. But there are sustaining items which can be directed at each of the services. Perhaps the AAF has offended most: one not-too-prominent Army fighter pilot has fourteen various medals. A comparable Marine pilot has two. Three hundred medals in a batch do not constitute an unusual ceremony for pilots who have

completed no more than two or three routine missions. They have given as many as 1585 at one time—on the Ploesti bombing flight over Rumania.

The Navy has not been as gross an offender. It ranks, in the opinion of many, with the regular Army in its standards of awards. Being a quarter the size of the Army, the Navy is perhaps entitled to fewer peccadilloes in this field than the former. But it has its share—awarding a medal for 250 hours of solo flight and for “diving a plane to a perilously low height.”

Actually, to date, the Navy has been in far more and far more bitterly-fought engagements than the Army—including North Africa and Salerno. So has the Marine Corps. Of the three, the numerical size of the Marines (about 350,000) would entitle them to even fewer sins of award than the others—and, in due respect to all the engagements in which they have been participants since Pearl Harbor, they have been remarkably parsimonious about giving out honors. Perhaps even remiss. The Coast Guard has not been as *outré* as the others in the showering down of honors.

THE total effect of varying standards between the services is a general lowering of morale and a constantly increasing friction. One high-ranking Marine ace, who had shot down double the number of planes that other Army aces had claimed, and who had got the same decoration, used to habitually pick fights in Antipodes bars with Army pilots. Navy men, viewing the mountains of color and insigne upon the left breast of Army men, got to addressing them as heroes.

“Hey, hero,” they might say, “give me a light.”

The unfortunate aspect of the whole affair is that the accusation cannot be directed wholly or even in major part at any one of the services. All have offended. None will

admit it. What is needed is a specific statement of the qualifications of each medal and the standardization of such medals among all branches of the services, possibly among the civilian services as well.

To fail to do this is to encourage justified public speculation as to just what the medals *do* mean. One newspaper commentator observed that medals were given the Army for five bombing missions over Europe while it took twenty-five missions over the Pacific for the Navy and Marines to get the equivalent. From this the invidious comparison was made: the Nazi pilots are five times as tough as the Japanese pilot. It is possibly true that the Nazis are tougher; but to put it at five times is absurd. Yet, it is obvious, the newspaperman had a right to think as he did. The error was in blaming the toughness of the enemy rather than the laxness of the awards.

Ratios of award should be established. For instance, which is the more deserving of the Congressional Medal of Honor: a pilot who has shot down seven planes in a *tour de force* of twenty minutes or a pilot who has headed a squadron and borne its responsibilities for months of a grueling air-sea-and-ground battle? The former got the Medal of Honor and the latter got the Navy Cross.

The answer does not add up to logic nor to desirability.

NOTE: Since this article was written the following has been published by the International News Service:

“Texas Veterans of Foreign Wars have protested the indiscriminate awarding of the Congressional Medal of Honor. A resolution passed by the veterans was forwarded to Congressmen.

“Horace Shelton, departmental judge advocate, declared so many Congressional Medals had been given out in this war that it was becoming as cheap as the Croix de Guerre was in the last war.”

V-Mail Speeded Up

IMPROVEMENT in U. S. Navy V-Mail service has cut delivery time to the extent that letters reach addressees in various areas of the world within the following average periods of time:

Six days—Alaska.

Eight days—England.

Twelve days—Africa, Central Pacific and Samoa.

Fourteen days—South and Southwest Pacific.

Fifteen days—Australia, New Zealand and New Caledonia.

A V-Mail letter takes comparatively little longer time to reach its destination than for a correspondingly dated air mail letter. That time is required to photograph the letter at the mailing point, and to develop and print it at the delivery point.

Advantage of V-Mail is that it takes up less than two per cent of the space and weight of regular mail, thus releasing valuable cargo space for transporting vital materials and minimizing the possibility of foreign mail channels becoming choked.

In the interest of expediting the delivery of all mail to and from foreign ports, the U. S. Navy is urging correspondents to send three of every five letters by V-Mail, for the handling of which 21 new stations have been established during the last six months.

The Navy itself is using V-Mail for official correspondence whenever it is feasible in order to conserve space and now has launched the drive to ask all persons corresponding with Navy personnel to use V-Mail and lighten the air mail loads.

A New Marine Corps Knife

No. 1219C2, Knife, Fighting and Utility


By Captain P. D. Carleton, USMCR

AS soon as marines began their campaign in the South Pacific it became clear that the peculiar conditions of jungle warfare demanded that every marine be armed with a sheath knife. Speed in procurement was important and authorities at Headquarters started very early on the long process that leads from design through specifications to production.

The first official knife adopted by the Marine Corps was a combat weapon designed by Lt. Colonel Clifford H. Shuey, USMC, formerly in charge of the Engineer Division at Marine Corps Headquarters. Patterned after the British commando knife, this weapon was a sturdy, all-steel stiletto, 14 inches long, with a short guard and a knurled steel handle, particularly adapted for use by landing parties

and the raider battalions. Though this type of knife had proved admirable for quick raids on the French and Norwegian coasts and served excellently well the purpose for which it was provided in the Southwest Pacific, it could not be used for both the purposes that any jungle knife must serve: hand-to-hand combat and the daily chores of campaign life; that is, for hacking vines, cutting saplings, or whittling branches; opening cans, preparing food, possibly even for grubbing out foxholes, duties for which the bayonet was too awkward and too tender a weapon and the machete too cumbersome.

Colonel John M. Davis, of the Division of Plans and Policies, and Major Howard E. America, of the Supply Division of the Quartermaster's Department, undertook the



Army Knife.

Marine Knife.
(Fighting and utility.)

(Used by raiders, etc.)
Stiletto.

task of designing a knife that would fill all demands that could be made upon it. In coöperation with knife manufacturers they evolved the form of the present knife by a long process of careful experimentation and test, and set up the final specifications. The necessity for speed and shortages of critical materials made it essential that the type chosen conform in methods of manufacture to those already in use so that the contractors could use existing machinery and materials at hand and not have to waste precious time in retooling. For the form they went back to an early—and time tried—American pioneer type, the Bowie knife with a wide, heavy blade and a hooked point ground on the back approximately two inches from the tip. Blade and tang are made in one piece; the handle is composed of heavy leather washers, oven-dried, grooved to permit a good grip, and held in place by a heavy pommel $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch thick, screwed on to the tank and locked. The blade is seven inches long and one and a half inch wide, provided with a blood groove, and ground in such a manner that the swage grind forms a backbone from the choil to the point. The overall length of the knife is 12 inches; its balance lies a little over an inch back of the guard so that when the knife is held lightly in the hand the point has a tendency to pull up—the correct position for attacking with the bowie type blade. The pommel is heavy enough so that it can be used for hammering; it gives sufficient additional weight to the knife so that when it is swung loosely with two fingers gripped on the pommel, it becomes an efficient light machete for cutting vines or brush.

The knife has been made to meet very severe standards. The steel is high carbon, electric furnace or open hearth, so tempered that it is hard enough to withstand punishing service, and yet so flexible that the blade will not readily break or warp even when bent 20 to 30 degrees from normal. The type of steel, the method of tempering, and

the degree of hardening were agreed upon only after long consultation with the foremost metallurgists of Washington, D. C., and manufacturers were carefully informed just why these rigid specifications had to be met. Only one change was made from the original plans; open hearth steel was used in addition to electric furnace steel* only after it became clear that electric furnace steel could not be secured in sufficient amounts and rapidly enough to supply demands.

After a handmade sample embodying all the features desired was produced through the coöperation of one of the knife manufacturers, it was offered to various officers returning from Guadalcanal prior to its final adoption and was considered by them as the ideal knife for the purposes desired. The Commandant authorized the production of the knife on 23 November, 1942; on 27 January, 1943, the first shipment of 2100 knives to fill the most urgent needs was nearing its destination.

The Army knife, also illustrated, is designed according to the same high specifications as those of the Marine Corps knife, but it is to serve a totally different purpose. It is primarily a rugged fighting knife to be issued to all special troops who do not have the bayonet, though it can be used in a variety of other ways. The sheath of the knife illustrated above is now obsolete and the Army has designed a new sheath of cloth impregnated with a plastic impervious to mildew. This sheath is flexible and light. The Marine Corps sheath is built of heavy leather and fitted with a snap buckle to hold the knife securely in place.

*Electric furnace steel is used to produce the finest of surgical instruments. Because regulation of temperature is more easily controlled in the electric furnace, the steel it produces is likely to be of finer grain than open hearth steel and of more uniform quality. By careful methods of manufacture, however, just as effective results may be obtained with open hearth steel.

THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

APPLICATION FORM

The Secretary-Treasurer,
Marine Corps Association,
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington 25, D. C.

Sir:

I desire to be enrolled as a member of the Marine Corps Association. I enclose herewith a check (or money order) for \$2.00 covering the first year's dues and subscription to THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE.

NAME RANK

ADDRESS

All checks or money orders to be made out to "Marine Corps Association."

Russian Amphibious Operations

By Lieutenant Colonel G. Pshenyanik

The following article is an unsolicited cablegram from Moscow. It deals with the methods used by the Russian amphibious forces in combined operations against the Germans.

This summary of Soviet warfare is worth publishing for two reasons. First, the Russian armed services, long trained under the aegis and direction of German staff officers or their pupils, seem to be developing a distinctive military establishment. Much of their development in amphibious warfare seems to be borrowed both from British and American sources. To this they have added their own specialized tactics.

Second, it is a revealing general commentary upon the strategy of storm which has done so much to turn back the Nazis in the south of the Soviet Union.

ACCUMULATED combat experience in the organization of coöordinated action between the air forces, naval units, and infantry units has permitted the Red Army to draw a number of tactical conclusions.

The most complicated problems of these joint operations is first to assure the security of the landing detachments, then to support their advance. If the shore raid takes place at night, the initial task of naval fliers is to silence the enemy artillery. This may take a considerable period of time but it adds materially to the security of the forces engaged in the amphibious operation.

In the fighting below Novorossisk and Temryuk, active night bombers were entrusted with the two tasks mentioned above. The procedure proved to be highly successful. On the eve of the Novorossisk aerial operation, the system of German artillery posts were carefully studied by Soviet bomber crews. A certain number of night bombers were assigned to attack each individual sector. Russian aircraft flew over the German batteries throughout the night with not less than two planes flying constantly above each target. It was found that the crews of the Russian night bombers could easily locate enemy batteries at night by the flashes of the Nazi guns.

One night bomber unit was ordered to take to the air to secure the landing operations of the Russian marine de-

tachments on the outskirts of Novorossisk. These attacked shore defenses and silenced German post artillery batteries. At the same time, night bomber crews took off in pairs and released their bombs wherever they spotted gun flashes. As a result of this joint action, the marines landed safely and assembled on the shore to prepare for further advance.

Besides destroying enemy gun positions, Soviet night bombers often conducted harassing operations against infantry and tank forces. Northwest of Temryuk, a notable operation of this kind was carried out. Naval landing units carried out a magnificent operation according to schedule after the Soviet night bombers had silenced German shore batteries. The Russian marine forces attacked the shore at dawn and cut off the enemy's lone communication line between Temryuk and Golubitskaya. As a result of this operation, action being carried on both at the flanks and at the rear, Soviet land troops were able to make a frontal attack and to force the Nazis to evacuate Temryuk.

In all such operations, bomber planes must be ready for action at the first streak of dawn. When air reconnaissance crews bring back reports of the movements of enemy reserve troops withdrawn from other sectors and sent to the shore area, the bombers take off to raid these forces.

During the battle of Novorossisk, the Germans rushed reserves from the so-called "Blue Line" in the rear of their central sector to help their harassed units below the town. Soviet reconnaissance crews spotted this movement in good time. A Stormovik formation inflicted heavy losses upon the German reinforcements. In this way, they secured the operations of the marine and ground forces struggling toward the Black Sea port. Stormovik squadrons conducted low-level attacks throughout by strafing enemy combat forces and firing upon Nazi artillery positions and strong-points which lay ahead of the advancing Marine units. Strafing crews concentrated their fire primarily upon pill-boxes, blockhouses, and other enemy fortifications which hampered Soviet ground forces from broadening their base of operations on the coast. Stormoviks also had to attack many different kinds of buildings transformed into strong-points by the Nazi invaders. Marines helped the fliers to locate their targets with the aid of flare rockets.

Cause and Effect

IF we understand the true reason for any single event, then we shall be able to work out the chain of cause and effect, and, if we can do this, we shall foresee events and so be in a position to prepare ourselves to meet them. Our


reason is the director of our actions and also the spirit of our plan. . . . We must analyse its motive and discover where it has failed us; thus we shall turn errors to our advantage by compelling them to teach us.

MAJOR GENERAL J. F. C. FULLER.

MESSAGE WRITING BASED ON OPINION



MESSAGE WRITING BASED ON FACT



OVERLAYS . . . BRIEF AND ACCURATE

Here is a picture of a simple overlay covering message No. 2 in the preceding picture. It contains the same information. For the use of overlays it is essential, of course, that both the patrol leader and the commanding officer have copies of the same map. Note how the overlay is oriented on the map by numbered grid lines. This is all the commanding officer needs to know to plot the overlay correctly on his own map.

BE SURE MESSAGE IS CLEAR. In the picture at the bottom of the page you see a scout out on patrol reading a message back to his patrol leader. The patrol leader has asked him to do this to be sure that the message is clear. When the patrol leader is certain that the message gives all important data and that it is clear, he sends the scout to his commanding officer with the message. The patrol leader also tells his intended future action to the messenger before the messenger leaves. He tells him whether he will continue on his mission, or remain in observation, or go to some other locality which he designates. The commanding officer is sure to ask the messenger what the patrol leader's plans are. Thus, if the messenger is captured there will be nothing in the message itself to tell the enemy where the patrol is at that time. In friendly territory and close to friendly troops, one messenger is enough for each message sent. In hostile territory, or when it may be necessary for the messengers to pass through artillery fire, two messengers might go together or separately.

(Pictures and text from *Scouting and Patrolling*, published by Infantry Journal, 25 cts.)

MESSAGE WRITING BASED ON OPINION

Here you see two messages. These messages contain important data which a man couldn't easily remember. Therefore they are in written form. Note that these messages are numbered in sequence for this mission. The date is clearly marked. The time is shown in the lower right corner under TIME SIGNED. The signature and grade of the writer are given as shown—no initials or other data are given. The message is plain and states clearly all important information of value to the commanding officer. If there were any doubt whether message No. 1 had reached its destination, a summary of it would have been included in message No. 2.

Note the clear distinction made between facts seen or heard and estimates based on opinions. In one case a native supplied the information. This is unmistakably stated. In the other case, a Jap patrol was actually sighted by the patrol leader. This is also clearly stated in the message.

Here is a checklist for every message you write:

- (1) **WHAT DID YOU SEE?** Number of enemy, number and type of each different weapon?
- (2) **WHERE DID YOU SEE IT?** Exact locality?
- (3) **ACTIONS?** What was the enemy doing? If moving, in what direction and at about what speed?
- (4) **WHEN DID YOU SEE IT?** Give the time when you saw the action unless that time is exactly the same as the time at which the message is signed.
- (5) **WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT LOCALITY?**
- (6) **WHAT ARE YOUR INTENTIONS?** (Note this carefully: If you intend to stay about where you are, do not say where you are in the message. The capture of the message might have fatal results for you.)

OVERLAYS . . . BRIEF AND ACCURATE



BE SURE MESSAGE IS CLEAR



Decorations and Commendations

NAVY CROSS

MAJOR EDGAR J. CRANE, USMCR:

"For extraordinary heroism as Commanding Officer of Company B, First Battalion, Second Marines, Reinforced, during initial landings on enemy Japanese-controlled territory in the Solomon Islands Area, August 7-9, 1942. After leading his men to the successful completion of a dangerous and important mission on Florida Island, Captain Crane withdrew his company and proceeded by water to reinforce the attack on Gavutu and Tanambogo Islands. Although menaced by the withering blasts of hostile weapons, he brought two of six boats in to attempt a landing but was forced by extremely heavy machine-gun fire to remain in the water for four hours before he was able to get ashore, completely unarmed. With the small number of men still under his command, Captain Crane obtained arms from friendly troops and continued action against the enemy. His aggressive fighting spirit and courageous devotion to duty, maintained despite great personal risk, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

MAJOR PAUL J. FONTANA, USMC:

"For extraordinary heroism as a pilot during action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area, November 11-14, 1942. When twenty-two Japanese bombers with an escort of six Zero-type fighters attempted to bomb Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, Major Fontana, leading a flight of eight planes, shot down one bomber while intercepting and disorganizing the hostile formation before effective completion of its mission was accomplished. On the following day, he sent down in flames two aircraft while his men destroyed five others of a large formation of enemy bombers about to attack friendly ships off Lunga Point. Later, when a force of our bombers on an important offensive mission was intercepted by twelve fighters, Major Fontana, leading a six-plane flight, courageously engaged the attackers and sent two hostile craft hurtling into the water, thereby contributing to the disruption of the enemy attack. His unconquerable fighting spirit and valiant disregard for his own personal safety were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

MAJOR FREDERICK R. PAYNE, JR., USMC:

"For extraordinary heroism as member of Marine Fighting Squadron 212 in aerial combat against enemy Japanese forces over Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, during September and October, 1942. Throughout that strenuous period when the island airfields were under constant bombardment and our precarious ground positions were menaced by the desperate counter thrusts of a fanatical foe, Major Payne repeatedly patrolled hostile territory and intercepted enemy bombing flights. With bold determination and courageous disregard of personal safety, he pressed home numerous attacks against heavily escorted waves of invading bombers and, in five vigorous fights against tremendous odds, shot down a total of six Japanese planes. His superb flying skill and dauntless initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

CAPTAINS JACK E. CONGER, USMC; FRANK C. DRURY, USMC; ROBERT F. STOUT, USMC; AND EUGENE A. TROWBRIDGE, USMC:

"For extraordinary heroism as members of Marine Fighting Squadrons 212 and 223 in aerial combat against enemy Japanese forces over Guadalcanal, Solomons Islands, from September 15 to November 10, 1942. Throughout that strenuous period when the island airfield was under constant bombardment and our precarious ground positions were menaced by the desperate thrusts of a fanatical foe, these men repeatedly strafed enemy ships and shore establishments and intercepted persistent bombing flights. With bold determination and courageous disregard of personal safety, they pressed home numerous attacks against heavily escorted waves of invading bombers and, in several vigorous fights against tremendous odds, shot down a group total of 25 Japanese aircraft. Their superb flying skill and dauntless initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

CAPTAIN JOHN J. SMITH, USMCR:

"For extraordinary heroism while attached to the First Battalion, Second Marines, Reinforced, during initial landings on enemy Japanese-controlled territory in the Solomon Islands Area, August 7-9, 1942. When reinforcements were urgently needed elsewhere, Captain Smith and his company withdrew from positions on Florida Island where a dangerous mission had just been completed, and proceeded by water to assist in the attack on Gavutu and Tanambogo Islands. Although menaced by the withering blasts of hostile weapons, he attempted a landing but was forced by extremely heavy machine-gun fire to remain in the water for four hours before he was able to get ashore. With the small number of men still with him, Captain Smith immediately obtained arms from friendly troops and, although suffering a painful wound, participated in a vigorous action which forced the enemy to retire. His aggressive

fighting spirit and courageous devotion to duty, maintained despite great personal risk, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

FIRST LIEUTENANT JEFFERSON J. DE BLANC, USMCR:

"For extraordinary heroism as a pilot attached to a Marine Fighting Squadron in combat against enemy Japanese forces in the vicinity of Kolombangara Island, Solomon Island, on January 31, 1943. Setting out with his group of fighter aircraft as escort for a striking force of torpedo planes and dive bombers, First Lieutenant De Blanc and his comrades contacted an enemy destroyer, corvette, and cargo vessel protected by a group of fighter planes. Repeatedly attacking the Japanese fighters as they attempted to drive off our torpedo planes and bombers, he skillfully maneuvered his plane and shot down five enemy aircraft, the last one after his own craft was so badly damaged that he finally had to land on Kolombangara Island. Because of the extremely efficient protection furnished by First Lieutenant De Blanc and his comrades, our striking force was able to attack the enemy surface vessels unmolested, scoring hits on both the destroyer and cargo ships. His superb airmanship and great courage were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

FIRST LIEUTENANT ROGER A. HABERMAN, USMCR:

"For extraordinary heroism as a section leader in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area during the period October 9, 1942 to January 22, 1943. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, First Lieutenant Haberman brilliantly led his section in many hazardous offensive flight missions. During these aggressive attacks on strong hostile forces, the men under his inspiring command shot down sixty-eight Japanese aircraft, of which seven were credited to his own expert marksmanship. On one occasion, although he had been painfully wounded, First Lieutenant Haberman, with unflinching determination, relentlessly continued the action, and, maintaining his superb airmanship, shot one enemy bomber out of the sky. His indomitable fighting spirit and courageous devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

FIRST LIEUTENANT FRANK H. PRESLEY, USMCR:

"For extraordinary heroism as a pilot in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area during the periods October 9 to November 23, 1942 and January 1-30, 1943. During an extremely tense and dangerous period when our positions on Guadalcanal Island were ominously threatened, First Lieutenant Presley, while serving a six week's tour of duty, participated in numerous engagements with hostile forces and, by his expert marksmanship, shot down three enemy planes. In the latter period, despite the dangers involved in combat with numerically superior forces, he skillfully operated his fighter on offensive patrols and accounted for the destruction of two hostile craft. On one occasion, when ten dive bombers and twelve Zero-type fighters attacked a Task Force, for which his patrol were serving as protective cover, First Lieutenant Presley displayed superb airmanship in shooting one bomber out of the sky and contributing to the severe losses inflicted on the enemy. His relentless fighting spirit was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

SECOND LIEUTENANTS THOMAS H. MANN, JR., USMCR; AND JOSEPH L. NARR, USMCR:

"For extraordinary heroism as pilots attached to a Marine Fighting squadron in combat against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area from September 25 to November 12, 1942. Despite numerically superior Japanese forces, they skillfully pressed home their attacks against the enemy, shooting down 16 hostile aircraft, thereby contributing to the security of our forces in that area. Their cool courage, splendid airmanship and indomitable fighting spirit were an inspiration to all the members of their squadron and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

SECOND LIEUTENANTS ROBERT L. MANNING, USMC; AND WILFRED V. MICHAUD, USMC:

"For extraordinary heroism while serving with the First Parachute Battalion, First Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the invasion of Gavutu, Solomon Islands, on August 7, 1942. When the progress of their unit was retarded by heavy opposition, both men led courageous attacks against heavily fortified gun emplacements from which deadly fire was emanating. Their daring aggressiveness and valiant devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

MARINE GUNNER HENRY B. HAMILTON, USMC:

"For extraordinary heroism as pilot of a combat plane attached to a Marine Aircraft Wing in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area on October 18 and 21, 1942. Taking part in an aerial engagement against the enemy on October 18, Marine Gunner

Hamilton personally destroyed two hostile fighter planes and one heavy bomber. Three days later his flight of eight planes attacked twenty-seven Japanese aircraft and shot down six. His courage, skill, and indomitable fighting spirit were a never-failing source of confidence to his comrades and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

CORPORAL RALPH W. FORDYCE, USMC:

"For extraordinary heroism while serving with the First Parachute Battalion, First Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the invasion of Gavutu, Solomon Islands, on August 7, 1942. Fighting with skill and determination against three Japanese, Corporal Fordyce overpowered and killed one of them and, seizing the dead enemy's weapon, he shot and mortally wounded the others. Persisting in his daring and relentless tactics, he later charged through the entrance to a hostile dugout, attacked the occupants with a sub-machine gun, and inflicted fatal wounds on five of the enemy, including their officer. His gallant fighting spirit and personal valor, maintained despite imminent peril to his own life, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF SECOND DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANCIS P. MULCAHY, USMC:

During the period, from December 29, 1942 to February 15, 1943, of continuous battling for control of the sea lanes to Guadalcanal, Brigadier General Mulcahy planned and directed the operations of the air units with such superb professional ability and unrelenting determination as to frustrate the enemy efforts to transport desperately needed troops and supplies to the island.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

MAJOR GENERAL HOLLAND M. SMITH, USMC:

Major General Smith laid the groundwork for amphibious training of practically all American units in his position of great responsibility as Commanding General of the Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, and later as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area, and Commanding General of the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet.

LEGION OF MERIT

COLONEL WILLIAM J. WHALING, USMC:

Requesting and receiving permission to organize a scout-sniper detachment, Colonel Whaling supervised the training of selected groups in scouting, stalking, and ambush tactics, affording his men practical experience by leading them on hazardous missions deep in hostile territory.

LIEUTENANT COLONELS THOMAS G. ENNIS, USMC; AND SAMUEL C. TAXIS, USMC:

As commanding officers during action against enemy Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, they performed their duties with brilliant professional ability and gallant leadership.

MAJOR GEORGE A. SARLES, USMC:

In control of all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps air units, he planned and directed innumerable vital missions of bombardment, dive bombing, torpedo attacks, searches and anti-submarine patrols against Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands from September 23 to November 15, 1942, which resulted in great destruction of enemy bases, personnel and material.

GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF SECOND SILVER STAR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JULIAN P. BROWN, USMC:

Participating in the raids on Marshall, Gilbert, Wake, and Marcus Islands as well as the Battle of Midway, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, under constant threat of attack by air and submarines, skillfully performed his duties throughout protracted operations in hostile waters, in immediate proximity to enemy territory and bases.

SILVER STAR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT G. HUNT, USMC:

With complete disregard for his safety, Lieutenant Colonel Hunt personally directed the extremely hazardous operations of his leading company in forcing a crossing of the upper Matanikau River.

MAJOR ROBERT A. BLACK, USMC:

Despite frequent hostile air attacks and shelling by Japanese surface vessels, Major Black worked repeatedly in exposed positions on Guadalcanal to effect emergency repairs to the communications system linking all ground and air units on the island.

MAJOR WILLIAM A. KENGLA, USMC:

On Guadalcanal, January 19, 1943, when his battalion, attacking along the Coast Road, suddenly encountered withering and demoralizing fire from concealed enemy forces, Major Kengla, with inspiring leadership, directed the laborious advance of his troops in the face of desperate hostile resistance.

MAJOR WOOD B. KYLE, USMC:

Refusing to be evacuated when he was wounded in action during the vital offensive operations of his battalion on Guadalcanal from November 1, 1942 to January 14, 1943, Major Kyle assumed command of the battalion after the commanding officer had been forced to withdraw as a result of serious wounds, and with keen initiative and aggressive leadership successfully drove through relentless Japanese resistance to capture his objective.

CAPTAIN CHARLES M. FREEMAN, USMC:

Escorting our bombers over an enemy task force, Captain Freeman and his flight destroyed nine Japanese planes, and, by severely strafing hostile antiaircraft batteries, diminished their fire to a point where our bombers could fly in and obtain direct hits on one cruiser and three destroyers.

SECOND LIEUTENANT RALPH C. FREY, JR., USMCR:

Second Lieutenant Frey, although critically wounded, engaged with his comrades in hand-to-hand combat with the Japanese on Guadalcanal on the night of September 14, 1942 and succeeded in establishing his platoon in a strong point from which it carried on until daylight.

SECOND LIEUTENANT HARRY M. TULLY, USMC:

Second Lieutenant Tully fought a lone mission for two days and nights against hidden Japanese on Gavutu whose dangerously accurate fire menaced the Marines and retarded the thorough occupation of the island.

SECOND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM L. WOODRUFF, USMC:

Second Lieutenant Woodruff was an inspiration to his men, working with tenacious devotion to duty during periods of intense enemy gun fire from both ship and land-based artillery on Guadalcanal from September 25 to November 2, 1942.

GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF SECOND DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

CAPTAIN HERMAN HANSEN, JR., USMC:

Piloting an unarmored plane which was also without armament, Captain Hansen performed eighty highly significant reconnaissance and photographic flights over Guadalcanal, Malaita, and Santa Isabel Islands.

DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

MAJOR ANDREW B. GALATIAN, JR., USMC; AND MICHAEL SAMPAS, USMC:

Constantly mapping enemy territory in the Solomon Islands Area, without aid of fighter cover, and in the face of heavy antiaircraft and some aerial opposition, Majors Galatian and Sampas persevered in their task of reconnaissance, gaining valuable information concerning the enemy.

CAPTAINS OTIS V. CALHOUN, JR., USMC; ROBERT B. FRASER USMC; KENNETH J. KIRK, JR., USMCR; JOHN M. MASSEY USMC; AND NATHAN T. POST, JR., USMC:

Courageously and determinedly, these men contributed to the dissipation of enemy forces in the Solomon Islands Area with their repeated flight missions.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS ALEXANDER R. BERRY, USMCR; WILLIAM W. DEAN, USMCR; WAYNE W. LAIRD, USMCR; GLEN A. LOBAN, USMCR; BRUCE C. PELTO, USMCR; AND AUSTIN WIGGINS, JR., USMCR:

With great courage and expert marksmanship, these pilots inflicted several damaging operations in the Solomon Islands Area, contributing a large measure to the success of numerous missions against enemy aircraft, shore installations, and surface vessels.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS ROBERT R. FINCH, USMCR; HOWARD G. FITZPATRICK, USMCR; SAMUEL B. FOLSON, JR., USMCR; ARTHUR O. HELLERUDE, USMCR; GEORGE B. HERLIHY, USMCR; WILLIAM H. HRONEK, JR., USMCR; RUSSELL L. JANSON, USMCR; ROBERT E. KELLY, USMCR; CHARLES E. KOLLMANN, USMCR; EDGAR P. MCBRYDE JR., USMCR; JOHN H. MCENIRY, JR., USMCR; JOHN B.

MAAS, JR., USMCR; ELLIS E. MATHESON, USMCR; ARTHUR N. NEHF, JR., USMCR; HERBERT A. PETERS, USMCR; ROY M. A. RUDDELL, USMCR; JOHN SKINNER, JR., USMCR; AND JACOB A. O. STUB, JR., USMCR:

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
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Lessons of Tarawa*

IN the fighting at Tarawa we have learned some lessons which we can profit by. We have long known that no amphibious landing can be made and a beachhead established without heavy artillery and air support. But more than this is required. The entire area from which the counterattack may develop must be softened up preliminary to invasion, in order to prevent excessive losses. Any invasion attempt must be supported by sea forces, but no sea force, including naval air, can afford to spend its full effort in the softening-up process so long as the Jap fleet remains a threat. The 16-inch gun is a powerful weapon in a sea fight, but its effectiveness in destroying unknown and sunken enemy pillboxes, by direct or high-angle gunfire, is not great. Moreover, the 16-inch gun cannot be fired an unlimited number of times without relining for the sake of accuracy of fire. For constant air and night artillery bombardment it is possible that a slow-speed light ship, armed with mortars, could be usefully employed.

In the Gilberts, the Japs have had only the time since they entered the war to perfect their defense. Yet, without sea or air support, their land forces exacted a heavy toll before the islands fell. In the Marshalls and Carolines they have had long years to perfect defenses, and amphibious operations against key spots might be a long, costly job. Very likely the Japs have planned for just such a move on our part. However, there are key spots in the Pacific outflanking the Carolines, just as the Gilberts outflank the Marshalls. They would be extremely valuable to us because they have sufficient ground space from which heavy bombers of the Liberator and Fortress types could operate efficiently, putting the entire chain from Ponape to Palau under a heavy air bombardment. These key spots are Manus and New Ireland in the New Guinea area, and Guam and Saipan in the Marianas. From Guam to Truk, the round-trip air flight is close to 1,100 miles, and from Manus Island, around 1,250. Moreover, Manus Island has a fair harbor for fleet operations.

*Admiral William V. Pratt, in *Newsweek*, December 13, 1943.

The Japanese Predicament*

THE Japanese nation is suffering from a surfeit of almost everything that it considers good. Japan takes pride in her empire and her army; today the army is active and the empire is large, so large that materials, manpower, and food are abundant. Many Japanese are ready to die for their Emperor; today they have increasing opportunities to display their devotion. Many Japanese are uncritically willing to follow their government; today they have plenty of rules to obey. Abundance is Japan's problem.

For it is very possible to get sick from having to eat too much in too short a time, and Japan's problems are in part the consequence of being forced to bolt her empire too quickly. Had the war proceeded at the pace Japan wished,

there would be no problem. Japan won her empire promptly; she wanted only the leisure to consume it. But the pace of war has accelerated. Allied action has become so frequent and so intense that, unlike 1942 when battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway stood out against a pattern of comparative inaction, there is now unspectacular but almost continuous action. There is a front. Furthermore, there is every indication that the skirmishes of today will grow into the major battles of tomorrow. Japan must build up stockpiles of materials against the day when the resources of her new empire are no longer firmly in her hands; at the same time she must increase her fighting effort. But it is impossible to have a war and enjoy it too. Japan finds herself confronted by a series of dilemmas, each of which helps make the others worse. . . . There is no question, of course, that Japan has plenty of raw materials, for she has exclusive access to areas that once supplied the world. The conquered areas are as rich in oil and metals as Japan proper is impoverished. But raw materials mean nothing without ships. . . . That is Japan's chief dilemma and the key to her worries. If she gathers the full wealth of her empire, she cannot supply her troops; then she loses the empire. If she supplies her troops, she cannot exploit the empire; then she has not enough to supply her troops and to feed her people and her machines.

What It Takes To Bomb Germany*

THE writer labels this article a "story of peculiarities indigenous to the pilots and combat crew members of the Fortresses flying out of England." Specifically, it is a shrewd, penetrating character study of a young squadron commander whom he calls "Cleve," and who in an exaggerated way was typical of all the chip-on-the-shoulder, spit-in-your-eye pilots who do the best work in the Army Air Force. The writer first saw "Cleve" when he was showing off by handling a 4-engine bomber like a fighter. When scolded for the stunt, Cleve—who was a major—boasted that he could do even better with his B-17.

Says the writer: "I discovered that the other squadron commanders, flight commanders, and pilots and gunners were almost as individualistic as Cleve. They had the wrong attitude. Surely the Germans and the Japs would have considered their conduct very bad. They voiced their opinions loudly and often, criticized their seniors freely, followed many instructions very far from the letter, and were perfectly capable of passing up a general with their hands in their pockets. They had to a high degree the traditional American lack of awe for authority." Then he adds significantly: "They were winning the war."

The writer comments on the metamorphosis of this pilot, who had been a sensitive, almost self-effacing kind of a boy before leaving the States. The writer follows through with a list of the pilot's stunts, moments when he was dangerously reckless with his plane, as well as his own life. Yet his squadron had implicit faith in him, and he had the

*From *Fortune*, December 1943.

*Lt. Colonel Birne Lay, Jr., in *Harper's*, November, 1943.



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Every penny counts — At FEDERAL, where communications equipment is made for our armed forces, an idea is spreading. For every axis plane reported shot down, employees drop an extra coin in a box — for extra bonds for extra bombs and bombers.

Thundering out of the overcast
Like a midnight express
The first wave of bombers
Spots the twinkling steel mill . . .
Blasts it into a roaring volcano
As the hinges of hell open
And fill the sky with daggers of light
And streaking, shrieking meteors of ack ack

Silhouetted against this inferno
Another target looms
And the young voice of the squadron leader
Speaking over the interplane radiotelephone
Calmly directs the next wave of bombers
To the doomed power plant ahead . . .

* * * * *
Shuddering under the impact
Of flak and fighter fire
The rocketing war birds
Level off into their "run"
And the pale bombardier catches his breath
Like he used to when he called signals
In the games back at "State"
As he whispers . . . 'Bombs . . . away!'

Did he say "bombs" . . . or "bonds"?

* * * * *
Down they hurtle
The bonds
That have been converted into TNT . . .
Your milkman's bond
Your stenographer's bond
The bond of the woman who cleans your office
Of the neighbor whose boy was in today's battle
And YOUR bond . . .
Your EXTRA bond . . .
Is THAT there, too?

* * * * *
Here at I. T. & T.
And its associate companies
Communications equipment and services
Are only part of the job . . .
Every man and woman here
Is buying war bonds
Extra war bonds
To back the attack
And bring our sons and brothers
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knack of handling them perfectly. For instance; on the flight to bomb Regensburg when about two hundred enemy fighters attacked, Cleve lost three out of a total of six ships in his squadron. He held his position in the low squadron, even when fighter after fighter pounced on him with 20mm cannon and rockets. They killed his radio operator, injured his top-turret gunner and bombardier, shot away his nose-guns, severed his hydraulic system, shot his rudder cables away on one side, and knocked his No. 3 engine out, setting it on fire. The writer, watching from an upper formation, wondered how he could possibly make the target, and also why he didn't bail out while there was still time. The crew wanted to, and made ready to abandon ship. They were stopped only when Cleve said: "You son of a bitch. You sit there and *take it*." The brutal words sobered the crew, returned them to their guns. Cleve's Fortress plugged on, bombed Regensburg, followed the returning planes back over the Alps, struggled over the Mediterranean and landed at the base.

The writer points out that most men would have cracked up after that. But early next morning Cleve and his crew were working frantically on their plane, getting it ready for a bombing mission against Bordeaux. He had chosen that in preference to a seat in a transport back to England. As the writer watched, Cleve taunted him with: "Afraid to fly with me?" The writer says: "Suddenly I saw in this American boy the inner core of whatever has made America great in the past and will keep her great in the future. I saw through the front that he was putting up—the shield of hardness and callousness and recklessness. Cleve and all the other Cleves who fly bombers against the Luftwaffe had been again and again through the soul-searing experience of being divided between duty and instinct of self-preservation. Duty had won. Faced with a bitterly tough assignment, he had made himself tougher and harder than the job by means of that resiliency and adaptability which a boy growing up in America commonly acquires, but which his goose-stepping opponents cannot duplicate."

The Vanishing Jap*

IT cannot be said that the public mind is overborne by the prospect of a long war against Japan when the war against Hitler is over. And we cannot say that this *ejunie* transformation has surprised us. The redoubtable Jap of 1941, the invincible Jap of 1942 has given way to the vanishing Jap of 1943. . . . Every day General MacArthur issues communiqués as long as the Russians'; for nigh on two years the American Navy Department issues news of Jap ships sunk and damaged; and the humble citizen at home dutifully chalks up every authoritative claim. Adding these up he cannot resist the conclusion that the formidable Japs are so no longer. According to the liberal estimates of the American naval authorities the Japanese had 18 battleships built and building at the outbreak of the war. The Americans have sunk 3 and damaged 10. The Japanese had 18 aircraft carriers. The Americans have sunk six, probably sunk one, and damaged nine. The Japanese had 56 cruisers. The Americans, according to their claims, have sunk 34, probably sunk 4 and

damaged 68. The Japanese had 156 destroyers. The Americans have sunk 76, probably sunk 18, and damaged 82. . . . With such losses . . . either Japanese military and naval power must have been very much weakened—or if this is not so, as our own authorities suggest, then General MacArthur and the American Navy Department are conducting—not war—but election propaganda with the Jap Navy. Is it not time that the public received a really authoritative appreciation of the prospects of the war in the Far East?

The Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels

This tribute to the services of the aborigines of the South Pacific was written by an unidentified Australian soldier and published in a Brisbane newspaper.

MANY a mother in Australia, when the busy day is done, Sends a prayer to the Almighty for the keeping of her son;

Asking that an angel guide him, and to bring him safely back—

Now we see those prayers are answered, on the Owen Stanley track.

Tho' they haven't any halos, only holes slashed through the ear,

And their faces marked with tattoos and with scratch pins in their hair,

Bringing back the badly wounded, just as steady as a hearse, Using leaves to keep the rain off, and as gentle as a nurse; Slow and careful in bad places on the awful mountain track,

And the look upon their faces makes us think that Christ was black.

Not a move to hurt the carried, as they treat him like a saint, It's a picture worth recording, that an artist's yet to paint. Many a lad will see his mother, and the husbands wee 'uns and wives,

Just because the Fuzzy Wuzzies carried them to save their lives

From mortar or machine-gun fire or a chance surprise attack, To safety and care of doctors at the bottom of the track.

May the mothers in Australia, when they offer up a prayer, Mention these impromptu angels with fuzzy wuzzy hair.

"Cat Fever" Doesn't Come From Cats

To clarify reports of an outbreak of a "tropical disease" described as "cat fever" at the Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery explains that the infection is the ordinary common cold. Washington, Quantico, and New River have also been hit by the mild but annoying ailment.

"Cat fever" is merely a Navy contraction of acute catarrhal fever, which is the service term for minor upper respiratory conditions, chiefly the common cold, according to Commander T. J. Carter, (MC) USN, officer in charge of the Division of Preventive Medicine.


Published reports had incorrectly described "cat fever" as being of tropical origin.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Any books reviewed may be obtained at publishers' prices from The Marine Corps Association, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

TARGET: GERMANY. By Army Air Force Officials. New York: Simon and Schuster, in coöperation with *Life* magazine. 121 pps. \$1.00.

THIS book is the official story of the VIIIth Bomber Command's first year of combat operations in Europe and is a testament to American men and machines and an American idea. In the past twelve months, the men and machines have proved themselves against the fiercest aerial opposition in the world. Thanks to their record, the American idea—high-altitude daylight precision bombing—has come through a period of doubt and experimentation to triumphant vindication." It shows frankly all the complicating factors that go into strategic bombing—what the big bombing raids mean in terms of men and machines on the ground as well as in the air. It appears to deliberately try to debunk many of our air power enthusiasts. For the first time, the real costs of this form of air power are made known to the public. It is the reply to many of the futile theories and "win-the-war-easy" plans of the crack-pot air strategists. The authors admit that the whole daylight heavy-bombing experiment was, for a long time, on trial and its success was by no means assured.

The VIIIth had to learn air warfare the hard way and from the ground up. It took many beatings during the experimental stages. The frank statement of the case of strategic bombing in this book was long overdue; the air enthusiasts have perhaps already oversold the nation to air power and our great masses of planes may have to wait for the ground, sea, and amphibious forces to capture the necessary bases from which air power can strike at the vitals of our enemies; if, indeed, they do not have to wait until the tools and methods are perfected with which to take those bases.

The most informative chapter in the book is one entitled "Men, Mud and Machines." It drives home the basic factors of time, cost, logistics, and other considerations in no uncertain terms. "Behind every bomber is an airdrome, from which it sets out and to which it must return. Behind every airdrome is a base that houses the men who work on the airdrome from which the bomber flies. Behind every base lie months of planning, thousands of man-hours of labor, and millions of dollars of matériel and equipment—all of which must be expended before the men can move into the base and the base can run the airdrome and the airdrome can put the bomber into the air."

Each group of approximately 50 heavy bombers of the VIIIth Air Force has its own base. Each requires about 2,500 officers and men to fly, service and repair the planes, and carry on the usual maintenance and housekeeping affairs of a post. Each group has its corps of specialists—20 or more on the average to each plane—most of whom must have had months or even years of previous training. Each bomber base is built at the cost of about \$5,000,000 and has most of the facilities of one of our first class airports, plus living accommodations for all personnel who operate and maintain its planes. Each base requires approximately 640,000 square yards of concrete—enough to build a road 18 feet wide and 60 miles long—400 buildings and all kinds of public utilities. The vast outlay of tools and matériel to build such an airbase can readily be appraised only by the experienced construction engineer. "Warehouses, thea-

ters, churches, barracks, offices, and machine shops have to be built. Water, electrical, and sewage systems must be laid down." All of this has to be done in a country extremely short of man power and materials in the face of priorities and mud. It took ten months to complete the first United States airdrome in England.

But we have been talking only of one base. To make 1,000-plane attacks the order of the day, which must be done to win over the Luftwaffe and break the industrial strength of Germany, we must have fifty such bases and approximately 2,500 planes to allow for necessary reserves and planes undergoing repair. In three and a half years of war, the island (England) has become a checkerboard of landing fields. But with the steady growth of the RAF and the U. S. Air Force, the demand for space has exceeded the supply, and the problem of apportioning the materials, the transportation space, and the construction equipment has been a major factor in meeting the schedules. It would appear from the estimates given that approximately two hundred thousand or more men—enough for ten ground divisions and auxiliary troops—will be required to keep raids of that size going, in as rapid succession as weather permits.

But this is not the end of the effort. The bomber command must have the support of a vast fighter command, ground-air support command, and service of supplies. The logistic support required in overseas shipping and production facilities in the United States, as well as in England, are known only to the experts. When thousands of tons of bombs are dropped deep in the enemy's country, millions of gallons of gasoline will be consumed and must be constantly replaced. "If bombs fell into a pasture, killing no one, maiming no factory, the gigantic size of the effort would be wasted. Even where the bombs fall squarely upon selected targets the element of resistance must be understood. In general the will to rebuild, to get on with living and fighting is greater in Germans, as in the English, than is the will to quail and quit. Cities have a custom of refusing to stay prostrate."

However, only a small part of the book is devoted to the more or less ponderous logistic and operational problems. The opening chapter, a masterpiece of human interest writing, is called "Mission 95." It gives the reader the step by step measures that are taken to get a great air raid underway, make its approach to the target, drop its bombs on a target in German-held Europe, and make the best of trying to get back to their bases. This chapter, as well as several others, give vivid accounts of battles in the sky where the temperature is normally 40 below. Few of us have any idea what is necessary even to keep alive at 5 miles up, much less to be engaged in battles. The book is rich in the experiences of heroic men who vividly tell their own tales.

The authors give a brief but interesting history of the VIIIth Bomber Command from its beginning early in 1942. It grew very slowly for many months. It too had to wait for the great plane-building program to get underway. As the bomber command grew, its many problems were solved—all too often the hard way. Many theories had to be tested and methods perfected.

The book is unusually frank in its discussion of the tactical

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methods used by both our air corps and the enemy in his attempts to stop the destructive raids. The Germans know most of the effective counter measures and are making an all-out effort to stop the terribly destructive daylight bombing raids. At times the enemy was perfectly informed beforehand and, as a result, our bombers took terrible beatings. Raids made all the way from Norway to the south of Europe are described in some detail.

One of the most interesting chapters is devoted to the defenses against daylight raids which have been set up by the Germans. A general picture of the German detector system and the controls of their fighter command is given, and an example of how it functions during a raid. This explanation of the German defense system leaves no doubt but that Germany is suffering heavily under the bombing raids; otherwise they would not make such a gigantic effort to break them up.

Summing up, "What the year proved, what it added up to, cannot be done in a phrase. The official figures: 16,977 tons of bombs dropped; 2,050 enemy fighters destroyed; 472 bombers and 4,481 men missing; do not give the complete picture—any more than Goebbels' mid-August understatement that the war in the air was Germany's most serious problem. No one hero story can convey all the heroism, no one example of bomb damage can indicate the tremendous cumulative strain on Nazi industrial resources. The scale is too large for easy simplification."

To the question, "Will bombing win the war?" the authors decline to give a direct answer, but comment: "The results of 124 attacks, of course, varied. A few were relative failures, other moderate successes, and some prodigious triumphs. Fortunately, the improvement in the bombing which came about as the first year's campaign progressed placed most of the notable successes in the second six months of operations—when targets of more importance were attacked."

Target: Germany is the first of many official anonymous reports on the progress of the war which will likely be published in this country. Comment has been made in the *GAZETTE* on the official writing programs that all the services have embarked upon. The Air Corps with its staff of competent writers has set a fast pace for the rest of us to follow.

C. H. METCALF.

• • • •

BOOT. By Corporal Gilbert P. Bailey, USMCR. Columbia, S. C.: Bostick & Thornley. 163 pps. \$3.00.

A FORMER newspaper editor from Indiana, Corporal Bailey, has given us a good picture of the training of the recruits of the United States Marine Corps at Parris Island, S. C.

It is intensive training from early until late. The platoon is kept together and the men have no time for anything except the things that *must* be learned. All the work is done under the guidance and supervision of the Drill Instructor. He is a three-in-one—tankmaster, instructor, and counselor. He tells them how and shows them how to do the task at hand.

Into the eight weeks must be squeezed all the drilling necessary to strengthen flabby muscles and teach slow-moving boys how to move with rapidity and precision. They must learn how to handle, take apart and reassemble their rifles. These must be cleaned and must become a part of the man. His use of the rifle will be tested on the range, after long days of coaching by the experts who have taught thousands of experts. He learns to respect the weapons he must depend on for protection. Then there is the bayonet practice and the other forms of hand-to-hand combat.

The boot is well cared for and fed. He goes on the double from the time he arrives until he leaves. Every ounce of his

strength is needed for his duties and it is one of the prices he pays for his membership in a proud fighting fraternity, with a personality and an *esprit* all its own.

The illustrations are excellent photography. The story tells the experiences of hundreds of thousands of Marines who have gone through Parris Island. To many of these, as well as to their friends and families, the book will hold a lasting charm.

C. H. M.

• • • •

THESE ARE THE GENERALS. With an introduction by Walter Millis. Alfred A. Knopf: New York. 259 pps. \$2.50.

PERHAPS this book might better be titled *These Are Some of the Generals*, for it is noteworthy for its omissions as well as for the sketches of generals included in it. Most of the articles appeared originally in the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Collier's*, and *Life*—some of them as long ago as 1941. For example, the sketch of General MacArthur by Clare Boothe Luce was written before Pearl Harbor and, while a few paragraphs have been added to "bring it up to date," it has a strangely unreal pre-war ring to it.

The only Marine Corps general represented is our new Commandant, Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who is competently described in a twelve-page chapter by Leigh White. This is, in fact, one of the best sketches in the book. No mention is made of Generals Holcomb, Geiger, Woods, and Mulcahy. After all, General Holcomb was expanding the Marine Corps several times over, and the other three were making the air hot for the Japs, while many of the Army generals described were as yet preparing their troops for combat. And General Holland Smith, also unmentioned, was, in the words of his recent citation, "[laying] the groundwork for amphibious training of practically all American units."

Army generals described include General Marshall, Chief of Staff; Generals Eisenhower, Arnold, Clark, Patton, and Chennault of the fighting fronts; and Generals McNair, McNarney, and Somervell of the equally important training, planning, and supply fronts. There are seventeen biographic sketches in all.

CLIFFORD P. MOREHOUSE.

• • • •

MARINES AT WAR. Edited by Aimee Crane. Introduction by Brigadier General Robert L. Denig, USMC. 128 pps. New York: Hyperion Press—Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00.

MARINES AT WAR is an interesting pictorial presentation of the thoughts of fighting men who have looked with sympathetic eyes upon the tragedy, comedy, and routine of war. As explained in General Denig's introduction, many of the drawings and sketches were made under incredibly difficult conditions of combat. The accompanying biographical sketches of the artists reveal many of them to be very young and relatively untrained in the techniques of artistic expression. Nevertheless, many of the pictures indicate keen insight and a profound understanding of humankind on the part of the artist. Many also seem to this reviewer to have been well and skillfully done.

A wide variety of subjects is covered by the selections. From the good-natured satire of Technical Sergeant Donahue's "Combat Correspondents" (page 77) to the unadorned grimness of Major Dickson's "Here It Comes" (page 83), almost the gamut of Marine Corps life in the field is presented.

A few pictures seem worthy of special mention, although every one deserves careful examination. The Unknown Artist of Guadalcanal's hasty sketch of the stretcher party (page 74) epitomizes the gallant and terrible activity on that island and at the same time reveals a startling power of expression. Jack-



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

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son's "Portrait of a Marine" (page 39) depicts the strength and determination typical of the youth in our ranks today. Laidman's watercolor "At the Edge of Henderson Field" (page 81) is excellent in its composition, color, and serenity.

Some of the selections are not truly representative of the artists. A few such cases are cited, the quality of whose work varies greatly in some instances. Ellsworth's sketch of "The Line, New Zealand" (page 50) conveys a definite feeling of the wetness of rain and mud, whereas his watercolor entitled "Bad News" (page 63) seems crudely done and somewhat artificial in its effect. Laidman's "Police Detail" (page 109) appears trivial beside his virile "Indian Marine" (page 102). Dickson's "Listening Post" (page 49) is self-conscious and theatrical when compared with the heart-searing realism of "The Last 100 Yards" (page 58).

It also seems to the reviewer that a more judicious choice might have been made of pictures to be reproduced in color. Perhaps if some of the artists had been represented by fewer selections, and a more generous assortment of talent offered, greater interest would have been attracted to this book. A complete table of contents or an index would make the book much more convenient to handle.

To offset these unfavorable comments, the attention of the reader is called to the extraordinary merit of Sergeant Donahue's excellent oil painting of "A Marine" (page 62). Accuracy of detail and beauty of composition make this the outstanding picture of the collection. It presents in a superlative manner the finest characteristics of a Marine in combat.

L. C. KENDALL.


THE NAVY AT WAR; Paintings and Drawings by Combat Artists: Lt. Commander Griffith Baily Cole, USNR; Lt. Dwight C. Sheplar, USNR; Lt. William F. Draper, USNR; Lt. (jg) Mitchell Jamieson, USNR; and Lt. Albert R. Murray, USNR. Commentary by Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: William Morrow & Co. 159 pp. \$4.00.

THE work of five painter reporters who were sent on active duty with sea and ground forces and a knowing commentary by Hanson Baldwin has been assembled into an inspiring folio of our naval action. Through the media of water color, oil, and charcoal the articulate hand of the artist has caught the thrilling spirit and action of ships, men and planes in the struggle of war. Here each combat artist has exhibited at once a predilection for realism and a keen understanding of his subject. Thus we have a collection of paintings that is almost completely independent of any text.

The first pages of the book deal with the events in the North Atlantic during the months before Pearl Harbor. With tense and literal linear pattern Commander Cole has depicted the brave struggle of our men-of-war engaged in protecting the passage of "aid short of war" to the beleaguered countries. This is followed by a dramatic composition, designed by the same artist as a panoramic mural, wherein he describes with characteristic attention to detail the holocaust of December 7th.

The body of the book carries an exciting chronology of naval action—the historic episodes of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the land-sea-and-sky battles of the Solomons campaign, task forces and flat-tops, troop movements to North Africa, the stoic work of the Construction Battalions in the Aleutians, and finally the amphibious operations in the Sicilian invasion.

Lieutenant Murray has contributed a number of colorful paintings dealing with the early chapters of a declared war—



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The crisp water colors of Lieutenant Sheplar display the quick movement of our destroyers as they protect the hulking convoys to the combat zone. Lieutenant Jamieson is equally concerned with the subject of Atlantic and Pacific convoys. In an illuminating sequence of pictures he records with line and brush the shepherded Liberty ships, tankers, and freighters, and the men toiling on endless watch to load them. Nothing is described in them exactly, but everything is suggested.

Lieutenant Draper's oil paintings of the Aleutian campaign catch the bleak atmosphere of the Arctic. With ample brush he records the sporadic series of air raids, sea skirmishes, scouting missions, and patrols that were so doggedly accomplished through fog and williwaw.

Cole with the exacting clarity of a draftsman shows us streaking PT's and Zeros in mortal combat, heavy cruisers and giant enemy carriers at Midway belching great clouds of smoke and flame into the skies. Again Sheplar's fluid water color technique and definite talent for briefing and putting across an idea in its simplest terms, scores the highest spot in the book with his visual impressions of offensive operations of our Marine battalions in the Solomons. On the other hand, Jamieson, offering his renderings of action in the Mediterranean theater, seems to find that the contingency of realistic action demands less concentration upon single figures than the weaving together of scores of figures in a coherent pattern of movement.

D. C. KLINE.

TO ALL HANDS, AN AMPHIBIOUS ADVENTURE. By Lieutenant John Mason Brown, USNR. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company (Whittlesey House). 248 pps. \$2.75.

THIS is one of the most literate and literary books yet to come out of this war. John Mason Brown is well known as an author and dramatic critic. He has now proved that he can write as interestingly about naval operations in wartime as about a first night on Broadway.

The book is unusual in that it consists of a series of daily broadcasts given over the loud-speaker system of the flagship of Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, who was in command of one of the Amphibious Forces taking part in the invasion of Italy. The addresses were written on order. Lieutenant Brown was given the bridge as his battle station and a microphone as a weapon. His assignment was to broadcast a message to all hands every day and, in time of battle, to give them a play-by-play account of the action. He did both with a remarkable degree of success, and it is significant that these talks, prepared for the immediate occasion, were of sufficient permanent value to be published in book form.

On the way across the Atlantic, Brown spoke to the men on a variety of subjects. He commented on the daily news; he described the convoy of which his ship was a part; he quoted Shakespeare to men whose reading had largely been confined to the comic strip—and they liked it; he talked about ancient Roman civilization, American plumbing, and German psychology. And when the action was hottest, he gave a vivid eyewitness picture of it to the men who were sweating below.

I quote two paragraphs from his chapter on "The Sealed Ship" which summarize in a clear, succinct manner the objectives for which all of us in military services are fighting:

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we have had to endure; happy in spite of the threatening days so near at hand; happy because as men we find ourselves included within the parenthesis of our own times. In our hearts we know that we could not have expected to share in the future unless we had shared in this unmerry and appalling present.

"When I mention the advantages we gain by sharing in the present, I do not mean those vulgar advantages I may seem to mean. I do not mean the low professional or political gains which may be ours because we happen to have been in uniform in the right places at the proper times. I do not mean the *camaraderie* of the legionnaire-in-convention-met which may yet be our fate. I do not mean those tall and ever-growing tales we will have to tell, which will serve our grandchildren as sedatives. I mean the simple satisfaction we will always have, so long as we have life, of having been included emotionally and experientially in the major challenge of our time; of having tried to play our fractional parts; of being able to enjoy the pleasanter world we trust will emerge from all this regrettable horror, with that pleasure which is ours when, after panting up a difficult mountain, we look down on the valley beneath us and relish an earned view."

Here is a war book that is vivid without being profane, realistic without being obscene, and that gives a picture of American idealism in action. CLIFFORD P. MOREHOUSE.

◆◆◆
JAPAN'S MILITARY MASTERS. By Hillis Lory. The Viking Press: New York. 256 pps. \$2.50.

THIS book was published simultaneously in standard hard cover format and in the paper-bound Fighting Force series. We reviewed it last month in the paper-bound edition indicating that it "provides very essential information of a formidable enemy, and is, furthermore, a textbook on how not to train the army of a democracy." The book is one of first importance for understanding our Japanese enemy and many will want to have the book in this permanent binding for preservation and future reference.

◆◆◆
HONG KONG AFTERMATH. By Wenzell Brown. Smith & Durrell, Inc.: New York. 283 pps. \$2.75.

THIS is an eye-witness account of the author's experiences behind the barbed wires of Stanley Prison Camp in Hong Kong. The Book-of-the-Month Club News describes it as "above the general run of war books" and even "a book which rivals Dostoevsky's *Memoirs From A Dead House*." Certainly, it gives a vivid picture of life under the painful and humiliating circumstances of confinement in a Japanese concentration camp.

◆◆◆
TOMORROW WE FLY. By William B. Stout and Franklin M. Reck. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 160 pps. \$2.00.

THERE are plenty of books on air power these days—some of them well-informed, some ill-informed, some uninformed. Most of them deal with the vital and immediate subject of winning the war; this one is different. It assumes the winning of the war and attempts to give us a picture of peacetime air power after the war.

Tomorrow We Fly opens up new vistas of possibilities in the near future. Mr. Stout will be recalled as the inventor genius at Consolidated Vultee Aircraft who, years ago, designed the Ford trimotor plane and whose car of tomorrow was a feature of the New York World's Fair. In his opinion, air transporta-

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tion at the beginning of the war was in the same stage as the railways in 1900, while private aircraft were about as far developed as was the auto in 1905.

Some of the predictions in the book seem fantastic but the authors are experienced aeronautic engineers, not writers of fiction or creators of comic strips. Even if you believe only one-tenth of what you read in this book, it is well worth reading.

C. P. M.

1 1 1

MALTA EPIC. By Ian Hay. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 238 pps. \$3.00.

THIS is the story of the British occupation and defense of the vital air base in the center of the Mediterranean and of three historic sieges which the island fortress has endured.

The first part of the book is devoted to the present war. Like many other defensive positions, Malta was, at first, practically without aircraft and its defenses against air attacks had to be developed as the war progressed. The attempts to take the island from the British began early in the war and its garrison was, in the full sense of the term, beleaguered most of the time until after the Allies cleared the Germans from North Africa. Since then it has become an easily accessible important naval and air base.

The book contains stirring accounts of the many desperate fights put up to defend the island and resupply it.

The second half of the book is devoted entirely to the historic sieges of other days, since the founding of the fortress by the Knights of Malta.

C. H. M.

1 1 1

NAPOLEON AND MODERN WAR. By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, FA. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 154 pps. \$1.00.

NAPOLEON'S MAXIMS have been annotated by the author in the light of events since Napoleon's day and, to some extent, during the present war. Many of the comments are more or less obvious to the professional soldier; some of them might be disputed. For the deeper student of war, the notes are of considerable advantage in a study of Napoleon's maxims. The author has prepared a number of scholarly military works in recent years and articles particularly for the *Field Artillery Journal*.

C. H. METCALF.

1 1 1

WEATHER AROUND THE WORLD. By Ivan Ray Tannehill. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 200 pp. \$2.50.

THIS book was written for the general reading public by one of the world's leading authorities on the weather. It contains chapters on the various phenomena of weather such as is contained in the usual books on meteorology and then presents, in the major part of the book, weather conditions in all parts of the world. It stresses weather conditions over the sea but gives the reader definite ideas about weather in the land areas as well.

1 1 1

AMERICAN WARPLANES. By Elizabeth Mallet Conger. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 156 pp. \$2.00.

ELIZABETH MALLET CONGER has written an interesting book for children to help them in identifying various types of American Army and Navy planes. The volume, short, concise and in simple language, will probably start a good many family squabbles when air-minded parents discover that it is just as interesting to a grown-up as to a child. The book is profusely illustrated.

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In reporting this unprecedented amount of mail transhipment, the Director of Naval Communications expressed appreciation for the "excellent coöperation" extended by the U. S. Naval Air Transport Service, Army Air Forces, Army Transport Command and Army Postal Service in assisting with the carriage of the mail.

In comparison, 193,000 pounds of air mail were routed to overseas destinations by the Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, during October. Air mail routed overseas by the Fleet Post Office, New York, New York, for the same month totaled 177,000 pounds.

Slightly more than 524 pounds of the San Francisco figure accounted for 1,887,000 V-Mail letters; a little more than 154 pounds of the New York volume for 555,000 V-Mail letters. V-Mail takes up less than two per cent of the space and weight of regular mail.



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
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